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ABSTRACT 
 
Energy technologies and mixes have recently begun to change. For instance, there have 
been high recent growth rates in solar and wind energy consumption. This is important 
because affordable and clean energy is a crucial contributor to economic development. 
There are many impacts of energy on economic development through social, health, 
economic, and environmental channels. 
This thesis investigates the underlying macroeconomic and institutional factors that 
contribute to differences in energy use across countries. I focus on potentially important 
factors underlying energy outcomes that have not received prominent attention in the 
previous literature. I find that the size of financial capital stocks is an important 
contributor to energy mix differences across countries. The type of financial capital is 
also important. Both private credit from banks and domestic private debt have positive 
impacts on wind energy consumption. I do not find evidence of an effect of equity. I 
also find that citizen preferences matter for energy transitions. Solar energy use is 
greater in countries that have a higher proportion of citizens who perceive climate 
change to be a serious personal threat. Aggregate policy support and the specific policy 
of carbon pricing have also been important for solar energy. Another finding is that the 
effectiveness of governments is the most important governance aspect underlying 
electricity sector development in low- and middle-income countries.  
Sudden shocks can also have large impacts on both energy and economic development. 
There was a major fall in energy use for road transport following the 2010 earthquake 
in Haiti. This likely contributed to the transmission of a potentially permanent 
earthquake impact on gross domestic product. 
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This thesis also considers a potential causal relationship from electricity to economic 
growth. While the availability of electricity provides numerous benefits, I do not find 
evidence that initial electricity availability is a key factor explaining differences in 
subsequent national economic growth performance. 
The results suggest that indirect policies, other than just specific energy policies, could 
make a valuable contribution to energy sector outcomes. These indirect policies include 
financial policy that affects financial system size and structure, education to help shape 
energy preferences, institutional reform, and investment to foster resilience to natural 
disasters. Improved energy outcomes can then contribute to economic development 
outcomes including social, health, and environmental improvements.  
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Summary:  
This thesis includes five papers on energy economics and economic development. The 
first looks at the impact of financial capital on consumption of each of the main energy 
types. The following paper considers the roles of preferences and policies for adoption 
of solar and wind energy. The next paper investigates the importance of government 
effectiveness for the development of the electricity sectors of low- and middle-income 
countries. In the fourth paper, the macroeconomic impacts of the 2010 earthquake in 
Haiti are analysed, including changes in energy use. The final paper assesses if 
electricity availability is a precondition for subsequent economic growth, taking into 
account many other possible causes of economic growth. 
1.1 Context, purpose, and contribution 
Transformation of energy systems is the most important required change for limiting 
anthropogenic global warming to less than two degrees Celsius (DDPP 2015). The 
IPCC (2011) notes that consumption of fossil fuels accounts for more than half of global 
anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions, underlining the importance of changes in the 
mix of energy. The increasing cost competitiveness of renewable electricity sources 
presents an opportunity to accelerate the energy transition (Nature Energy 2017). The 
cost reductions in renewable energy may contribute to an ‘energy revolution’ 
(Bloomberg 2017). With global energy demand projected to increase by 30 percent to 
2040 (IEA 2016a), the importance of energy mix changes is magnified.  
The economic development implications of energy use are also profound. The United 
Nations Sustainable Development Goals recognise the importance of energy, with goal 
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7 focusing on ensuring access to affordable, reliable, sustainable, and modern energy 
for all. 
What factors matter for energy transitions and economic development? Economies and 
energy sectors are complex systems with many factors contributing to outcomes (Sachs 
2005). No one factor will be a panacea for economic growth (Easterly 2001). This thesis 
focuses on multiple factors that have received less attention in various contexts. For 
instance, Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) explain the crucial role of institutions in 
contributing to economic growth differences, but the importance of institutional aspects 
for electricity sector development has not received as much attention. Shocks can also 
devastate, especially when resilience is low. Diamond (2006) discusses the numerous 
institutional and environmental causes of low resilience in Haiti, prior to the 2010 
earthquake. Another factor is finance. 'Behind each great historical phenomenon there 
lies a financial secret' (Ferguson 2008, p. 4). Will the size and structure of financial 
sectors play a key role in the ongoing energy transition, or will energy outcomes be 
driven more directly by energy policies?  
In this thesis, the first paper aims to consider the role of financial capital for use of 
different energy types. I assess the impact on nine different energy types. I also consider 
different aspects of financial capital, including capital market financial sectors as well 
as capital from financial institutions such as banks. I consider the role of financial 
capital in both developing and high-income countries, as finance can be a constraint for 
new energy types in any country where there is high cost of capital for new and high-
risk technology. 
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I find that financial capital is particularly important for capital-intensive energy types 
and systems. For instance, countries with larger amounts of credit from private sector 
banks have larger 10-year increases in capital-intensive energy types such as wind and 
solar. In addition to bank credit, financial market capital such as private debt also plays 
a role in promoting capital-intensive energy types such as wind. 
Chapter 3 assesses the roles of preferences and policies in contributing to differences 
in national-level adoption of wind and solar energy. I consider the impact of aggregate 
policy support, in addition to analysis of specific policies that have been included in 
previous studies on renewable energy outcomes (Pfeiffer and Mulder 2013; Aguirre 
and Ibikunle 2014; Smith and Urpelainen 2014). I also consider the impact of 
preferences, which are an underlying factor that contributes to policy.  
I find that there are some differences and similarities in underlying factors promoting 
solar and wind energy. Carbon pricing is a specific policy type that appears to have 
supported both solar and wind energy. I find that holistic policy support has contributed 
to greater use of solar energy. Preferences for solar energy are also important for solar 
use, as are climate change perceptions. 
Governance attributes, such as government effectiveness, could be key underlying 
factors for electricity sector development, due to the large and complex role that 
governments play in electricity sectors. For instance, Onyeji et al. (2012) investigates 
the role of government effectiveness in contributing to electricity access for a sample 
of 60 developing countries. The aim of Chapter 4 of this thesis is to determine which 
governance attribute is the most important for the development of electricity sectors for 
a large sample of developing countries. Some contributions of Chapter 4 are the 
findings that government effectiveness is important for promoting electricity sector 
development in developing countries, and that government effectiveness has a more 
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important role than other governance attributes. An implication is that policies to 
increase government effectiveness could be useful before major reforms specifically 
focusing on electricity sectors. 
The final two chapters switch to considering economic outcomes, including the role of 
energy in contributing to economic growth. The human welfare consequences of 
economic growth have been described as staggering (Lucas 1988). The massive impact 
of economic growth on quality of life implies that it is important to try to identify causes 
of differences in economic outcomes, even though causal interpretations are difficult to 
establish. 
In Chapter 5, the purpose is to discover whether the 2010 earthquake in Haiti has had a 
permanent macroeconomic impact. Previous research suggests that national economies 
usually recover from natural disasters (Cavallo et al. 2013), although sustained effects 
are evident at more local levels (Barone and Mocetti 2014; duPont and Noy 2015), and 
the recovery from the 2015 earthquakes in Nepal has been ‘painfully slow’ (Ojha et al. 
2017). To investigate the potential for a permanent macroeconomic impact from the 
2010 earthquake in Haiti, I use the synthetic control method (SCM). The SCM has been 
used previously to investigate the impact of natural disasters on economic outcomes 
(Barone and Mocetti 2014; duPont and Noy 2015).  
Chapter 5 identifies the persistent macroeconomic impact of the 2010 earthquake in 
Haiti. Some sectors, such as the services sector, experienced particularly severe 
impacts. The large inflow of foreign aid contributed to a short-term spike in private 
consumption at the macroeconomic level, but investment has not recovered to the 
counterfactual scenario assuming no earthquake. Another outcome was a major fall in 
road transport energy use, and this also inhibited GDP recovery. 
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Chapter 6 considers the large literature on the relationship between electricity and 
economic growth. This literature finds mixed results. Roughly equal proportions find 
each of the four possible relationships: one-way causation in each direction, a bi-
directional relationship, or no relationship (Ozturk 2010; Payne 2010). Results vary for 
different countries, time periods, and methodologies. Most studies have used annual 
data with methods related to Granger causality.  
Chapter 6 assesses the role of initial electricity availability, in an attempt to separate 
the impact of electricity availability on subsequent economic growth from the 
endogenous relationship between contemporaneous electricity consumption and 
economic growth. I find a significant impact of initial electricity levels on subsequent 
economic growth when only initial income is controlled for, but not when other 
potential determinants of economic growth are considered.  
This thesis considers empirical relationships, aiming to identify and quantify key 
underlying factors that lead to differences in energy and economic outcomes across 
countries to support more appropriate policy responses. The broad range of underlying 
factors related to energy and economic development suggests that broad, inter-
disciplinary policy perspectives could be useful. 
1.2 Method and data sources  
This thesis follows the research papers model, presenting five papers that are within the 
energy economics and development economics fields. Each paper uses econometric 
analysis, aiming to identify relationships between various macroeconomic, 
institutional, and energy variables. 
Each of the five papers uses national-level data with various samples of countries. Each 
chapter assesses average differences across countries. Chapter 2 analyses a global 
sample of countries, and then splits the global sample into a high-income group and 
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another group for low and middle-income countries. Chapter 3 includes a European 
Union group and a broader international group. In Chapter 4, the focus is on developing 
countries, excluding high-income countries. Chapter 5 investigates earthquake impacts 
in one country, Haiti, but uses a group of other countries at similar levels of economic 
development to calculate a counterfactual. The final paper uses a global sample, and in 
addition also excludes high-income countries to give a developing country sample.  
A number of statistical methods are used, including cross-sectional regression, fixed-
effects panel regression, instrumental variables, and the synthetic control method 
(SCM). Chapter 2 uses both cross-sectional and fixed-effects panel regressions. Chapter 
3, Chapter 4, and Chapter 6 also use cross-sectional regressions. Chapter 5 uses the 
SCM, which involves the calculation of a counterfactual for Haiti following the 
exogenous shock of the 2010 earthquake.  
Identifying causal relationships using macroeconomic data is a major challenge; I 
consider potential endogeneity from data measurement error, reverse causation, and 
omitted variable bias. I address potential endogeneity in a number of ways, including 
use of lagged independent variables, changes in dependent variables, and instrumental 
variables.  
There are a number of contributions related to method and data. Chapter 2 assesses nine 
different energy types, and five segments of the financial sector. I also calculate a 
capital-intensity indicator for national electricity systems. This is the weighted average 
of the capital intensities for each energy type underlying the electricity sector in each 
country. Chapter 3 uses a numerical value for aggregate policy support, as opposed to 
binary variables for less aggregated policy measures. The analysis of the government 
effectiveness role in electricity sector development in Chapter 4 includes a large sample 
of developing countries, many electricity variables, and a broad range of potential 
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determinants of electricity sector usage. Chapter 5 applies the SCM to sectors of the 
economy, in addition to the more common application to GDP as an aggregate measure 
of economic activity. Chapter 6 investigates the role of electricity in contributing to 
economic growth using cross-sectional growth regressions for a 10-year period, while 
controlling for a range of important variables. The regression approach for the 10-year 
period contrasts to Granger causality studies that use annual data. I also consider a 
number of proxies for electricity availability, such as electricity capacity, access, losses, 
and quality. 
1.3 Key variables and definitions 
I use many national-level energy, institutional, macroeconomic, and financial variables.  
Economic variables include gross domestic product (GDP) and various financial capital 
segments. GDP is the market value of final goods and services produced within a 
country in a year, at constant prices. For financial capital, I focus on the aggregate size 
of financial institutions and markets at the national level. A key variable in this thesis 
is bank size measured by domestic private sector credit, as a ratio to GDP, provided by 
deposit money banks. I use financial market data for debt securities, sub-divided for 
domestic or international origin of issuance and public or private issuers. Each of the 
financial variables are stocks rather than flows. 
I consider nine different energy types in Chapter 2: biofuels and waste, hydro, coal, oil, 
natural gas, nuclear, wind, solar, and geothermal. Chapter 3 considers wind and solar 
energy and also some differences between solar photovoltaic (PV) and solar thermal 
energy. Various aspects of electricity are considered in Chapter 4 and Chapter 6, 
including electricity capacity, consumption, access, transmission and distribution 
losses, and quality. Chapter 5 assesses total energy, electricity, and road transport 
energy use. 
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Government effectiveness is the key governance variable in Chapter 4. Government 
effectiveness measures the perceptions of the quality of public services, quality of the 
civil service and degree of independence from political pressures, quality of policy 
formulation and implementation, and the credibility of government commitment to 
policies. 
I also use a number of variables to measure policies and preferences. A key policy 
variable in Chapter 3 is a binary variable for countries with a carbon price. Chapter 3 
also has a measure for aggregate policy support, with a euro-value for total public 
interventions for European Union (EU) countries in solar and wind energy sectors. This 
aggregate policy support variable includes research and development, investment 
support, production support, energy savings, and energy demand measures. Measures 
of preferences that underlie policy and give a general sense of renewable energy policy 
uncertainty include climate change perceptions and surveys of preferences for increased 
support for solar or wind energy.   
1.4 Organisation  
This thesis includes seven chapters: this introductory chapter, five main empirical 
research chapters, and the conclusion. The next three chapters look at underlying 
contributors to differences in energy use across countries. In particular they focus on 
the impact of financial capital, policies, preferences, and government effectiveness on 
energy variables. The following two chapters consider impacts on GDP. The impact of 
the earthquake in Haiti in 2010 on GDP and the role of electricity in contributing to 
growth in GDP are investigated. 
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CHAPTER 2 SWITCHING TOWARDS COAL OR 
RENEWABLE ENERGY? THE EFFECTS OF 
FINANCIAL CAPITAL ON ENERGY TRANSITIONS 
 
Summary: 
Does a country’s stock of financial capital affect its ability to achieve energy 
transitions? This paper uses data for up to 137 countries for the period 1998–2013 to 
investigate the importance of financial capital for changes in the use of each energy 
type. I find that financial capital supports transition to more capital-intensive energy 
types. For high-income countries, financial capital facilitates transitions from fossil 
fuels to modern renewable energy sources, especially wind. Both private credit from 
banks and domestic private debt securities support greater shares of wind energy. For 
lower-income countries, financial capital supports progression from biomass towards 
fossil fuel energy sources such as coal. I also find that countries with larger stocks of 
financial capital are more likely to move to more capital-intensive electricity generation 
systems. 
2.1 Introduction 
In this paper I use national data to examine the influence of different types of financial 
capital on consumption of different types of energy: biofuels and waste; hydro; coal; 
oil; natural gas; nuclear; wind; solar; and geothermal. In addition to analysis for a world 
sample, I present separate assessments for high-income and lower-income countries to 
reveal differences in the effect of financial capital on energy transitions according to 
development level. The impacts of financial capital on energy mix have a number of 
indirect but important implications. These relate to economic outcomes, environmental 
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impacts including global climate change, and health outcomes affected by local air 
pollution. 
I first define some key variables. Financial capital is the stock of financial assets that 
can be used to fund future production, and includes institutional assets such as bank 
deposits, and capital market instruments such as bonds and equity. Two key financial 
capital variables are (a) bank credit to the private sector and (b) outstanding private debt 
securities. Capital intensity is the capital cost to produce the same amount of electricity 
as one kilowatt of capacity operating on a continual basis (Timmons et al. 2014).1  
Capital intensity differs considerably across energy types. Figure 2.1 shows the 
different capital intensities for electricity generation sources in the United States (US). 
The capital intensity is lowest for natural gas and coal, and is substantially higher for 
renewable energy sources such as wind and solar. Most of the costs of wind and solar 
energy are capital costs. For natural gas and coal, fuel costs are more important than 
capital costs.2  
 
 
 
 
 
1 
                                                          
1 More specifically, capital intensity is the capital cost per kilowatt, divided by the capacity factor. 
Capital costs are upfront costs in 2012 US dollars. The capacity factor is the ratio of actual output to 
potential capacity. Capital intensity is not the capital share of total costs. 
2 The higher capital intensities for wind and solar also partly relate to the lower assumed average 
capacity factors for these energy types. 
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2Figure 2.1 Capital intensity by electricity type 
 
Notes: Capital intensity by electricity type (capital cost divided by expected kilowatts, calculated as 
capital cost per kilowatt (US EIA 2015a) divided by assumed capacity factor (US EIA 2015b)). Oil is 
not included. Sources: US EIA (2015a; 2015b), Timmons et al. (2014), author calculations.  
 
The results of previous studies that have investigated the influence of financial capital 
on national-level energy use have varied. Brunnschweiler (2010) shows a positive 
impact of the financial sector on renewable energy production in developing countries. 
In contrast, Pfeiffer and Mulder (2013) find no evidence of an impact of finance on 
renewable energy adoption, rather than use, based on a variable measuring the 
importance of commercial banks relative to central banks in developing countries. For 
aggregate energy, Sadorsky (2010) finds that stock market development contributes to 
energy consumption in emerging economies. In a group of central and eastern European 
countries, the bank sector has been found to be important for explaining national energy 
consumption (Sadorsky 2011). In contrast to other studies, I focus on the impacts of 
financial capital on nine energy types rather than more aggregated energy variables. 
This identifies the impacts of financial capital on energy mix transitions.  
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There are a number of other factors in addition to financial capital in determining 
energy mix. Larger endowments of energy resources are associated with greater 
domestic consumption of those energy types and lower use of substitute energy types. 
Also, countries have been shown to move up a national-level energy ladder as their 
gross domestic product per capita increases, progressing to fossil fuels then modern 
renewables (Burke 2013). In addition, Burke and Dundas (2015) find an association 
between female labour force participation and reductions in biomass energy use at the 
household level. Climate is also likely to encourage the use of particular energy types. 
For instance, hydro energy is more feasible when there is more water available from 
greater precipitation, and less evaporation from lower temperatures.  
The differing impacts of financial capital on energy transitions could have a number of 
economic implications. Energy is a necessary factor of production (Stern 2011), with 
the type and cost of energy affecting the amount of resources available for other 
productive uses. Also, reliability of energy supply is an issue, depending on the types 
and sources of energy. Nations that rely on large amounts of imported fossil fuels may 
have to contend with energy security concerns, while intermittent renewable sources 
present reliability concerns in the absence of cost-effective energy storage. 
There are also environmental implications of the mix of energy types used by national 
economies. At a local level, transition away from biomass energy could have favourable 
impacts on indoor air pollution, reducing adverse health impacts. Air pollution can also 
be exacerbated by greater use of energy sources such as coal. At a global level, greater 
use of fossil fuels contributes to greater risk of adverse climate changes. If financial 
capital facilitates the transition of lower-income countries towards fossil fuels, financial 
capital accumulation could play a role in the economic processes contributing to 
adverse climate change. 
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In Section 2.2, I discuss the mechanisms through which financial system size and 
structure may be important for national-level energy mixes. Section 2.3 details the 
method and data. I present the results in Section 2.4, and conclude in Section 2.5. 
2.2 The relationship between financial systems and energy types 
Capital-intensive energy production of all types can benefit from larger supplies of 
financial capital at lower cost. When there is a larger supply of aggregate financial 
capital available, greater competition between capital providers helps to lower the cost 
of capital. This lower cost of capital benefits all borrowers in an economy, with the 
largest benefits accruing to capital-intensive sectors that are more sensitive to cost of 
capital changes, including energy producers. If there is instead a shortage of financial 
capital, some energy projects may no longer be commercially viable, due to the elevated 
cost of capital (IEA 2014).  
There are a number of financial segments that could be important for energy transitions. 
The banking sector has been the main source of external finance for energy investments 
in most countries, with capital markets offering another alternative (IEA 2014). For 
instance, Corsatea et al. (2014) note the importance of corporate debt for wind energy 
development. While larger banking and capital market financial segments could 
support energy financing, aversion to higher-risk investments can relate to regulatory 
standards for some investors. The Basel III capital adequacy standards may increase the 
cost of long-term energy financing through banks (IEA 2014), while the Solvency II 
standards discourage insurance company investments in securitised assets (Citi 2015). 
For pension funds, low risk investments may also be preferred, hindering investment in 
higher-risk energy types. 
Access to external finance has been found to be associated with greater innovation 
(Ayyagari et al. 2011) and financial innovation can be beneficial for some energy types. 
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Financial innovation to produce different types of financial fund structures can produce 
different risk-return profiles related to varying claims on income and capital, including 
more liquid and divisible investments. For instance, YieldCos are investment fund 
structures that own infrastructure assets and distribute dividends based on electricity 
revenue (OECD 2015). As a portfolio of publicly listed energy assets, YieldCos require 
parent companies to have large amounts of capital, which is more likely in larger 
financial systems. Larger markets allow greater liquidity and more research analysis, 
underlying growth of YieldCos and the renewable energy generation that they finance. 
Financial capital constraints can impede industrial expansion (Levine 2005), including 
in the energy sector, and these constraints may relate to factors other than just the cost 
of capital. For instance, capital quantity can be restricted when bond covenants or loan 
tenor are not appropriate for energy producers. This is important for all energy types, 
as energy production is more reliant on external finance than many other industries 
(Rajan and Zingales 1998). 
Financial capital is typically in shorter supply in developing countries. International 
financial institutions and donors have consequently supported numerous financing 
initiatives for renewable energy in developing countries (Painuly and Wohlgemuth 
2006). Energy producers may have greater access to financial capital in developed 
countries, but this can vary over time. Following the global credit crunch beginning in 
2008, there was less capital available for renewable energy, due to capital provider 
bankruptcies and higher risk aversion (NREL 2011).  
Energy producers can potentially benefit from access to capital from both domestic and 
international sources. Investors have a home bias (Obstfeld and Rogoff 2001), related 
to many possible reasons such as barriers to international investment, information 
asymmetries, and behavioural biases (Warren 2010), meaning that domestic capital 
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could be important in supporting domestic energy transitions. In addition, smaller scale 
energy projects, including some solar photovoltaic projects, may be too small to access 
international capital sources (Ondraczek et al. 2015). International capital flows might 
also be important for some energy producers, and access to international markets and 
international networks for bank syndicate lending can expand available private capital 
sources. Aid from international development agencies and bilateral government 
donations has also been a source of energy capital (Tirpak and Adams 2008), but private 
capital might be increasingly important as financial sectors develop. 
Financial capital constraints for energy producers could be overcome through access to 
either public or private sources of finance, and this varies by energy type. Nuclear 
energy relies more on public than private financial sources (Helm 2012, p. 136). 
Nuclear presents a different set of risks to other energy types and can dissuade private 
investment. There are risks related to nuclear waste, in addition to the long-term and 
capital intensive nature of nuclear energy investment. Nuclear risks are also hard for 
private capital sources to diversify. Geothermal energy development can also be reliant 
on public finance due to the combination of resource risk, high capital intensity, and 
long lead times (ESMAP 2012). 
2.3 Method and data 
I estimate Eq. (1): 
(1)                               ∆2003−2013 𝑆𝑗,𝑐 =  𝐹𝑐
2003𝛼𝑗 + 𝒙′𝑐
2003 𝝌𝑗 +  𝜀𝑗,𝑐  
   
where ∆2003−2013 𝑆𝑗,𝑐 is the change in the share of total primary energy supply for 
energy type 𝑗 in country 𝑐 over the ten-year period 2003–2013. 𝐹 is the financial capital 
variable: private credit from deposit money banks divided by GDP. 𝒙 is a vector of 
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other potential determinants of energy consumption. The error term is 𝜀𝑗,𝑐, with 
𝐸(𝜀𝑗,𝑐) = 0.  
My regressions for the change in energy share for the ten years to 2013 use ordinary 
least squares estimates with standard errors that are robust to heteroscedasticity. As the 
same set of independent variables is in each regression for Eq. (1), seemingly unrelated 
regression estimation provides no advantage over equation-by-equation ordinary least 
squares. 
In addition to the energy shares, I also use electricity shares as well as an aggregate 
measure of capital intensity of electricity generation.3 I calculate the capital intensity 
measure as the product of capital intensity for each electricity type from Figure 2.1 and 
the share of total electricity output for each electricity type in each country, summed 
over all electricity types.4 This assumes that the capital intensities for electricity types 
in Figure 2.1, based on data from the US Energy Information Administration (US EIA) 
(2015a; 2015b), are representative for every country. As a robustness test, I also 
calculate capital intensity using the regional or country data from the IEA (2014) on 
capital costs in nine different countries or regions: Europe, United States, Japan, Russia, 
China, India, Middle East, Africa, and Brazil.5 The US EIA data do not cover the capital 
cost of electricity generation using oil. I proxy this using the US EIA capital intensity 
of natural gas multiplied by the oil:natural gas capital cost of electricity generation ratio 
in Japan (Power Generation Costs Analysis Working Group 2015). 
In addition to analysis of the full sample of up to 137 countries, I also consider two sub-
samples. This is to test for different impacts of financial capital on energy transitions 
                                                          
3 I thank an anonymous reviewer for the suggestion to use capital intensity as a dependent variable. 
4 The unit for the capital intensity measure is 2012 US dollars divided by expected kilowatts, then 
divided by one thousand. 
5 Regression results using IEA (2014) capital costs are in Table A2.1 in the Appendix. 
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for countries at different stages of development. I use World Bank (2016a) income 
classifications, combining low-income countries with middle-income countries in one 
group. I refer to these countries as lower-income countries. The other group is high-
income countries. 
My next step is to use Eq. (2) in a fixed-effects panel setting: 
(2)                                𝑆𝑗,𝑐,𝑡 = 𝑭′𝑐,𝑡𝜶𝑗 +  𝒙′𝑐,𝑡𝝌𝑗 +  𝜀𝑗,𝑐,𝑡     
where 𝑆𝑗,𝑐,𝑡 is the share of total primary energy supply for energy type 𝑗 in country 𝑐 
and year 𝑡. The dependent variable in Eq. (2) is in level terms. 𝑭 is a vector of financial 
capital variables, with additional financial variables compared to Eq. (1). These are not 
used in Eq. (1) as the number of countries with data for each variable in both 2003 and 
2013 is small. 𝒙 is a vector of other determinants. Time effects are included, and the 
error term is 𝜀𝑗,𝑐,𝑡, with 𝐸(𝜀𝑗,𝑐,𝑡) = 0. The fixed-effects panel estimates are for 1998–
2012. 
Primary energy supply data are taken from the International Energy Agency (IEA 
2017). For the dependent variables, I divide energy supply for each energy type by total 
primary energy supply. Energy supply is for nine different energy types: biofuels and 
waste, hydro, coal, oil, natural gas, nuclear, wind, solar, and geothermal.6 These make 
up 99.9 percent of total primary energy supply in 2013. Energy share data are 
summarised in Table 2.1. 
 
 
                                                          
6 Using IEA categories, the coal variable includes coal, peat, and oilshale. Oil includes crude, natural 
gas liquids and feedstocks, and oil products. 
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1Table 2.1 Energy-type share of total primary energy supply, 2013 
By income grouping, percent. 
 Biofuels 
and waste 
Hydro Coal Oil Gas Nuclear Wind Solar Geo-
thermal 
Lower-income 15.2 2.7 41.9 24.1 13.7 1.2 0.3 0.3 0.6 
High-income 4.7 2.2 17.3 34.4 31.2 8.8 0.6 0.3 0.4 
World 10.0 2.5 29.9 29.1 22.2 4.9 0.4 0.3 0.5 
Notes: These statistics cover 137 countries. Source: IEA (2017). 
The financial variables are from the Global Financial Development Database (GFDD 
2017) with key variables being bank credit to the private sector and outstanding private 
debt securities. The variable for private sector credit from deposit money banks, divided 
by GDP, has been used frequently in the empirical literature on the role of private 
financial institutions in economic outcomes (Čihák et al. 2012). This variable measures 
banking sector depth, representing private rather than public sources of capital, and is 
available for a broad group of countries. In addition to financial institutions, financial 
markets are also possible sources of finance. For the panel regressions, I use outstanding 
debt securities and stock market capitalisation to represent financial market depth. To 
assess the impact of aggregate private credit and debt, I add three variables to form a 
composite private debt and credit variable. The three variables are private sector credit 
from deposit money banks, outstanding domestic private debt securities, and 
outstanding international private debt securities. Also, I use an aggregate public debt 
variable, made up of outstanding domestic public debt securities and outstanding 
international public debt securities. Each financial variable is divided by GDP. Table 
2.2 shows that there is substantial variation in financial variables between different 
countries, with the standard deviation for each variable of a similar magnitude to the 
mean. 
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2Table 2.2 Financial variables, 1998–2012 
Variable Minimum Mean Maximum Standard 
Deviation 
Private credit 0.13 0.87 2.73 0.50 
Domestic private debt 0.00 0.30 1.63 0.30 
International private debt 0.00 0.28 3.64 0.45 
Private debt and credit 0.15 1.44 6.85 1.03 
Public debt 0.03 0.41 1.89 0.27 
Equity 0.05 0.76 5.70 0.67 
Notes: Each variable is divided by GDP. Source: GFDD (2017). There are 551 observations.  
I show some examples of positive relationships between financial capital and energy 
types in Figure 2.2 and Figure 2.3. For high-income countries, Figure 2.2 shows a 
positive relationship between important variables (please see the following results 
section): domestic private debt and the wind share of energy supply. For lower-income 
countries, a positive relationship between private credit and coal share of energy is 
evident in Figure 2.3. These scatter plots give an indication of the relationship between 
financial capital and energy types without controlling for other variables. 
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3Figure 2.2 Private debt and wind share, high-income countries, 2011 
 
Notes: Outstanding domestic private debt securities divided by GDP versus wind share of total primary 
energy supply (percent divided by 100). 36 countries are included for 2011, based on data availability 
for high-income countries. Sources: IEA (2017), GFDD (2017).  
4Figure 2.3 Private credit and coal share, lower-income countries, 2011 
 
Notes: Bank credit to the private sector divided by GDP versus coal share of total primary energy 
supply (percent divided by 100). 74 lower-income countries are included for 2011, based on data 
availability. Sources: IEA (2017), GFDD (2017). 
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Other potential determinants of changes in energy-type use include the log of GDP per 
capita, fossil fuel reserves per capita, forest area per capita, land area per capita, average 
precipitation and temperature, initial total energy consumption per capita, and the 
percentage change in total energy consumption per capita over the previous five years. 
Prior research has found that some of these variables are important for the 
energy/electricity mix (Burke 2010; Burke 2013). Initial energy use may impact future 
energy use because energy production depends on long-lived infrastructure. The growth 
rate of previous energy use can also impact on future energy use through the impact on 
predicted energy demand (Popp et al. 2011) and energy investment decisions, and has 
been found to impact on energy types such as hydro (Pfeiffer and Mulder 2013). The 
independent variables are initial values from the start of the ten-year period, with some 
exceptions: precipitation and temperature are ten-year averages up to 2013 to measure 
climate rather than weather, coal reserves are only available for 2011, and the five-year 
percentage change in energy consumption is for the five years to 2003. 
In addition to the key data sources for energy (IEA 2017) and finance (GFDD 2017), I 
also use some further sources. Fossil fuel reserves are from the United States Energy 
Information Administration (US EIA 2016). Fossil fuel reserves are for coal, oil, and 
natural gas.7 I use GDP per capita,8 total population,9 land area, and forest area data 
from the World Development Indicators (World Bank 2016a). Precipitation and 
temperature data are from CRU CY v.3.22 dataset (Harris et al. 2014). 
To reduce possible reverse causation, I model changes in the energy mix shares against 
initial values of the financial capital variable. Using an initial value is also suitable 
because financial capital may take time to affect energy production and consumption, 
                                                          
7 I use BP (2015) conversion factors to convert oil and gas into thousand tonnes of oil equivalent, and a 
US EIA (2016) conversion factor to convert coal into thousand tonnes of oil equivalent.  
8 Purchasing power parity (constant 2011 international dollars). 
9 I use population data to convert variables into per capita values. 
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due to long lead times in energy investment. Reverse causation from energy types to 
financial segments is unlikely for modern energy types, such as wind and solar, which 
are small components of national energy mixes (as shown in Table 2.1). In contrast, 
financial stocks are often large and have built up over time, with the large size in 
relation to GDP evident in Table 2.2. The impact of other energy types on financial 
development would also generally be outweighed by other non-energy sectors, because 
the finance sector is used by all sectors of the economy and not just the energy sector 
or just one specific energy type.   
Omitted variable bias could potentially arise from the absence of a policy variable. 
While policy variables are important for renewable energy (Zhao et al. 2013), policy 
support and financial sector size are unlikely to be highly correlated. This relates to 
financial sectors servicing entire economies rather than just the energy sector, or just 
single energy types. The omission of a policy variable in this paper thus might not be a 
major source of bias for the coefficients for the financial sector variables.  
To further address potential endogeneity, Eq. (2) uses panel data for the dependent 
variable in levels. Inclusion of time dummies helps to account for globally-common 
omitted variables, such as changes over time in global energy prices or technology. 
Advances in technology have been found to have a small effect in raising investment 
in some renewable energy types in OECD countries (Popp et al. 2011). Country-
specific factors, such as time-invariant aspects of institutions or policies, are also 
accounted for in the fixed-effects model.  
Reverse causation for the panel estimation from Eq. (2) could arise in a few special 
cases, when an energy type has a causal impact on a particular financial market 
segment. For example, development of geothermal or hydro energy could lead to larger 
international private debt borrowing, as the combination of high capital intensity, long 
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time horizons, and geological risk factors discourages capital providers in some 
countries. In response to this, I use a composite financial variable for debt and credit 
that includes domestic and international market debt in addition to domestic bank credit 
to the private sector. Reverse causation is less likely for an aggregated variable that 
includes both bank credit and market debt. 
2.4 Results 
Table 2.3 shows results for Eq. (1) for each of the nine energy types for the full sample 
of countries. The financial variable, bank credit to the private sector divided by GDP, 
has positive and statistically significant impacts on two of the nine energy types. Wind 
and solar energy both have positive coefficients that are statistically significant at the 
one percent level, indicating that these capital-intensive energy types benefit from 
greater supplies of financial capital.10 
In the oil regression, the coefficient for private credit is negative and statistically 
significant at the ten percent level. This suggests that greater supplies of financial 
capital could encourage reductions in use of energy types with lower capital intensity, 
such as some fossil fuels. More efficient use of oil through technological innovation is 
one possible contributor to the negative relationship between financial capital and oil 
share. For instance, greater access to finance can support improvements in fuel 
economy through innovative automobile design, such as for new passenger light-duty 
vehicles (IEA 2012). Road transport energy use is a large and growing component of 
                                                          
10 I find consistent results for the private credit variable using dependent variables representing the (a) 
change in per capita energy consumption in tonnes of oil equivalent, or (b) level of primary energy 
supply share (rather than the change). Other robustness tests also produce similar results for the wind 
regression, including dependent variables for the ten-year period to 2012 instead of 2013, the five-year 
period to 2013 instead of the ten-year period to 2013, and non-linear estimators including fractional 
logit and Poisson models. 
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final oil consumption (Gao et al. 2015), and is likely a factor in explaining the negative 
coefficient. 
The variables in Table 2.3 explain 34 percent of the cross-country variation in the 
change of wind share and 37 percent for the solar share over the period 2003–2013.11 
The coefficients of determination for some of the other energy types are also quite high. 
An exception is nuclear energy, with only two percent of variation explained by the 
financial and other variables in the model. This is reasonable given that most nuclear 
capacity was added prior to the ten-year period to 2013 and that nuclear energy relies 
more on public rather than private capital. 
The economic significance of financial capital for wind energy consumption is 
considerable. A one standard deviation increase in private credit by deposit money 
banks as a share of GDP leads to an increase of 0.5 of one standard deviation for the 
change in wind share of total primary energy supply, all else equal. Expressed 
differently, a one percentage point increase in private credit by deposit money banks as 
a share of GDP is associated with a 0.008 percentage point increase in wind energy 
share. For oil, a one percentage point increase in the private credit variable is associated 
with a 0.033 percentage point decrease in oil energy share. 
                                                          
11 Other variables that could impact energy supply include foreign direct investment and gross capital 
formation. These variables are not statistically significant when used to replace the financial capital 
variable.  
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3Table 2.3 Results, change in share of total primary energy supply for the ten years to 2013 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: ***, **, * show statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively. Robust standard errors are in brackets below the coefficients. All countries 
are included if data are available. The sample covers 114 countries for coal and solar regressions and 115 for other types. The independent variables are initial 
values; they are for the year 2003 unless otherwise noted. Coal reserves are for 2011. Temperature and precipitation are 10-year averages to 2013. Initial energy use 
is total primary energy supply per capita. Change in total energy use per capita is a percentage change for the five years to 2003.  
                Dependent variables: Ten-year change in share of total primary energy supply 
 Biofuels 
and waste 
Hydro Coal Oil Natural 
Gas 
Nuclear Wind Solar Geo-
thermal 
Private credit, -0.012 0.003 0.017 -0.033* 0.005 0.009 0.008*** 0.004*** 0.007 
    divided by GDP (0.012) (0.005) (0.012) (0.018) (0.017) (0.020) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) 
Log GDP per capita 0.023*** 0.000 -0.007* -0.023*** 0.012 -0.005 0.001*** 0.001*** -0.004 
 (0.007) (0.003) (0.004) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) 
Coal reserves, -0.001 0.006* -0.028** 0.008 0.025 0.006 0.000 0.001** -0.011 
    KTOE per capita (0.009) (0.003) (0.011) (0.014) (0.022) (0.010) (0.001) (0.001) (0.007) 
Oil reserves, -0.006 -0.001 0.013*** -0.002 -0.001 0.000 -0.000 -0.001** -0.001 
    KTOE per capita  (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.008) (0.007) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) 
Gas reserves, -0.002 -0.001 0.006*** -0.009** 0.006* -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001 
    KTOE per capita   (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Forest area, sq. km, -0.342** 0.141 -0.215* 0.179 0.419** 0.140 0.006 0.007 -0.240 
    per capita (0.157) (0.115) (0.116) (0.241) (0.204) (0.091) (0.012) (0.008) (0.151) 
Land area sq. km, -0.088** -0.072** 0.052 0.061 -0.111 -0.001 -0.013*** -0.012*** 0.118* 
    per capita (0.040) (0.030) (0.032) (0.096) (0.076) (0.017) (0.005) (0.004) (0.068) 
Temperature, C -0.002** 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.002** 0.001 -0.000 0.000** -0.000 
    ten-year average (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Precipitation, metres -0.003 -0.000 0.020*** -0.011 -0.009 -0.003 -0.001 -0.002*** 0.008** 
    ten-year average (0.007) (0.003) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) 
Initial energy use  0.000 0.001 -0.005** 0.006 -0.003 0.001 -0.001* -0.000** 0.002 
    per capita (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) 
Change in total  -0.023 0.053* 0.060** -0.171*** 0.063 0.011 -0.005 0.002 0.012 
    energy use pc (0.053) (0.028) (0.026) (0.045) (0.040) (0.011) (0.003) (0.002) (0.015) 
R2 0.322 0.146 0.282 0.357 0.145 0.022 0.339 0.370 0.182 
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There are reasonable results for some of the natural endowment controls in Table 2.3. 
For example, countries with larger gas reserves experienced reductions in the share of 
oil energy consumed in Table 2.3, all else equal. This is an example of one energy type 
substituting for another energy type. Higher reserves of an energy type could also 
encourage higher use of another. For example, larger coal reserves are associated with 
greater changes in solar share in Table 2.3, possibly due to concerns over future 
pollution or carbon emissions. Renewable and non-renewable energy are substitutes in 
some industries but complements in others (Kumar et al. 2015). Larger gas reserves are 
also associated with larger increases in gas share, showing that countries increase their 
share of energy types when they have larger endowments. This relationship is not 
evident for the changes in other energy types with less rapid growth, but is evident if 
levels of energy types are used for the dependent variable rather than changes.12  
Table 2.4 uses shares of electricity output instead of shares of total primary energy 
supply. There is again a positive and significant coefficient for private credit in the wind 
regression in Table 2.4. In the solar regression, the coefficient for private credit is again 
positive, but is not significant. There is a negative and significant coefficient for natural 
gas in Table 2.4. This is similar to Table 2.3 where there is also a negative and 
significant coefficient for a fossil fuel energy type, but the significant coefficient in 
Table 2.3 is for oil rather than natural gas. The importance of financial capital for more 
capital-intensive electricity systems is also evident in the final column of Table 2.4; 
there is a positive coefficient for private credit, significant at the one percent level, in 
explaining the change in the aggregate capital intensity measure. For a one percentage 
point increase in private credit divided by GDP, there is an increase in the change in 
                                                          
12 Results with dependent variables in levels rather than changes are included in Table A2.2 in the 
Appendix. 
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the aggregate capital intensity of national electricity generation systems of eight US 
dollars per expected kilowatt.   
Table 2.5 presents estimates for high-income countries. The financial capital 
coefficients for wind and solar energy are similar to Table 2.3. The coefficient for 
private credit is significant at the five percent level for high-income countries in Table 
2.5 for the wind regression, and at the ten percent level for the solar regression due to 
the higher standard error for the smaller sample. Private credit still has a negative 
relationship with oil energy for high-income countries, all other things equal, but is no 
longer significant.  
Most of the other explanatory variables in Table 2.5 are not significant, but some 
significant coefficients match expectation. Land area has a positive coefficient for 
geothermal energy, significant at the one percent level, perhaps because more land 
provides more space for domestic geothermal sources. There are significant coefficients 
in the solar regression, including a positive coefficient for temperature and negative 
coefficient for precipitation, all other things equal. These are reasonable, as solar energy 
would benefit from greater solar irradiation with higher temperatures and less rainfall.  
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4Table 2.4 Results, change in electricity share and capital intensity for the ten years to 2013 
Notes: ***, **, * show statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively. Robust standard errors are in brackets below the coefficients. All countries 
are included if data are available: the sample covers 114 countries, but 113 for coal and solar regressions. The independent variables are for the year 2003 unless 
otherwise noted. Coal reserves are for 2011. Temperature and precipitation are 10-year averages to 2013. Change in total electricity use per capita is a percentage 
change for the five years to 2003. Capital intensity is a measure calculated by the author as electricity-type capital intensity multiplied by electricity share, summed 
for each electricity type. 
 
 Dependent variables: Ten-year change in electricity share, and ten-year change in capital intensity  
 Biofuels 
and waste 
Hydro Coal Oil Natural 
Gas 
Nuclear Wind Solar Geo-
thermal 
Capital 
Intensity 
Private credit, 0.005 -0.004 0.008 0.013 -0.086** 0.013 0.046** 0.004 0.003 0.844*** 
    divided by GDP (0.007) (0.019) (0.020) (0.028) (0.035) (0.037) (0.019) (0.003) (0.003) (0.251) 
Log GDP per capita 0.006*** 0.011 -0.008 -0.024 0.019 -0.007 0.005 0.003** -0.005** 0.068 
 (0.002) (0.017) (0.006) (0.017) (0.014) (0.009) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.067) 
Coal reserves, -0.007 0.028 -0.007 0.021 -0.035 0.006 -0.002 0.005* -0.010* 0.129 
    KTOE per capita (0.007) (0.023) (0.031) (0.027) (0.031) (0.017) (0.007) (0.003) (0.005) (0.113) 
Oil reserves, -0.001 0.004 0.020*** -0.015 -0.008 0.003 -0.001 -0.003*** -0.004* -0.099 
    KTOE per capita  (0.003) (0.009) (0.006) (0.011) (0.014) (0.005) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.060) 
Gas reserves, 0.000 -0.000 0.003*** 0.006*** -0.009*** 0.000 0.000 -0.000** -0.000 0.016 
    KTOE per capita   (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.012) 
Forest area, sq. km, -0.068 -0.890** -0.665*** 0.886 0.798 0.173 -0.015 0.015 -0.188 -1.978 
    per capita (0.076) (0.451) (0.229) (0.555) (0.561) (0.173) (0.077) (0.022) (0.126) (1.811) 
Land area sq. km, -0.024 -0.061 0.199** -0.195 0.019 0.043 -0.058** -0.040*** 0.079* -1.590* 
    per capita (0.022) (0.148) (0.078) (0.273) (0.281) (0.046) (0.026) (0.014) (0.045) (0.882) 
Temperature, C, -0.001*** -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.004** 0.001 -0.001* 0.000 0.000 -0.015* 
    ten-year average (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.008) 
Precipitation, metres 0.006 0.010 0.040*** -0.021 -0.033* -0.004 -0.002 -0.003*** 0.002 -0.021 
    ten-year average (0.004) (0.014) (0.010) (0.021) (0.020) (0.004) (0.005) (0.001) (0.003) (0.093) 
Initial electricity use  -0.014* 0.008 -0.039 0.031 0.023 -0.000 -0.022** -0.000 0.023** -0.187 
    per capita (0.008) (0.042) (0.025) (0.036) (0.041) (0.015) (0.010) (0.003) (0.011) (0.181) 
Change in total  0.001 0.020 0.009** -0.011 -0.022** 0.004 -0.005** 0.004*** 0.000 0.097* 
    electricity use pc (0.003) (0.021) (0.004) (0.025) (0.009) (0.004) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.059) 
R2 0.197 0.084 0.237 0.078 0.151 0.030 0.282 0.280 0.269 0.365 
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 5Table 2.5 Results, change in share of total primary energy supply for the ten years to 2013, high-income countries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: ***, **, * show statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively. Robust standard errors are in brackets below the coefficients. 46 high-
income countries are included, but 45 for solar and coal. The independent variables are initial values from 2003, but coal reserves are for 2011. Temperature and 
precipitation are 10-year averages to 2013. Initial energy use is total primary energy supply per capita in 2003. Change in total energy use per capita is the five-year 
percentage change to 2003.  
 Dependent variables: Ten-year change in share of total primary energy supply 
 Biofuels 
and waste 
Hydro Coal Oil Natural 
Gas 
Nuclear Wind Solar Geo-
thermal 
Private credit, 0.003 -0.011 0.004 -0.052 0.020 0.015 0.013** 0.006* 0.014* 
   divided by GDP (0.013) (0.008) (0.016) (0.032) (0.027) (0.038) (0.006) (0.003) (0.008) 
Log GDP per capita -0.015 0.027 -0.006 -0.023 0.020 0.016 0.001 0.000 -0.016*** 
 (0.021) (0.020) (0.012) (0.040) (0.034) (0.015) (0.004) (0.003) (0.006) 
Coal reserves, -0.008 0.006 -0.022** 0.030 0.011 -0.015 0.002 0.001 -0.016** 
    KTOE per capita (0.015) (0.011) (0.010) (0.020) (0.027) (0.014) (0.002) (0.002) (0.007) 
Oil reserves, -0.004 0.001 0.014** -0.005 -0.004 -0.008 0.000 -0.001** 0.003 
    KTOE per capita  (0.006) (0.003) (0.006) (0.012) (0.017) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) 
Gas reserves, -0.000 0.001 0.006* -0.010 0.004 -0.003 0.001 0.000 -0.000 
    KTOE per capita   (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.007) (0.008) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Forest area, sq. km, -0.226 0.231 -0.326 0.263 0.385 0.798 0.002 0.025 -0.735*** 
    per capita (0.276) (0.175) (0.243) (0.482) (0.607) (0.507) (0.051) (0.043) (0.209) 
Land area, sq. km, -0.070 -0.055 0.090 -0.110 -0.064 -0.028 -0.021 -0.019 0.264*** 
    per capita (0.074) (0.058) (0.064) (0.157) (0.142) (0.075) (0.014) (0.017) (0.031) 
Temperature, C, -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 0.003 0.002 -0.000 0.000** -0.001*** 
    ten-year average (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Precipitation, metres -0.007 -0.001 0.023** -0.008 -0.007 -0.013 -0.001 -0.004*** 0.012 
    ten-year average (0.010) (0.005) (0.010) (0.023) (0.031) (0.009) (0.002) (0.001) (0.008) 
Initial energy use 0.000 -0.003 -0.006* 0.007 0.000 0.002 -0.001 -0.000 0.003* 
    per capita (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.010) (0.010) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Change in total  -0.081 0.083 0.077 -0.163 0.071 0.007 0.004 0.004 -0.015 
    energy use pc (0.071) (0.066) (0.048) (0.108) (0.131) (0.042) (0.012) (0.008) (0.017) 
R2 0.358 0.275 0.235 0.329 0.244 0.072 0.361 0.430 0.561 
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6Table 2.6 Results, change in share of total primary energy supply for the ten years to 2013, lower-income countries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: ***, **, * show statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively. Robust standard errors are in brackets below the coefficients. 69 low-income 
and middle-income countries, referred to as lower-income countries, are included. The independent variables are initial values from 2003, except coal reserves, 
which are for 2011. Temperature and precipitation are 10-year averages to 2013. Initial energy use is total primary supply per capita in 2003. Change in total energy 
use per capita is the five-year percentage change to 2003. 
 
 Dependent variables: Ten-year change in share of total primary energy supply 
 Biofuels 
and waste 
Hydro Coal Oil Natural 
Gas 
Nuclear Wind Solar Geo-
thermal 
Private credit, -0.051** 0.001 0.048** 0.013 0.003 -0.004 -0.001 0.002 -0.005 
    divided by GDP (0.021) (0.012) (0.019) (0.027) (0.026) (0.007) (0.002) (0.001) (0.006) 
Log GDP per capita 0.007 -0.002 -0.010 -0.031*** 0.033*** -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.002 
 (0.008) (0.003) (0.008) (0.012) (0.012) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) 
Coal reserves, -0.041** 0.003 -0.055*** 0.011 0.096** -0.006 -0.002 -0.000 -0.001 
    KTOE per capita (0.021) (0.008) (0.019) (0.029) (0.044) (0.011) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004) 
Oil reserves, -0.075* 0.020 0.039 0.079 0.031 -0.022 -0.002 0.001 0.001 
    KTOE per capita  (0.044) (0.022) (0.044) (0.077) (0.082) (0.015) (0.003) (0.002) (0.010) 
Gas reserves, 0.042 -0.069** 0.011 -0.008 0.111 0.002 -0.011** -0.011** -0.030 
    KTOE per capita   (0.104) (0.031) (0.071) (0.168) (0.179) (0.022) (0.005) (0.004) (0.033) 
Forest area, sq. km, -0.354* 0.009 -0.136 0.163 0.500*** 0.018 -0.011 0.001 -0.086 
    per capita (0.186) (0.071) (0.123) (0.174) (0.189) (0.024) (0.008) (0.003) (0.071) 
Land area, sq. km, -0.040 -0.071** 0.015 0.166* -0.227*** -0.006 -0.002 -0.002 0.016 
    per capita (0.056) (0.029) (0.045) (0.094) (0.067) (0.008) (0.003) (0.002) (0.017) 
Temperature, C, -0.001 0.001* -0.001 -0.002 0.001 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 
    ten-year average (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Precipitation, metres 0.003 -0.001 0.020** -0.009 -0.014 -0.000 0.000 -0.001** 0.004 
    ten-year average (0.010) (0.004) (0.008) (0.011) (0.010) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.004) 
Initial energy use 0.030*** 0.009* 0.000 -0.006 -0.042* 0.007 0.001 0.000 -0.001 
    per capita (0.010) (0.005) (0.016) (0.015) (0.023) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Change in total  0.037 0.058 0.038 -0.185*** 0.024 0.000 -0.000 0.002 0.026 
    energy use pc (0.068) (0.035) (0.034) (0.056) (0.058) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.021) 
R2 0.190 0.287 0.283 0.406 0.199 0.094 0.121 0.318 0.075 
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7Table 2.7 Results, fixed-effects panel estimates, 1998–2012 
Notes: ***, **, * show statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively. Robust standard errors clustered by country are in brackets below the 
coefficients. Coefficients for dummy variables for each year, and coefficients for constants, are not shown. All countries are included if data are available. There are 
546 observations for solar and 551 observations for the other energy types. This includes 47 countries. All financial variables are divided by GDP. 
 
 Dependent variables: Share of total primary energy supply  
 Biofuels 
and waste 
Hydro Coal Oil Natural Gas Nuclear Wind Solar Geo-
thermal 
Private credit,  0.013** -0.004 -0.030** 0.018 0.010 -0.003 0.006*** 0.001* -0.011*** 
    divided by GDP (0.006) (0.004) (0.014) (0.014) (0.012) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004) 
Domestic private 0.002 0.007 -0.004 -0.006 0.009 0.004 0.009*** 0.001 -0.016 
  debt securities (0.012) (0.005) (0.018) (0.021) (0.028) (0.006) (0.003) (0.001) (0.010) 
International private -0.003 -0.000 0.000 -0.017 -0.015 0.000 -0.001 -0.001* 0.037*** 
  debt securities (0.004) (0.002) (0.005) (0.010) (0.010) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.011) 
Public debt -0.008 0.003 0.010 -0.035 0.046** -0.026 0.006 0.001 0.005 
    securities (0.012) (0.005) (0.026) (0.036) (0.021) (0.023) (0.004) (0.001) (0.010) 
Stock market  -0.004 -0.002 0.002 -0.012 0.018** 0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.000 
    capitalisation (0.003) (0.002) (0.007) (0.010) (0.009) (0.003) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) 
Log GDP -0.114*** -0.001 0.081*** 0.023 -0.011 0.017* -0.008* -0.002 0.015** 
    per capita (0.015) (0.010) (0.024) (0.045) (0.053) (0.010) (0.004) (0.003) (0.007) 
Temperature,  0.003** 0.001 -0.002 0.002 -0.007*** 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001* 
    Degrees Celsius (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Precipitation, -0.002 0.010*** 0.010 -0.011 -0.003 -0.003 0.001 -0.000 0.003*** 
    Metres (0.002) (0.003) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
R2 (within) 0.424 0.110 0.243 0.467 0.363 0.098 0.541 0.234 0.431 
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In Table 2.6, which has results for lower-income countries, there are key differences in 
financial capital impact, including a positive coefficient in the coal regression and a 
negative coefficient in the biofuel and waste regression. Both are significant at the five 
percent level. This shows that financial capital supports the transition to energy types 
with higher capital intensity; coal energy is more capital intensive than biomass energy 
in developing countries, where biomass energy predominantly involves labour-
intensive collection of fuelwood and other biomass.  
The economic significance of the impact of private credit on coal share for lower-
income countries is considerable. A one percentage point increase in private credit as a 
share of GDP is associated with an increase of 0.048 percentage points in the coal share, 
and a decrease of 0.051 percentage points for biofuel and waste, for lower-income 
countries. 
Fixed-effects panel estimates in Table 2.7 confirm the result that financial capital has 
been important for the transition to wind and solar energy. Using a panel of country 
data for 1998–2012, I find that bank credit to the private sector has a positive impact 
on wind energy, significant at the one percent level. This finding is similar to 
Brunnschweiler (2010) who finds a positive impact of private credit on renewable 
energy use for non-OECD countries for the period 1980–2006. Outstanding domestic 
private debt securities divided by GDP also has a positive association with wind energy 
consumption in Table 2.7, again significant at the one percent level. Public debt, stock 
market capitalisation, and international debt securities are not associated with greater 
wind energy use. Table 2.7 also provides evidence of finance contributing to the 
transition away from coal energy. This relates to high-income countries as the panel 
data are comprised primarily of high-income countries for which the financial system 
data used in Table 2.7 are more available. 
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The variables in Table 2.7 explain a large proportion of the variation in some of the 
energy shares, especially the 54 percent of variation explained for the wind share of 
total primary energy supply.13 In addition to the financial capital variables, some of the 
controls in Table 2.7 are also significant, indicating the importance of variables such as 
GDP per capita and climatic conditions. There is a positive and significant coefficient 
for the log of GDP per capita in explaining coal use in Table 2.7. There is also a positive 
and significant coefficient for precipitation in contributing to hydro share of energy.  
The amount of outstanding international private debt securities is strongly correlated 
with greater geothermal energy use. Endogeneity is a potential concern in this instance, 
as the use of large amounts of geothermal energy in a few countries may result in an 
increase in off-shore borrowing from specialist debt suppliers. Specialist finance 
providers for energy types such as geothermal energy (NREL 2011) deal with the 
specific combination of risk factors including geological risks. To reduce the reverse 
causation potential, I explored aggregating the private credit and debt variables, with 
this composite variable labelled as Private credit and debt in Table A2.3. This 
composite variable does not have a significant coefficient for geothermal share, but 
there is significance at the five percent level for this composite variable in the wind 
regression, confirming an important role of financial capital for capital-intensive energy 
types such as wind. 
2.5 Conclusion 
In this paper I find that financial capital has different impacts for different energy types 
depending on country development level, using data from 1998–2013 for up to 137 
countries. For lower-income countries, financial capital contributes to the transition 
                                                          
13 The coefficients and the R-squared are similar for the wind regression when using one-year lags, 
controlling for carbon dioxide emissions, and controlling for the oil price instead of the time dummies.  
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from biomass towards fossil fuels such as coal. For high-income countries, financial 
capital supports transitions away from fossil fuels and toward more capital-intensive 
wind energy. In both cases, financial capital appears to support transition to the next 
energy type on the national-level energy ladder (Burke 2013). Financial capital impacts 
on energy transitions have subsequent implications for energy supply and security, and 
environmental implications for global climate change and local pollution levels. 
For high-income countries, financial capital has been particularly important for capital-
intensive energy types such as wind, and to a lesser degree solar. The structure of 
financial systems is also relevant for energy use: countries with larger pools of domestic 
credit and debt use more wind energy as a share of total energy, while other types of 
financial capital, such as public debt and equity, have not been strongly associated with 
wind energy expansion.  
For lower-income countries, the impact of financial capital in contributing to the 
transition towards fossil fuels such as coal has a number of implications. If there is a 
continued increase in financial capital in lower-income countries, local air quality may 
deteriorate, with increased pollution from coal energy production, although pressure on 
deforestation to support biomass energy may reduce. At the global level, financial 
capital’s contribution to greater coal use in lower-income countries may exacerbate 
potential climate change risks. 
An implication of my results is that countries that experience growth in their financial 
sectors could also experience growth in energy types that are more capital-intensive 
than incumbent energy types. For the Netherlands, wind energy could grow 
considerably, given that private credit from banks divided by GDP increased by 52 
percentage points in the decade to 2013. Comparison of India and China is also relevant; 
increasing coal use could be more likely in India than in China given that private credit 
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divided by GDP has increased by 20 percentage points in India in the decade to 2013, 
but by 11 percentage points in China.  
Variation in financial sector size and growth could lead to different energy-mix paths, 
but financial capital is only one among many relevant variables affecting energy mix 
transitions. Other variables such as income and natural endowments are also important. 
For instance, hydro energy depends on precipitation and availability of water resources 
(see also Burke 2010). 
Financial policies that influence the size and structure of financial systems have 
potential to indirectly increase the use of energy types that are more capital intensive 
than incumbent energy types. This paper shows the importance of domestic private 
capital for energy transitions using data from 1998–2013, but other forms of capital 
could also play a role in different time periods. Greater use of international private 
capital could be supported by policy to reduce barriers to international finance. In 
addition, public capital could also potentially have a role in supporting new 
technologies that are perceived by private financial capital providers as too risky, before 
a track record of returns is established. Public capital could also be of greater 
importance in countries where state owned enterprises have a larger role in the energy 
sector. Future research could focus more on the role of policy for energy transitions.  
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CHAPTER 3 ADOPTION OF SOLAR AND WIND 
ENERGY: THE ROLES OF PREFERENCES AND 
POLICIES 
 
Summary: 
This paper analyses the roles of preferences and policies in national adoption of solar 
and wind energy technologies. I use cross-sectional regressions for both the European 
Union and for a broader international sample. I find that solar energy adoption has been 
larger in countries where more people are concerned about climate change. Stated 
preference for solar energy is also associated with greater adoption of solar energy. 
Aggregate levels of policy support, measured in euros per megawatt hour, appear to 
have been important for solar energy adoption. Countries with carbon pricing also use 
more solar and wind energy. The results highlight the importance of well-informed 
citizenries and directed policy effort for the early adoption of modern renewable energy 
technologies. 
3.1 Introduction 
This paper assesses the importance of potential factors that explain national-level 
adoption of solar and wind energy. I focus on determinants such as specific policies, 
aggregate policy support, and preferences, while also controlling for financial capital, 
natural resources, uncertainty, technology, income, and total energy use. I use a cross-
sectional regression approach for renewable energy use in 2014 for two groups of 
countries: a group of European Union (EU) countries and a larger international sample.  
There are a number of benefits of modern renewable energy, such as wind and solar 
energy, compared to fossil fuels, but there are also currently some disadvantages. An 
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increase in renewable energy share can diversify energy mixes that are mostly 
comprised of fossil fuels. This can reduce contributions to adverse climate change, 
reduce local pollution, and reduce geopolitical instability when fossil fuels are sourced 
from, or transported across, hostile countries. The cost of solar and wind energy has 
fallen considerably in recent years, although these modern renewable energy sources 
have been more costly than established energy sources in the past (IEA 2015; IEA 
2016b). Solar and wind energy also face intermittency issues without adequate storage 
or appropriate energy system design. 
Preferences and perceptions of citizens and politicians could be important for renewable 
energy adoption. There is potential for greater use of solar and wind energy when 
citizens have stronger preferences for these energy types and when they are more 
concerned about climate change. Citizen preferences can also be informative about the 
crucial aspect of uncertainty in policy; if there is a lack of public support for renewable 
energy, then there may be greater political preference to lessen current renewable 
energy policy support and there could be larger impediments for renewable energy 
investment. The negative impact of policy uncertainty on renewable energy investment 
has been noted in the case of the United States (Barradale 2010), but political 
preferences and uncertainty are difficult to measure directly across a global sample of 
countries. One indirect way to assess renewable energy policy uncertainty is through 
political participation in globalisation. Politicians that are more engaged at a global 
scale may have a preference for higher renewable energy use to contribute to global 
climate change action. Climate change is a key aspect of a number of global agreements 
and increasing renewable energy use is a key way to meet commitments set in global 
agreements.   
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A range of specific renewable energy and climate change policy instruments could be 
important for renewable energy adoption. Policymakers could theoretically use one 
policy instrument to target a policy goal of higher renewable energy shares of total 
energy, but multi-dimensional policy approaches may be required in a context of 
complexity. Energy policy is complex in itself, before considering the political context 
and overlapping aspects of economic, environmental, and social policy. 
A comprehensive policy variable in this paper complements other papers that have 
studied the importance of specific policies for renewable energy use. Other papers have 
found mixed results depending on what policies and what level of aggregation of 
renewable energy are used. Smith and Urpelainen (2014) find that feed-in tariffs have 
been effective in increasing renewable electricity using an instrumental variables 
approach. Polzin et al. (2015) note that feed-in tariffs are more effective for less mature 
technologies, whereas renewable portfolio standards appear more effective for mature 
technologies. Policies are not always successful; Aguirre and Ibikunle (2014) find that 
policies involving voluntary participation appear to have a negative relationship with 
renewable investment, possibly due to uncertainty from government policy changes. 
Studies also find mixed results depending on the type of policy support. Pfeiffer and 
Mulder (2013) show negative impacts on non-hydro renewable energy of institutional 
and strategic policy support measures from the IEA/IRENA Global Renewable Energy 
Policies and Measures Database, but positive impacts from economic and regulatory 
instruments. 
Carbon pricing is another specific policy approach that could influence renewable 
energy adoption. In the left half of Figure 3.1, wind and solar energy use in 2014 are 
very low for countries without a carbon price in 2009, on average. In contrast, countries 
with a carbon price in 2009 had much higher levels of wind and solar energy use in 
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2014. This depicts the relationship between carbon pricing and energy use, without 
controlling for other factors. The regressions in the results section control for other 
factors that could be important for renewable energy differences across countries. 
5Figure 3.1 Energy use, by type, split by carbon price status 
 
Notes: Energy use (wind, solar PV, and solar thermal) per capita in tonnes of oil equivalent, split by 
carbon price status in 2009 (34 countries had a carbon price in 2009). 140 countries are included with 
energy data for 2014, based on data availability. Sources: IEA (2017), Kossoy et al. (2015) 
 
In addition to more direct policies such as feed-in tariffs, renewable portfolio standards, 
and carbon pricing, broader policy measures focusing on innovation and trade could 
also affect renewable energy. Countries with a greater focus on innovation, as measured 
by the number of patents, could be faster to adopt new technology such as solar energy. 
Popp et al. (2011) analyse the impact of patents on investment in renewables capacity 
and find that technology advances do increase investment to a small extent. Johnstone 
et al. (2010) show that various polices can spur innovation: feed-in tariffs can increase 
patent numbers for solar, while renewable energy certificates can increase wind energy 
patent numbers. Together, these two studies indicate that policy can increase 
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innovation, which can increase renewable energy investment. Trade could be 
important: Omri and Nguyen (2014) find that trade openness is a driver of renewable 
energy consumption, but Pfeiffer and Mulder (2013) find a negative relationship 
between trade intensity and probability of adopting non-hydro renewable energy in 
developing countries.  
Other variables like income and national carbon dioxide emissions could also be 
important contributors to energy mix compositions. Burke (2010) finds that electricity 
use from different primary energy types follows a national-level ladder with countries 
progressing to use of different types of energy as income increases. For instance, wind 
energy is at an upper rung on the energy ladder, meaning that its use is predominantly 
by higher income countries. Sadorsky (2009) finds that higher levels of carbon dioxide 
emissions per capita drive greater subsequent renewable energy consumption in G7 
countries, possibly because of increased concern for climate change when emissions 
are higher.  
Access to large stocks of financial capital at low cost could be another important 
determinant of renewable energy use due to the high capital intensity of wind and solar 
energy. Some previous studies have found positive impacts of finance on renewables. 
Brunnschweiler (2010) shows that financial intermediation has a positive impact, 
including a positive impact of the amount of private credit from banks in a country for 
renewable electricity use. Chapter 2 finds that financial capital stocks are an important 
contributor to use of more capital-intensive energy types.   
The composition of financial sectors could also be important for energy outcomes. 
Private investors will increasingly be the source of capital for renewable energy due to 
the high government debt in many countries (Kaminker and Stewart 2012). The banking 
sector has been a key source of finance for energy investment in the past (IEA 2014), 
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but could face extra constraints due to financial regulations that discourage long-term 
energy finance (Kaminker and Stewart 2012; Ng and Tao 2016). Pension funds are a 
potentially important source of financing green growth initiatives (Della Croce et al. 
2011) given limitations on other sources. Corsatea et al. (2014) find that corporate debt 
is a major factor supporting sales of wind turbines, indicating that markets matter in 
addition to financial institutions. Whilst international sources of financing could be an 
option for some renewable energy projects, large domestic supply of financial capital 
could be important due to investor home bias. Home bias has decreased in EU countries 
following the introduction of the Euro, but there has been an increase in home bias in 
European debt markets from 2004–2012 (Battistini et al. 2013; Rubbaniy et al. 2014; 
Schoenmaker 2014; European Commission 2015). 
This paper makes a number of contributions. For instance, I separately consider wind 
and solar energy, identifying specific factors that are important for each energy type. I 
also consider fundamental and underlying factors that promote renewable energy 
including preferences and aggregate policy support. I aim to consider policy 
holistically: the policy support variable from an Ecofys (2014) report on subsidies and 
costs of energy for the European Commission, as described below, is a numerical 
measure of aggregate policy support in each EU country. This is in contrast to binary 
measures of policies. In addition, this paper also assesses the role of financial sector 
components across both markets and financial institutions. 
3.2 Method and data 
I use a cross-sectional regression approach with ordinary least squares estimates and 
standard errors that are robust to heteroscedasticity. The cross-sectional approach is 
appropriate to discover factors contributing to renewable energy adoption differences 
across countries. Uptake of wind and solar energy is a recent phenomenon, meaning it 
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is not suited to a long time-series analysis. Preferences might vary more across 
countries than across years, in the absence of specific shocks related to solar or wind 
energy, making a cross-sectional analysis suitable. The temporal dimension also 
presents considerable endogeneity risk through reverse causation. I use the following 
model to investigate the impact of preferences and policies on use of renewable energy 
types. 
                               𝑇𝑐
𝑗 =  𝑃𝑐𝛼
𝑗 + 𝑆𝑐𝛽
𝑗 +  𝒙𝑐𝜒
𝑗 +  𝜀𝑐
𝑗
  (1) 
𝑇𝑐
𝑗
 is energy use for country 𝑐 for energy type 𝑗, with two energy types being wind and 
solar energy. 𝑃𝑐 is for preferences or perceptions: this is preference for either wind 
energy or solar energy for the EU sample (percentage of respondents who think that 
their national government should focus on development of either wind or solar power 
divided by 100), and perceptions of climate change threat for the larger international 
sample (percentage of respondents who think global warming is a serious personal 
threat divided by 100). 𝑆𝑐 is a variable of policy support. For the EU sample, this is the 
aggregate measure of policy support from Ecofys (2014), with wind policy support used 
in the wind regression and solar policy support used in the solar regressions. The policy 
support variable for the global sample of countries is a binary variable with value of 1 
for countries with a carbon price at a national or sub-national level in 2009 and 0 
otherwise. There are 34 countries that had a carbon price in 2009 at a national level, 
including the 28 EU countries, or sub-national level, including the United States with 
the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative. Carbon pricing benefits renewable energy 
types by increasing the cost for substitute energy types that have to pay for their carbon 
dioxide emissions. An aggregate numerical policy variable for a global sample does not 
appear to be available. 
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𝒙𝑐 is a vector of other potential determinants including log GDP per capita, log patent 
numbers per capita, log global horizontal irradiance, log energy use per capita, 
government effectiveness, a political globalisation variable, private credit from deposit 
money banks divided by GDP, and other financial variables. The correlation of each 
potential determinant with wind and solar energy use is shown in the Appendix (Table 
A3.2). The variables with the higher correlations in Table A3.2 are related to 
preferences, policies, and financial capital. Table A3.2 also includes a number of other 
variables with lower correlations with wind and solar energy use, such as fossil fuel 
reserves and trade openness. The error term is 𝜀𝑐
𝑗
 , with 𝐸(𝜀𝑐
𝑗) = 0.  
The dependent variables are from the International Energy Agency (IEA 2017). I use 
energy use per capita levels and five-year changes, energy shares, and corresponding 
electricity data. Table 3.1 shows the average values for wind, solar PV, and solar 
thermal energy shares and per capita levels. While the average shares are relatively low, 
some countries have much higher shares. For instance, Denmark had a wind share of 
total primary energy supply of 7 percent in 2014. 
8Table 3.1 Energy use by type, 2014 
 Share (EU) Share 
(global) 
Primary energy use 
per capita (EU) 
Primary energy use 
per capita (global) 
Wind 0.013 0.004 0.038 0.010 
Solar PV 0.003 0.001 0.010 0.003 
Solar Thermal 0.003 0.001 0.008 0.003 
Notes: These mean values cover 28 countries for the EU sample and 140 countries for the global 
sample. Share is percentage of total primary energy supply divided by 100. Primary energy use per 
capita is in tonnes of oil equivalent. Source: IEA (2017). 
 
One of the key independent variables in this paper is a comprehensive measure of policy 
support, which is 𝑆𝑐 in equation (1) for the EU sample. The data are from the report by 
Ecofys (2014) which was prepared for the European Commission. The report aimed to 
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provide consistent and complete data for all of the 28 EU countries. The holistic policy 
variable includes both production and consumption support, and in general includes 
anything that directly impacts on energy costs or market prices paid by consumers. This 
includes public interventions that are direct subsidies and also indirect taxes, levies, 
regulations or measures, as well as decommission cost support, but it does not include 
risk transfers from private to public sectors. The Ecofys (2014) report breaks down the 
policies into five categories: research and development, investment support such as 
investment grants, support to production such as feed-in-tariffs, energy savings, and 
energy demand measures such as tax exemptions. The Ecofys (2014) report measures 
each of the components in euro terms, allowing summation to an aggregate measure. 
For instance, the euro values for renewable energy quotas with tradable certificates are 
either taken from national reports, or calculated as price of certificates multiplied by 
quantity of certificates.14 
For the financial data, I use the Global Financial Development Database (GFDD 2017). 
I look at different institutional and market components of financial systems. For 
financial institutions, a key variable is private credit by deposit money banks divided 
by GDP. I also investigate potential impacts of differing sizes of other institutional 
assets: pension funds, mutual funds, and insurance companies. For financial market 
variables, I consider both debt and equity. Debt components include separate variables 
for domestic private debt securities outstanding, and also international securities. For 
public debt securities, I consider a combined variable for public debt from local and 
overseas sources due to the smaller size of government borrowing from overseas 
markets. Stock market capitalisation is another source of financial capital that has been 
                                                          
14 I do not discuss the efficiency of various policy support measures because this paper has a focus on 
aggregate policy support in the early stages of solar and wind energy adoption. A comprehensive 
assessment of social efficiency could consider policy support and externalities related to each energy 
type over time. 
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found to have a positive association with clean energy (Paramati et al. 2017). The 
correlations of these variables with energy use are in Table A3.2 in the Appendix. 
I use other data sources for the other variables. For solar abundance, I use global 
horizontal irradiance from Breyer and Gerlach (2010; 2013). I use the World 
Development Indicators data from the World Bank (2016a) for gross domestic product, 
patents, trade openness, foreign direct investment, total energy use per capita, and 
population. Government effectiveness is from the Worldwide Governance Indicators 
(2015), political globalisation is from the KOF Index of Globalisation (Dreher 2006), 
weighted average cost of capital is from DiaCore (2016), renewable energy preferences 
are from an EU survey (European Commission 2006), and climate change perceptions 
are from Gallup (2009). A binary variable for carbon pricing is from a World Bank and 
Ecofys report (Kossoy et al. 2015). I also use binary variables for countries with feed-
in tariff and renewable energy certificate policies, based on the Global Status Report 
from REN21 (2011).  
Reverse causation from energy use to energy policy support is one potential source of 
endogeneity. For instance, some production or consumption subsidies are proportional 
to renewable energy use. I use lagged values for the explanatory variables to take into 
account delayed impacts and reduce endogeneity concerns. One exception is that the 
weighted average cost of capital is not lagged, due to data availability. The lag length 
is generally five years. The preference data are from more than five years prior to the 
energy use data due to the timing of the preference surveys: solar and wind preferences 
for EU citizens are from 2005, and climate change perceptions are from 2007–2008. 
These longer lags allow time for preferences and perceptions to be translated into 
policies and potential future outcomes. Impacts could be affected if preferences change 
considerably over time, but I note that there have been no clear large shocks for solar 
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or wind energy of a comparable scale to the Fukushima nuclear disaster. I use policy 
support per unit of energy (megawatt hours) as another approach to partly address the 
reverse causation potential. This measures the intensity of energy support rather than 
total size. In relation to potential reverse causation for the financial variables, I note that 
financial markets and institutions, and components of financial markets and institutions, 
are large in comparison to smaller energy types like wind and solar. Wind and solar 
markets are also very recent, while financial markets are mature in the EU generally. 
Omitted variable bias is another potential source of endogeneity. For instance, 
differences in capacity factors and technology costs between countries could cause 
differences in energy output. Not controlling for specific technology differences is a 
reasonable approach given that differences in capital expenditure are difficult to 
determine at a national level (Ondraczek et al. 2015). Another group of variables that 
could lead to omitted variable bias is fossil fuel reserves, as Burke (2010; 2013) finds 
that fossil fuel reserves are important for energy and electricity mix. Countries could 
favour use of fossil fuels as substitutes to renewable energy when they have large 
domestic reserves of fossil fuels, but the correlations between fossil fuel reserves and 
modern renewable energy use are quite low in Table A3.2. There could also be channels 
of government policy effort that are not measured by the policy variables in this paper. 
While the EU policy support variable used in this paper may not be measured perfectly, 
it is intended to be comprehensive. To further address the issue of potentially missing 
policy variables, I note that I control for government effectiveness and the cost of 
capital to incorporate views on investment attractiveness differences across countries.  
Whilst I take multiple approaches to address potential endogeneity, it is still very 
difficult to evaluate policy impacts using observed data. It is not possible to conduct a 
perfectly controlled experiment for policy impacts at the macroeconomic level. The 
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results in the next section are useful and indicative, but need to be considered in the 
context of potential endogeneity. Similar outcomes using different approaches, such as 
panel regression, can strengthen the credibility of the cross-sectional results. 
3.3 Results 
Table 3.2 shows that aggregate policy support is positively associated with solar energy 
use, all else equal. There are positive and significant coefficients for aggregate policy 
support per megawatt hour in explaining solar energy use in each of the columns except 
for the first column. An increase in aggregate policy support of one euro per megawatt 
hour is associated with an increase of 0.002 percentage points in solar energy share in 
the second column, and an increase of 0.005 percentage points in solar electricity share 
in the fifth column. One euro per megawatt hour is a small magnitude relative to the 
average support of approximately 200 euro per megawatt hour. There are also positive 
and significant coefficients for aggregate policy support in explaining changes in solar 
energy and electricity use per capita in the third and sixth columns respectively. 
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9Table 3.2 Results for solar energy, European Union countries, 2014 
 Solar energy 
per capita 
Solar share of 
energy  
Solar energy 
p.c. change 
Solar 
electricity pc 
Solar share of 
electricity 
Solar elect. 
p.c. change 
Preference for solar energy (lag) 0.063** 0.019 0.007 0.194 0.008 0.196 
    (0.025) (0.014) (0.025) (0.273) (0.053) (0.253) 
Solar policy support per megawatt hour (lag) 0.026 0.018*** 0.036** 0.322** 0.047** 0.239** 
 (0.018) (0.006) (0.016) (0.138) (0.024) (0.112) 
Private credit divided by GDP (lag)  0.005** -0.001 -0.058 -0.015 -0.077 
   (0.002) (0.006) (0.053) (0.011) (0.050) 
Weighted average cost of capital  -0.000 -0.001 -0.022 -0.002 -0.019 
     (0.001) (0.001) (0.018) (0.003) (0.016) 
Log global horizontal irradiance  0.007 0.012 0.005 0.019 0.004 
  (0.010) (0.014) (0.148) (0.030) (0.139) 
Log GDP per capita (lag)  0.004 -0.002 0.003 0.027 0.044 
  (0.006) (0.015) (0.169) (0.031) (0.165) 
Log patents per capita (lag)  -0.004*** -0.000 -0.000 -0.002 -0.004 
  (0.002) (0.004) (0.036) (0.006) (0.029) 
Log energy use per capita (lag)  -0.003 -0.007 -0.112 -0.029* -0.117 
  (0.006) (0.008) (0.091) (0.016) (0.085) 
Observations 28 25 25 25 25 25 
R2 0.479 0.821 0.514 0.475 0.446 0.456 
Notes:  ***, **, * show statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent level respectively. Policy support, GDP per capita, private credit, patents, and energy use are 
lagged by 5 years. Preference for solar energy is based on a survey from 2005. Weighted average cost of capital is based on interviews of market participants in 
2014. Global horizontal irradiance is from a study by Breyer and Gerlach (2010). Robust standard errors are in brackets below the coefficients. Coefficients for 
constants are not shown. Variable definitions and units are in Table A3.1 in the Appendix. Panel results with the between estimator and independent variables lagged 
by two years also produce some positive and significant coefficients for solar preference, aggregate policy support, and private credit.  
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Preference for solar energy is positively associated with solar energy use for the EU 
sample of countries in Table 3.2. The solar preference variable has significance at the 
five percent level in the first column that includes preference and policy independent 
variables for the full sample of 28 EU countries. Reverse causality may not be a major 
threat here, as preferences are lagged by nine years. The coefficients are not significant 
when controlling for additional variables in the other columns, but the coefficients are 
positive in each case. There is a significant positive coefficient for solar preference in 
explaining solar thermal energy share (rather than total solar energy share) with the 
additional controls (Table A3.4 in the Appendix). 
Most of the controls in Table 3.2 are not significant. This is partly due to the small 
sample of EU countries. There is a negative coefficient, significant at the one percent 
level, for the log of (total) patent numbers in explaining solar energy share. Greater 
focus on technological development in a country does not appear to add to domestic 
solar energy use for the EU sample, although the patents variable is for all patents rather 
than just the solar energy industry. There is also a positive and significant coefficient 
for the private credit variable in the solar share of energy regression. These significant 
coefficients relate primarily to solar thermal energy, as shown in Table A3.4 in the 
Appendix, rather than solar photovoltaic energy. Patents and private credit are not 
significant in any of the solar electricity columns. Large fractions of variation in solar 
energy use are explained by the regressions in Table 3.2 for the relatively small and 
homogenous group of EU countries. 
Table 3.3 also suggests that preferences make a considerable contribution to solar 
energy use. The variable for the percentage of citizens in each country that view climate 
change as a personal threat is closely related with renewable energy preference, as using 
renewable energy instead of fossil fuels is a primary way to address climate change 
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concerns. This variable has positive and significant coefficients in each of the six 
columns. For a one percentage point increase in proportion of citizens perceiving 
climate change to be a serious personal threat, there is an increase of 0.005 percentage 
points in solar share of energy in the second column and 0.02 percentage points in solar 
share of electricity in the fifth column. These are small effects relative to the average 
shares in Table 3.1, but a one percentage point increase in climate change perception is 
also small. 
There are positive and significant coefficients for the carbon price variable in five of 
the six columns of Table 3.3.15 For instance, the coefficient for the binary carbon price 
variable is significant at the one percent level in explaining the change in solar energy 
use per capita in the third column. A caveat for a potential causal interpretation of the 
positive and significant coefficient for the carbon price variable is that carbon prices 
are not exogenous treatments; it is difficult to make causal policy inferences using 
observational data (Athey and Imbens 2017). Carbon prices could be more likely in 
countries that employ other policies favouring solar energy or in countries where 
renewable energy lobbyists are more successful and it is difficult to control for all 
aspects of the policy context. The carbon price variable is still significant when 
controlling for a binary feed-in tariff variable in the final three columns. This binary 
feed-in tariff variable has a positive correlation with solar energy use per capita, as 
shown in Table A3.2. 
Most of the controls are not significant in Table 3.3, similar to Table 3.2, but there are 
some notable exceptions. The log of global horizontal irradiance has positive and 
significant coefficients in three columns, suggesting that countries with more abundant 
                                                          
15 Results are very similar if only countries with a carbon price at a national level are assigned a value 
of 1 and countries with only sub-national carbon prices (United States and Canada in 2009) are 
assigned a value of 0. 
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solar resources have greater solar energy use. This is primarily for solar photovoltaic 
energy, as shown in Table A3.5 in the Appendix, rather than solar thermal energy. 
There is also a positive and significant coefficient for the global political participation 
variable in the third column for the change in solar energy use per capita. The patents 
variable is not included in Table 3.3 to increase the sample size.
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10Table 3.3 Results for solar energy, global sample of countries, 2014 
 Solar energy 
per capita 
Solar share of 
energy  
Solar energy 
p.c. change 
Solar electricity 
pc 
Solar share of 
electricity 
Solar elect. p.c. 
change 
Perceived threat of climate change (lag) 0.023** 0.005* 0.008* 0.089* 0.017* 0.080* 
    (0.009) (0.003) (0.004) (0.050) (0.009) (0.048) 
Carbon price (lag) 0.009** 0.004 0.012*** 0.104** 0.024*** 0.092** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.043) (0.008) (0.041) 
Private credit divided by GDP (lag)  0.004** 0.005 0.010 0.004 -0.001 
   (0.002) (0.004) (0.034) (0.005) (0.028) 
Globalisation: political participation (lag)  0.003 0.006* 0.064 0.010 0.052 
  (0.003) (0.004) (0.048) (0.009) (0.047) 
Government effectiveness (lag)  0.000 -0.002 -0.006 -0.005 -0.002 
     (0.002) (0.002) (0.023) (0.004) (0.021) 
Log global horizontal irradiance  0.016** 0.014* 0.118 0.027** 0.098 
  (0.006) (0.007) (0.077) (0.014) (0.068) 
Log GDP per capita (lag)  0.001 0.001 0.011 0.004 0.010 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.015) (0.003) (0.014) 
Log energy use per capita (lag)  -0.000 0.000 0.009 -0.000 0.008 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.014) (0.002) (0.013) 
Feed-in tariff (lag)    0.022 0.003 0.019 
    (0.015) (0.003) (0.014) 
Observations 107 93 93 74 74 74 
R2 0.133 0.277 0.458 0.413 0.438 0.406 
Notes:  ***, **, * show statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent level respectively. GDP per capita, private credit, globalisation: political participation, 
government effectiveness, and energy use are lagged by 5 years. Perceived threat of climate change is based on a survey from 2007–2008. Carbon price is a binary 
variable with value of 1 for countries that had a carbon price in 2009, and feed-in tariff is a binary variable with value of 1 for countries that had adopted feed-in 
tariffs prior to 2011. Global horizontal irradiance is from a study by Breyer and Gerlach (2010). Results are similar when controlling for fossil fuel reserves per 
capita. Robust standard errors are in brackets below the coefficients. Coefficients for constants are not shown. Variable definitions and units are in Table A3.1 in the 
Appendix. 
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Preferences and policies are not key determinants of wind energy for the EU sample of 
countries in Table 3.4. There is a positive coefficient for wind energy preference in the 
first column, significant at the ten percent level, but the significance disappears in the 
other columns with additional controls. None of the wind policy support coefficients 
are significant.  
Financial capital has been important for wind energy. Private credit from deposit money 
banks divided by GDP has positive and significant coefficients in each instance at either 
five or one percent levels of significance. For a one percentage point increase in the 
private credit variable, the wind share of energy increases by 0.02 percentage points, 
all else equal. The coefficients for domestic private debt are also positive and significant 
at the one percent level in three of the columns: wind energy share, wind electricity use 
per capita, and wind share of electricity. This variable also has the highest correlation 
with wind energy use per capita in Table A3.2 in the Appendix. The positive 
contribution of financial capital to wind energy suggests that this capital-intensive 
energy type benefits from larger supplies of private capital. Also, the cost of capital 
coefficient is not significant, suggesting that quantity of financial capital available has 
been more important for wind energy than the price of capital.  
Table 3.5 shows a positive contribution of policy for wind energy, with the carbon 
pricing variable being significant at the one percent level in each column. The carbon 
price variable is still significant when controlling for adoption of renewable energy 
certificates. The coefficient magnitudes for the carbon price variable are larger in Table 
3.5 than for solar energy in Table 3.3, due to the larger amount of wind energy use 
compared to solar energy use. 
In Table 3.5, financial capital is again a key contributor, with positive and significant 
coefficients for private credit in each case except for the final column with change in 
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wind electricity use per capita as the dependent variable. To assess another financial 
component, I use insurance company assets instead of domestic private debt for the 
global sample in Table 3.5. The correlation of insurance company asset size and wind 
energy per capita is also high in Table A3.2 in the Appendix and many countries have 
data missing for domestic private debt. The coefficients for insurance company asset 
size in Table 3.5 are not significant.  
Table 3.5 also has some other notable coefficients. Log GDP per capita has positive 
and significant coefficients and log of total energy use per capita has negative and 
significant coefficients in two columns. The positive coefficients for log GDP per capita 
for the global sample in Table 3.5 contrast with the negative coefficients for log GDP 
per capita in Table 3.4 for the EU sample. Climate change perception does not have a 
significant relationship with wind energy in any of the six columns of Table 3.5. 
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11Table 3.4 Results for wind energy, European Union countries, 2014 
 Wind energy 
per capita 
Wind share of 
energy  
Wind energy 
p.c. change 
Wind 
electricity pc 
Wind share of 
electricity 
Wind elect. 
p.c. change 
Preference for wind energy (lag) 0.182* -0.009 0.038 -0.017 -0.015 0.443 
    (0.095) (0.025) (0.040) (0.695) (0.124) (0.462) 
Wind policy support per megawatt hour (lag) -0.121 -0.014 -0.041 -1.150 0.034 -0.479 
 (0.185) (0.065) (0.139) (2.407) (0.293) (1.619) 
Private credit divided by GDP (lag)  0.018*** 0.023** 0.481** 0.081*** 0.263** 
   (0.007) (0.010) (0.195) (0.029) (0.111) 
Weighted average cost of capital  0.001 0.000 0.023 0.003 0.001 
     (0.002) (0.002) (0.047) (0.008) (0.026) 
Log global horizontal irradiance  0.007 -0.008 0.112 -0.009 -0.088 
  (0.016) (0.026) (0.494) (0.073) (0.298) 
Log GDP per capita (lag)  -0.040* -0.030 -0.870 -0.183* -0.353 
  (0.023) (0.030) (0.569) (0.101) (0.350) 
Log patents per capita (lag)  0.003 0.004 0.140 0.011 0.044 
  (0.004) (0.007) (0.131) (0.017) (0.077) 
Log energy use per capita (lag)  0.013 0.020 0.481 0.026 0.234 
  (0.013) (0.031) (0.519) (0.055) (0.357) 
Domestic private debt divided by GDP (lag)  0.033*** 0.021 0.925*** 0.188*** 0.243 
  (0.007) (0.017) (0.259) (0.027) (0.201) 
Observations 28 22 22 22 22 22 
R2 0.223 0.814 0.612 0.792 0.875 0.612 
Notes:  ***, **, * show statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent level respectively. Policy support, GDP per capita, private credit, private debt, patents, and 
energy use are lagged by 5 years. Preference for wind energy is based on a survey from 2005. Weighted average cost of capital is based on interviews of market 
participants in 2014. Global horizontal irradiance (GHI) is from a study by Breyer and Gerlach (2010). Robust standard errors are in brackets below the coefficients. 
Coefficients for constants are not shown. Excluding Denmark, which has large financial markets and wind energy consumption per capita, produces similar results. 
There are also similar results using panel regression: positive and significant coefficients for private credit and private debt (using the fixed effects estimator with 
time fixed effects, independent variables lagged by two years, and a modified list of controls due to data availability, including climate change perception instead of 
wind energy preference). 
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12Table 3.5 Results for wind energy, global sample of countries, 2014 
 Wind energy 
per capita 
Wind share of 
energy  
Wind energy 
p.c. change 
Wind 
electricity pc 
Wind share of 
electricity 
Wind elect. 
p.c. change 
Perceived threat of climate change (lag) 0.009 0.002 -0.006 -0.155 -0.002 -0.079 
    (0.014) (0.007) (0.008) (0.208) (0.038) (0.105) 
Carbon price (lag) 0.040*** 0.012*** 0.014*** 0.380*** 0.073*** 0.160*** 
 (0.009) (0.003) (0.004) (0.097) (0.019) (0.055) 
Private credit divided by GDP (lag)  0.017*** 0.012* 0.425** 0.092*** 0.138 
   (0.005) (0.007) (0.182) (0.034) (0.087) 
Globalisation: political participation (lag)  -0.007 -0.006 -0.228 -0.081 -0.116 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.212) (0.059) (0.104) 
Government effectiveness (lag)  -0.002 0.002 -0.003 -0.019 0.020 
     (0.002) (0.002) (0.062) (0.012) (0.034) 
Log global horizontal irradiance  0.007 -0.004 0.135 0.049 -0.026 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.184) (0.035) (0.093) 
Log GDP per capita (lag)  0.003** 0.002 0.081 0.028** 0.029 
  (0.001) (0.002) (0.059) (0.011) (0.028) 
Log energy use per capita (lag)  -0.005*** -0.003 -0.103 -0.034** -0.048 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.068) (0.014) (0.032) 
Insurance company assets divided by GDP (lag)  -0.001 0.010 0.207 0.018 0.123 
  (0.005) (0.010) (0.210) (0.034) (0.140) 
Renewable energy certificates (lag)    -0.049 0.004 0.005 
    (0.071) (0.013) (0.044) 
Observations 108 86 86 71 71 71 
R2 0.402 0.595 0.590 0.657 0.548 0.573 
Notes: ***, **, * show statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent level respectively. GDP per capita, private credit, globalisation: political participation, 
government effectiveness, insurance company assets, and energy use are lagged by 5 years. Perceived threat of climate change is based on a survey from 2007–2008. 
Carbon price and renewable energy certificates are binary variables with value of 1 for countries that had these policies in 2009 and 2011 respectively. Global 
horizontal irradiance is from a study by Breyer and Gerlach (2010). Robust standard errors are in brackets below the coefficients. Coefficients for constants are not 
shown. Variable definitions and units are in Table A3.1 in the Appendix. Excluding Demark, which has large financial markets and wind energy consumption per 
capita, produces similar results. Additional controls for natural resource endowments (fossil fuel reserves per capita and wind energy potential (based on Lu et al. 
2009)) are not significant at the ten percent level and their inclusion does not have major impacts on other coefficients. 
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3.4 Discussion 
This paper finds differing impacts of preferences and policies on wind and solar energy 
use. Aggregate policy support has been important for solar energy, and there is also 
evidence of a positive impact of solar energy preference on solar energy use. Preference 
for solar energy may also have been fuelled by climate change concerns, as transition 
to renewable energy sources is key way to lessen the threat of climate change. In 
addition, there is a positive association between carbon pricing and solar energy use. 
For wind energy, the size of domestic financial capital supplies has been crucial, as has 
implementation of carbon pricing. I find these results using cross-sectional regressions 
and energy data from 2014 using two samples of national-level data: one for 28 EU 
countries, and a second global sample. 
Preferences are important for renewable energy adoption as pre-cursors of policies. 
Governments theoretically should have a goal of increasing social welfare; greater 
preference for solar energy could potentially be evident in greater policy support for 
solar energy. Politicians have greater incentive to remove or lessen any existing solar 
support policies if public preference for solar energy is lower, adding to uncertainty and 
acting as an impediment to solar energy investment. The expectation of a positive 
relationship between solar energy preference and solar energy use is confirmed in this 
paper. There is also a positive relationship between preferences and solar energy using 
a more general survey of preferences on whether climate change is a major personal 
threat.  
The contribution of preferences to solar energy outcomes implies that an emphasis on 
education is important. Educators and policymakers could give greater attention to 
explaining the fundamental issues and principles related to climate change and 
renewable energy policy. In particular, they could encourage long-term, balanced, and 
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holistic perspectives. This could incorporate the many implications of energy mix 
including pollution, climate change, energy import dependency, cost projections over 
the long term, uncertainty, irreversible investments, and intermittency. In-depth 
knowledge of climate change may not be necessary for individuals, but a general 
understanding could be useful. This greater focus on education could provide a more 
solid foundation, encouraging support for evidence-based policies, and reducing 
uncertainty of adverse future policy change. 
I also find in this paper that aggregate amounts of policy support are important. A 
comprehensive measure of policy support for solar energy per megawatt hour in EU 
countries has a positive relationship with solar energy use. Solar energy has previously 
lacked cost-competitiveness, requiring considerable support per unit of energy 
production. Governments can choose from a range of policies, including those in the 
holistic policy support variable used in this paper: research and development, 
investment support, consumption support, energy savings, and energy demand. While 
I find that aggregate policy support has contributed to greater solar energy use, I do not 
assess the efficiency of this policy support.  
The positive relationship of carbon pricing with wind and solar energy suggests that 
policy composition is important in addition to aggregate policy support. Governments 
could further consider the merits of carbon pricing, not only as a low-cost approach to 
reducing carbon dioxide emissions, but also with direct evidence of support for some 
types of renewable energy. For example, the Australian government could reconsider 
the benefits of carbon pricing following the decision to remove the previous carbon-
pricing scheme. Australia has abundant solar resources, but has lower solar energy use 
than a number of European countries. Future research could consider extension of the 
carbon pricing variable to a numerical measure, rather than a binary variable. 
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The importance of financial capital for wind energy use is also evident in this paper. 
The aggregate size of financial institutions such as banks is an important contributor to 
wind energy use in both EU and global samples. Denmark is an example of a country 
with a large financial sector and large wind energy use. Financial market composition 
has also been important historically, as larger amounts of outstanding domestic private 
debt is another factor that has supported wind energy use. The importance of financial 
capital remains when taking policies and preferences into account.   
Another policy implication from this paper is that financial policies can complement 
direct carbon and energy policies. Financial sector policies help to determine the 
structure of financial systems (Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine 2008) which can then have 
an impact on energy outcomes. This is particularly important for capital-intensive 
energy types as there are differences in which financial segment has been most 
important for each energy type. Any policy that favours debt over equity could have 
indirect impacts on wind energy, given that the results in this paper show that debt is 
important for wind energy. 
Sources of financial capital for future investment in renewable energy do not 
necessarily need to be similar to the past if barriers to investment can be overcome and 
the low proportion of total investment going to renewables can be increased. For 
instance, large pension fund allocations directly to sustainable energy infrastructure 
were only a fraction of one percent of their investments in 2013 (OECD 2015b). Change 
may have begun, as institutional investors are showing increasing interest in climate-
aligned bonds, with growing investment in recent years (Climate Bonds Initiative 
2015). Financial policy could consider barriers to energy investment such as financial 
regulations, one of a number of barriers to institutional investment in renewable energy 
(Nelson and Pierpont 2013). For instance, pension funds face renewable energy 
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constraints such as investment restrictions, solvency regulations, and liquidity 
requirements. Pension fund investment restrictions vary by jurisdiction, but there can 
be limitations on asset classes and restrictions to higher-rated assets. Defined benefit 
pension funds also need to meet certain solvency thresholds, encouraging investment 
in established low-risk assets that are less likely to contribute to breach of solvency 
thresholds.  
A multifaceted approach to renewable energy policy is appropriate, given the 
complexity of energy systems and societies. The importance of preferences supports 
additional focus on education, through schools and the media, on broad implications of 
using different energy types. Establishing or maintaining a stable context for investment 
is a key requirement for policymakers, with education being a factor that can potentially 
contribute to greater stability. This paper also provides evidence in support of carbon 
pricing, suggesting that carbon pricing is an important component of comprehensive 
renewable energy policy approaches. The impact of financial capital on renewable 
energy outcomes also suggests that policymakers could consider financial policy as a 
component of renewable energy policy.   
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CHAPTER 4 THE IMPORTANCE OF GOVERNMENT 
EFFECTIVENESS FOR THE ELECTRICITY SECTOR IN 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
 
Summary: 
Electricity is a vital factor underlying modern living standards, but there are many 
developing countries with low levels of electricity use. This paper finds that the 
effectiveness of governments is the most important governance attribute for increasing 
electricity use in developing countries on average. I use cross-sectional regression and 
instrumental variable approaches with national-level data up to 2012 for 135 low and 
middle-income countries. The paper adds to the growing evidence on the importance 
of governance for development outcomes. Donors seeking to make more successful 
contributions to electrification should target countries with more effective 
governments. 
4.1 Introduction 
Electricity is the highest-quality energy form and a vital facilitator of modern living 
standards and production processes. Providing access to modern energy services, such 
as electricity, is a key objective of developing countries (Winkler et al. 2011). 
Developing countries vary greatly in terms of their success in providing widespread 
access to electricity to their populations.16 In 2012, in the average developing country, 
68 percent of the population had residential access to electricity, but some countries 
had much lower levels. Less than a quarter of the population had access to electricity 
                                                          
16 For this paper, developing countries are low and middle-income countries based on World Bank 
income categories in 2016. 
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in 2012 in many Sub-Saharan African countries and some Pacific Island countries 
(World Bank 2016a). In 2014, over one billion people, about three times the population 
of the United States, did not have access to electricity (World Bank 2017). There is, 
however, relatively little systematic evidence on the reasons why some developing 
countries have been more successful in electricity provision than others. This paper uses 
data from many sources to provide systematic evidence for the key factors underlying 
electricity sector development.  
The importance of electricity use is evident when considering a range of economic, 
social, health, and environmental impacts. Electricity is crucial from an economic 
perspective, as it is an important factor of production (Stern 2011). Economic impacts 
of electrification are also evident at the household level, with increased labour supply 
following electrification in some cases (Grogan and Sadanand 2013; Salmon and 
Tanguy 2016). Children benefit from electricity as there is more time available for 
education when electricity reduces the need to collect fuelwood (World Bank 2010). 
Effects of electricity on fertility have been found, with the direction of impact differing 
for rural and urban households (Peters and Vance 2011). Electricity use can also reduce 
a leading disease risk factor, household air pollution from solid fuel use (Lim et al. 
2012). Further, electricity can be better than solid fuels from an environmental 
perspective. For example, electricity use provides an opportunity to reduce 
deforestation, although the range of impacts will depend on the fuel used to generate 
electricity. The importance of electricity is also evident in its inclusion in United 
Nations Sustainable Development Goal number 7, as well as the increasing focus on 
electricity outcomes in Africa (USAID 2016; Ouedraogo 2017). 
Institutions are important for economic growth (Acemoglu et al. 2001; Acemoglu et al. 
2005), although there is less literature on the role of governance for broader 
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development outcomes (Sen 2014). Two studies that do assess the role of governance 
for development outcomes are those by Rajkumar and Swaroop (2008), who find that 
public spending improves health and education outcomes when governance is good, 
and Halleröd et al. (2013), who find that quality of governance affects basic human 
needs. The importance of institutions and governance for some energy outcomes has 
been assessed in a number of recent studies (Nilsson and Nykvist 2016; Moncada et al. 
2017). If governance also has an impact on electricity sector outcomes, there can be 
flow-on impacts to many development outcomes that relate to electricity availability.  
There are a number of different governance attributes (Kaufmann et al. 2009; 
Kaufmann et al. 2010) that could be important for electricity use. For instance, 
governments that are effective in general are also more likely to be effective in 
electricity provision. Onyeji et al. (2012) find that government effectiveness seems to 
explain more of the variation in electricity in Sub-Saharan African countries compared 
to other countries, while Magnani and Vaona (2016) find that efficiency in revenue 
mobilisation is positively related to access to electricity. The degree of corruption could 
be another factor impacting on electricity use. Dal Bó and Rossi (2007) find that more 
corruption in a country is associated with lower efficiency in electric utility firms in a 
sample of Latin American countries. Estache et al. (2009) also find that corruption has 
negative impacts for the electricity sector. 
Effective governments could be important for electricity sectors for many reasons. 
Large fixed costs of electricity infrastructure mean that natural monopolies exist in 
electricity sectors. The large scale and complexity of electrification programs requires 
long-term commitment, prioritisation, and planning, along with the large up-front 
investments (IEA 2011). Public sector involvement in electrification is also crucial 
when there are major obstacles for the private sector. Private sector involvement may 
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be particularly limited in rural areas, due to reasons such as the small size of the market, 
population dispersion, and weak paying capacity of consumers (Bhattacharyya 2013). 
Also, secure supply of electricity can be regarded as possessing public good 
characteristics (Abbott 2001).The major role of governments in electrification is 
emphasised by Bhattacharyya (2012, p. 265): ‘it is not sufficient to have the legal 
framework or organisational arrangement for a successful electrification programme. It 
requires a strong government commitment and financial support, a strong strategy and 
a systematic plan to bring success.’ Strong government commitment is a common 
theme for developing countries achieving success in electrification, such as in South 
Africa (Bhattacharyya 2013), Vietnam (Ostojic et al. 2011), and Indonesia (Asian 
Development Bank 2016). In contrast to these successful historical outcomes, weak 
governance is associated with weak outcomes for electrification in some countries in 
Sub-Saharan Africa (Bhattacharyya 2013).  
The degree of democracy in a country could be important for electrification. 
Democracies produce higher levels of public services than autocratic regimes (Lake 
and Baum 2001) in some cases, including increased electrification in South Africa 
(Kroth et al. 2016). For a sample of African countries, Ahlborg et al. (2015) find that 
democracy has a positive impact on household electricity consumption per capita. 
Trotter (2016) presents evidence that there is a positive association between democracy 
and rural electrification in Sub-Saharan Africa. For small island developing states, 
Boräng et al. (2016) find that democracy supports electricity consumption when the 
level of corruption is low. Others have also suggested that more authoritarian 
governments could be beneficial: Wolfram et al. (2012), for example, note the 
conjecture that electricity access in China is greater than India partly because of the 
strong authoritarian government in China.  
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A range of government reforms and policies can potentially impact on electricity use. 
Reform related specifically to the energy sector could potentially have major impacts 
on the electricity sector, although experiences are mixed. Energy reform has led to 
modest efficiency gains in the context of incomplete and uneven reform processes in 
developing countries (Kessides 2012; Pollitt 2012; Jamasb et al. 2017). Reform outside 
the energy sector could also be important. Nepal and Jamasb (2012a) note that power 
sector reform is interdependent with reforms in other sectors, meaning that overall 
government effectiveness or regulatory quality could be influential for electricity use. 
This paper does not focus on the impact of electricity-sector-specific policies but rather 
is about the impact of government effectiveness in general. The mixed results of 
previous reform attempts (Boccanfuso et al. 2009; Kessides 2012; Pollitt 2012; Jamasb 
et al. 2017) suggests that success in electricity development may be about more than 
implementing one or more specific electricity sector policies. Rather, the scale and 
complexity of electrification programs may require a more fundamental level of 
government effectiveness, in order to apply a broad range of inter-connected policies 
that are suitable in the dynamic context of each country. Governments face many 
competing goals, and commitment to electrification programs requires planning and 
prioritisation while making trade-offs among competing interests. Previous case studies 
also support the investigation of general government effectiveness rather than sector-
specific policies: some case studies of electrification success focus more on 
fundamental skills such as commitment, balancing competing interests, and 
prioritisation rather than sector-specific policies (Ostojic et. al. 2011; Bhattacharyya 
2013, for example).  
This paper contributes by comprehensively assessing the impact of government 
effectiveness on electricity outcomes including electricity capacity, access, 
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consumption, transmission and distribution losses, and quality of supply. I focus on 
deep determinants rather than sector-specific government policies to assess the impact 
of enduring factors that contribute to electricity outcomes. I use a sample of up to 135 
low and middle-income countries, and combine numerous data sources. I aim to explain 
multiple dimensions of electricity use, while controlling for a wide range of important 
factors. This is the first paper to document the role of government effectiveness for 
electricity sector development with such a broad coverage of developing countries, 
electricity dimensions, and deep determinants. I include a number of robustness tests, 
including an instrumental variable approach and a model that uses changes in the 
dependent variable, to address potential endogeneity. The next section considers 
variation in electricity use for developing countries, followed by the more systematic 
approach. 
4.2 Initial evidence 
Figure 4.1 shows the countries with final electricity consumption per capita of less than 
250 kilowatt hours per year (an arbitrary threshold to identify low electricity 
consumption). These countries are predominantly in Africa. For Asia and the Pacific it 
is more mixed; some countries have low consumption of electricity but most others 
have consumption above the 250 kilowatt hour per capita threshold in 2012.17 The 
highlighted countries are generally low-income or lower middle-income countries, 
emphasizing the importance of controlling for income when testing for the impact of 
government effectiveness on electricity consumption per capita. 
 
                                                          
17 Nepal, Myanmar, Cambodia, Timor-Leste, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, and Kiribati have electricity 
consumption per capita below 250 kilowatt hours in 2012. 
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6Figure 4.1 Countries with low electricity consumption per capita, 2012 
 
Notes: Countries shaded in red if final electricity consumption per capita in 2012 was less than 250 
kilowatt hours. Data is missing for Eritrea and Kosovo. Sources: UN (2016a), World Bank (2016a) 
 
While there is a positive relationship between government effectiveness and electricity 
consumption, evident in Figure 4.2, there is considerable variation around the line of 
best fit suggesting other factors apart from government effectiveness are important. 
Some countries such as Malaysia have relatively high electricity consumption and 
government effectiveness scores. In contrast, over half of developing countries have 
final electricity consumption per capita of less than one megawatt hour per year, 
including countries such as Chad, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau, and Haiti.18  
 
 
 
                                                          
18 One megawatt hour per capita equates to a value of zero for the log scale in Figure 4.2. 
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7Figure 4.2 Government effectiveness and electricity consumption, 2012 
 
Notes: Government effectiveness and log of final electricity consumption (megawatt hours per capita). 
Data are unavailable for some small countries. The most populous country for which data are 
unavailable is Eritrea. Sources: UN (2016a), Worldwide Governance Indicators (2015), World Bank 
(2016a) 
 
As with electricity consumption, there is also considerable variation across developing 
countries in access to electricity. Figure 4.3 shows the relationship between government 
effectiveness and electricity access. There is a positive relationship between 
government effectiveness and electricity access, although it is a weaker relationship 
than that in Figure 4.2. Countries such as Vietnam have achieved close to universal 
access, while others such as Cambodia have lower levels of access at 31 percent in 
2012. 
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8Figure 4.3 Government effectiveness and electricity access, 2012 
 
Notes: Government effectiveness and electricity access (percentage of population divided by 100). 
Electricity access data from the World Bank (2016a) includes some estimates. Sources: Worldwide 
Governance Indicators (2015), World Bank (2016a) 
 
4.3 Method and data 
To assess the impact of government effectiveness on electricity use more 
systematically, this paper uses a cross-sectional regression approach with data up to 
2012 for all low and middle-income countries.19 The cross-sectional approach uses 
variation between countries, and is appropriate given that some of the dependent 
variables, including electricity quality and access to electricity, do not have extensive 
historical time series. For robustness, I also consider the between estimator with panel 
data. The between estimator is a suitable panel estimator for assessing long-run 
relationships (Stern 2010).  
I estimate the following equation: 
                                                          
19 Subject to data availability. Income groups are based on 2016 income classifications. 
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                               𝐸𝑐
𝑗 =  𝐺𝑐𝛼
𝑗 + 𝑥′𝑐 𝛽
𝑗 +  𝜀𝑐
𝑗
  (1)   
with 𝐸𝑐
𝑗
 being the electricity dependent variable in separate regressions for each of the 
𝑗 electricity variables in 2012 including log electricity capacity per capita, log final 
consumption of electricity per capita, log household consumption of electricity per 
capita, access to electricity, electricity transmission and distribution losses, and quality 
of electricity supply. The 𝑐 subscript is for each of the countries. I initially use ordinary 
least squares estimates with standard errors that are robust to heteroscedasticity. The 
error term is 𝜀𝑐
𝑗
. I also use an instrumental variables approach. As explained later, I use 
1950 life expectancy to instrument for 2012 government effectiveness. 
The electricity variables that I use as dependent variables are from the World Bank 
(2016a), United Nations (2016b), and World Economic Forum (2016). Data for 
household electricity consumption and for final consumption are from the UN, as is 
electricity capacity. I convert these electricity variables into per capita terms using 
population data from the World Bank, and then calculate the natural logs. I also use 
World Bank data for the percentage of the population that has access to electricity, and 
for electricity transmission and distribution losses as a percentage of output.20 
Electricity quality index values, measuring the reliability of supply, are from the World 
Economic Forum. Data quality for electricity consumption and capacity is probably 
better than for access to electricity; access data from the World Bank are collected from 
a number of sources, including nationally representative household surveys, but with 
some estimated data. The World Bank uses a modelling approach that incorporates 
regional electricity access data when there are missing data points (World Bank 2014). 
                                                          
20 The International Energy Agency is an alternative data source for electricity access, but offers less 
comprehensive data coverage. 
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My key independent variable, 𝐺𝑐, is government effectiveness. I use the government 
effectiveness variable from the Worldwide Governance Indicators (2015). The variable 
is based on 48 components that measure perceptions of the quality of public service 
delivery, policy formulation, and policy implementation. While there is potential for 
measurement error in any governance indicator, including perceptions-based measures, 
the Worldwide Governance Indicators are widely relied upon (Kaufmann et al. 2009). 
Only two of the 48 components of government effectiveness relate to electricity: 
coverage of the electricity grid, and how problematic electricity is for growth of 
business. The government effectiveness variable is thus suitably distinct from variables 
measuring electricity capacity, consumption, access, transmission and distribution 
losses, and quality of supply. As an alternative measure I also use state effectiveness 
from the State Fragility Index (Marshall and Cole 2014). Electricity is not an explicit 
component of the state effectiveness variable that is comprised of four components: 
economic, social, political, and security effectiveness. Table 4.1 shows the range of 
values for government effectiveness, and also summarises the data for the electricity 
dependent variables.  
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13Table 4.1 Electricity use and government effectiveness, developing countries, 
2012 
Variable Min. Mean Max. Standard 
Deviation 
Electricity capacity per capita 0.003 0.38 2.51 0.45 
Household electricity consumption per capita 0.005 0.38 2.11 0.39 
Final electricity consumption per capita 0.01 1.14 5.19 1.15 
Electricity access 0.05 0.68 1.00 0.33 
Transmission and distribution losses 0.06 0.17 0.83 0.11 
Electricity quality 1.18 3.66 6.03 1.28 
Government effectiveness -2.23 -0.56 1.01 0.63 
Notes: Electricity capacity is in kilowatts. Electricity consumption is in megawatt hours. Electricity 
access is percent of population with access to electricity divided by 100. Electricity transmission and 
distribution losses are percent of electricity output divided by 100. Electricity quality and government 
effectiveness are index values. Electricity quality ranges from 1 for extremely unreliable to 7 for 
extremely reliable. Government effectiveness is distributed over a standard normal.  
 
I also assess the impact on electricity of other governance attributes, to examine the 
relative importance of government effectiveness for electricity sector development vis-
à-vis other governance attributes. Using the Worldwide Governance Indicators (2015), 
these other governance attributes are regulatory quality, political stability, voice and 
accountability, rule of law, and control of corruption. These other governance attributes 
are described in Appendix Table A4.1. 
There are a number of geographical or demographic aspects that could be important for 
differences in electricity use across countries. For instance, there could be electricity 
demand differences for heating and cooling purposes due to temperature differences 
between countries. The impact of temperature on power interruptions is also important 
in developing countries (Al-Sumaiti et al. 2017). Other factors include population 
density and the percentage of the population in rural areas. Electricity network 
extension would be more costly per person when population density is lower, while 
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more dispersed rural populations may be harder to reach. I also control for a measure 
of hydro endowments, as hydroelectricity is an important energy source in many 
developing countries (Burke 2010).  
Economic factors may contribute to electricity sector development. For instance, 
higher-income countries could afford to invest in greater levels of electricity 
infrastructure and to have higher consumption levels. For a component of total 
electricity use, Pfeiffer and Mulder (2013) find that non-hydro renewable electricity is 
promoted by higher per capita income. In relation to analysis of household data from 
Mexico, Gertler et al. (2016) suggest a nonlinear Engel curve with purchase of energy-
using assets being much more likely above income thresholds. Price for electricity 
consumption may also impact on various electricity outcomes including consumption 
and losses in transmission and distribution. 
As another control, I use a binary variable with value of one for countries in Africa and 
the Middle East. This binary variable controls for factors that are common across these 
countries. One common factor across countries in both Africa and the Middle East has 
been the stage of power sector reforms. Nagayama (2010) notes that reforms have 
proceeded in Asia and South America, but have been delayed in Africa and the Middle 
East. I also use a power sector reform indicator (ESMAP 1999), with values from zero 
to six, to control for lagged policy reform up to 1998 more directly. This indicator is 
the sum of binary sub-component indicators for the following six power sector reforms: 
corporatisation, regulation, regulatory body, independent power producers, restructure 
of state-owned utility, and privatisation of generation or distribution.  
I use a number of data sources for the geographic, demographic, and economic variables 
included in 𝑥′𝑐. Temperature data are from the climate dataset CRU CY v.3.22 from 
the Climate Research Unit (Harris et al. 2014). Electricity price for a business with a 
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standardised warehouse, measured in US cents per kilowatt-hour, is from the World 
Bank (2016b) Doing Business data. From the World Development Indicators, the rural 
proportion of the population and gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in purchasing 
power parity terms in constant 2011 international dollars are other key independent 
variables. Population density, water resources per capita, country income groups, and 
region are also from the World Bank (2016a). To account for the degree of democracy, 
I use the Polity2 variable from Marshall et al. (2014). GDP data from 1960 are from the 
Clio Infra (2016) database.  
Endogeneity from reverse causation or omitted variables is a potential issue. For 
instance, electricity availability and quality could affect the ability of governments to 
be effective. Omitted variables related to technology or political differences across 
countries could also bias results if these factors are correlated with both electricity and 
government effectiveness. I address the issue of potential endogeneity in a number of 
ways, including use of lagged variables, an instrumental variables approach, and 
dependent variables measuring changes rather than levels. 
I use the lagged values of government effectiveness from 1996 in one table of results, 
to reduce the risk of endogeneity from reverse causation. 1996 is the first year of data 
for government effectiveness and is prior to much of the electricity sector progress in 
developing countries. For instance, total electricity capacity in low and middle-income 
countries was nearly three times larger in 2012 compared to 1996. I also investigate 
using lagged values from 1996 for the controls that are more likely to be endogenous: 
log GDP per capita and rural population percentage. The power sector reform indicator 
includes reforms up to 1998. In another robustness test, I use GDP data from 1960 (Clio 
Infra 2016).  
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In order to further address potential endogeneity, I use an instrumental variable 
approach. I use log life expectancy from 1950–1955 from the UN (2016c) World 
Population Prospects as an instrument for 2012 government effectiveness. Countries 
with higher life expectancy in the past have had a more conducive context and greater 
incentive for institutional development over time, allowing for higher levels of 
government effectiveness to develop.21 The considerable positive correlation between 
1950 life expectancy and 2012 government effectiveness (0.5) helps make 1950 life 
expectancy a suitable instrument. Log life expectancy from 1950–1955 has a positive 
coefficient, significant at the one percent level, in explaining 2012 government 
effectiveness (even with additional controls related to geography such as malaria 
incidence). 1950 pre-dates the major electricity system development (Burke 2010), 
particularly in developing countries, reducing the risk of reverse causation or 1950–
1955 life expectancy having a direct impact on 2012 electrification. The instrumental 
variable approach in this paper is similar to the use of settler mortality as an instrument 
for current institutions (Acemoglu et al. 2001).  
I also use the model described by equation 2 with medium-term changes in the 
dependent variable. This helps to reduce the risk of endogeneity, showing the impact 
of initial levels of government effectiveness on subsequent changes in electricity 
variables. 
                               𝛥𝐸𝑐
𝑗 =  𝐺𝑐𝛼
𝑗 + 𝑥′𝑐 𝛽
𝑗 +  𝜀𝑐
𝑗
 (2) 
𝛥𝐸𝑐
𝑗
 is the average annual percentage change for the electricity quantity variables of 
capacity, final consumption, and household consumption over the period 1996–2012. 
𝛥𝐸𝑐
𝑗
 is the percentage point change for the period 2000–2012 for electricity access, the 
                                                          
21 Life expectancy could also relate to other variables to a lesser extent, for instance geography, but I 
partly address this issue by controlling for important geographical aspects. 
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percentage point change for the period 1996–2012 for electricity transmission and 
distribution losses, and the change in index value from 2006–2012 for electricity 
quality.  
There is a different set of controls for the dependent variables in equation (2) compared 
to equation (1). In equation (2), I control for GDP per capita growth over the period 
1996–2012, the initial level of GDP per capita in 1996, and also the initial level of the 
relevant electricity variable. If there is a negative relationship between the controls for 
initial electricity use and subsequent growth in electricity use then there has been 
convergence. 
4.4 Results 
Table 4.2 shows initial results for the impact of government effectiveness on the log of 
final electricity consumption per capita without any controls. The impact of other 
governance attributes from the Worldwide Governance Indicators is also shown, 
allowing for a comparison of the relative importance of each governance attribute. Each 
of the governance attributes, which are highly correlated with each other, has positive 
coefficients that are significant at the one percent level, but government effectiveness 
has the largest coefficient out of all the governance attributes. In addition, government 
effectiveness explains 33 percent of the variation in the log of final electricity 
consumption per capita, and this is considerably above the other governance attributes, 
with rule of law the next largest at 22 percent.22 Also, the regulatory quality variable 
that focuses on private sector development only explains 17 percent of the variation in 
the log of final electricity consumption per capita. Government effectiveness appears 
                                                          
22 Government effectiveness also explains more of the variation in other electricity variables such as 
generation capacity, household consumption, access, transmission and distribution losses, and quality.  
77 
 
to be more important than other governance attributes for electricity consumption on 
average.   
14Table 4.2 Results, Worldwide Governance Indicators and log of final 
electricity consumption per capita, 2012 
 Dependent variable:  
Log of final electricity consumption per capita (megawatt-hours) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Government 1.350***      
    Effectiveness (0.164)      
Control of   1.030***     
    Corruption  (0.209)     
Voice and    0.572***    
    Accountability   (0.145)    
Political stability/    0.496***   
    no violence    (0.120)   
Regulatory     0.890***  
    Quality     (0.180)  
Rule of law      1.107*** 
      (0.157) 
Number of 
countries 
133 133 133 133 133 133 
R2 0.333 0.164 0.098 0.099 0.168 0.223 
Notes. ***, **, * show statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent level respectively. Robust 
standard errors are in brackets below the coefficients. Coefficients for constants are not shown. All 
variables are for 2012. Data are missing for Eritrea and Kosovo. The coefficient for government 
effectiveness is similar when using the between estimator with panel data for 2002–2012. The 
governance variables are highly correlated. 
 
The results in Table 4.3 show that government effectiveness has a beneficial impact on 
electricity sectors in developing countries, when controlling for other variables. There 
are positive coefficients for government effectiveness from 1996 in explaining four of 
the electricity dependent variables, with significance at the one percent level in column 
3.23 A one-unit increase in government effectiveness is associated with an increase of 
69 percent in final electricity consumption per capita on average, all else equal, based 
                                                          
23 Using state effectiveness from the State Fragility Index instead of government effectiveness from the 
Worldwide Governance Indicators also produces a corresponding significant coefficient in explaining 
the log of final electricity consumption per capita. In addition, the government effectiveness variable is 
still significant at the one percent level when regulatory quality is included as a control in the 
regression explaining the log of final electricity consumption per capita. 
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on Table 4.3. Column 5 suggests that a one-unit increase in government effectiveness 
is associated with 5 percent less transmission and distribution losses.24 
There are positive coefficients for the log of GDP per capita from 1996 in Table 4.3, 
significant in explaining electricity use at the one percent level, except for electricity 
quality which has significance at the ten percent level, and the non-significance for 
electricity losses. The positive coefficients match expectation because countries with 
higher incomes have greater ability to increase electricity sector investment and greater 
demand to consume electricity, all else equal. Whilst there is the risk of endogeneity, 
previous studies have not found strong evidence that electricity causes income level 
(Payne 2010; Chen et al. 2012; Bruns et al. 2014). 
Higher proportions of populations in rural areas are associated with lower electricity 
access and use. The negative coefficient for rural population percentage in contributing 
to access to electricity is significant at the one percent level. This result matches 
expectation due to the greater difficulty in extending access to more dispersed 
populations. Having a larger rural share of the population is also associated with lower 
electricity capacity per capita, final electricity consumption per capita, and household 
electricity consumption per capita. 
There are some significant coefficients for geographical variables in Table 4.3. 
Negative coefficients for temperature in explaining electricity dependent variables are 
significant at the one percent level in each of the first four columns. There is also some 
evidence that larger water resources support greater electricity capacity, with a positive 
coefficient and significance at the five percent level.  
                                                          
24 A one-unit change in government effectiveness is equivalent to approximately 30 percent of the 
range of the values for government effectiveness in low and middle-income countries. The government 
effectiveness index has a standard deviation of one. 
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15Table 4.3 Results, lagged government effectiveness and electricity use, 2012 
 (1)  
Log of electricity 
capacity per capita 
(kilowatts) 
(2)  
Log of household 
consumption of 
electricity per 
capita (megawatt-
hours) 
(3)  
Log of final 
consumption of 
electricity per 
capita (megawatt-
hours)  
(4)  
Access to 
electricity 
(percentage of 
population divided 
by 100) 
(5) Electricity 
transmission and 
distribution losses  
(percent of output 
divided by 100) 
(6) Electricity 
quality index 
Government  0.308* 0.314** 0.522*** -0.006 -0.049* 0.551** 
effectiveness 1996  (0.183) (0.142) (0.171) (0.038) (0.026) (0.249) 
Log GDP 0.604*** 0.801*** 0.678*** 0.157*** -0.014 0.345* 
  per capita, 1996 (0.163) (0.124) (0.166) (0.028) (0.025) (0.196) 
Rural population -0.019*** -0.012** -0.016*** -0.005*** 0.001 -0.009 
 (% of pop.), 1996 (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.011) 
Population density -0.079 0.343 0.114 0.295* -0.064 -1.032 
   (0.520) (0.347) (0.313) (0.165) (0.045) (0.964) 
Temperature -0.050*** -0.041*** -0.053*** -0.008*** -0.001 -0.010 
 (0.016) (0.013) (0.013) (0.003) (0.002) (0.020) 
Water resources 0.003** 0.001 0.001 -0.000 0.000 -0.004** 
   per capita (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) 
Electricity  -0.017 -0.026*** -0.014 -0.002 0.004* 0.018 
  Price (0.011) (0.009) (0.012) (0.002) (0.002) (0.014) 
Democracy / -0.023 -0.010 -0.021* -0.003 0.001 -0.051** 
  autocracy  (0.015) (0.013) (0.012) (0.004) (0.003) (0.021) 
Africa/Middle -0.928*** -0.621*** -0.702*** -0.243*** 0.062** -0.824** 
  East (0.189) (0.134) (0.140) (0.041) (0.024) (0.365) 
Number of countries 100 97 100 100 73 83 
R2 0.804 0.831 0.843 0.812 0.214 0.423 
Notes: ***, **, * show statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent level, respectively. Robust standard errors are in brackets below the coefficients. Coefficients 
for constants are not shown. Electricity price is the average of 2015 and 2016 data as earlier years of data are not available. Africa/Middle East is a binary variable 
equal to one for countries in Africa or the Middle East, and zero otherwise.
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Electricity price is associated with significant impacts on electricity sectors in 
developing countries. Electricity price has a negative coefficient for household 
electricity consumption per capita, significant at the one percent level. While the 
electricity prices are from a survey for commercial business customers, it is reasonable 
to assume that household electricity prices across countries could be positively 
correlated with business prices. The negative coefficient for electricity price in the 
household electricity consumption regression is reasonable as higher electricity price 
would lower demand. There would also be greater incentive to increase supply when 
price is higher, but consumer capacity to pay high prices could be constrained in 
developing countries. Also, when electricity price is higher, electricity transmission and 
distribution losses are higher, as shown in column 5. 
For the binary variable for countries in Africa and the Middle East, there are significant 
coefficients showing adverse effects for all six electricity dependent variables. The 
significance of the Africa/Middle East binary variable is not just related to common 
factors in Africa alone. With two binary variables, one for countries in the Middle East 
and North Africa, and one for countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, there are significant 
coefficients for each variable (results not shown). For the Middle East and North Africa 
binary variable, there are significant coefficients for three of the six electricity 
regressions. One possible explanation is that the lack of electricity sector reforms in 
these regions, identified by Nagayama (2010), contributes in part to the significant 
coefficients.25    
                                                          
25 There are similar results when using an indicator of reform in electricity sectors (ESMAP 1999) 
instead of the binary variable for countries in Africa and the Middle East. For example, the government 
effectiveness coefficient in the final electricity consumption regression changes from 0.522 to 0.527. 
The indicator of reform is not included in Table 4.3 as it would lower the sample size and because the 
paper focuses on deep determinants rather than sector-specific determinants of electricity sector 
development. The key government effectiveness variable assesses government policy holistically, 
including power sector reform. 
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Table 4.4 confirms the important role of government effectiveness for electricity sectors 
in developing countries, supporting the case for a causal relationship rather than just 
correlation. I use log life expectancy from 1950–1955 to instrument for government 
effectiveness in 2012. Log life expectancy from 1950–1955 explains 18 percent of the 
variation in 2012 government effectiveness for the electricity quality regression after 
controlling for other variables in the first stage of the two-stage least squares process. 
Other changes to reduce the risk of endogeneity include using lagged data from 1960 
for log GDP per capita and rural population percentage, and dropping electricity price 
due to a lack of historical data. There are statistically significant coefficients for 
government effectiveness in five of the six columns. The relationship between 
government effectiveness and final electricity consumption per capita is particularly 
strong. There is significance at the one percent level for government effectiveness in 
explaining the log of final electricity consumption per capita in Table 4.4 and also in 
Table 4.3. The government effectiveness variable is also significant at the one percent 
level in the electricity access column in Table 4.4, in contrast to the lack of significance 
for the corresponding coefficient in Table 4.3. The estimates in the first four columns 
of Table 4.4 pass the Stock-Yogo weak instrument test, with the F statistic on the 
excluded instrument exceeding the critical value (this does not apply for the last two 
columns).  
There are similarities and differences for the controls in Table 4.4 compared to Table 
4.3. The coefficients for log GDP per capita from 1960 are positive, but only column 6 
has significance at the one percent level. For rural population percentage, the coefficient 
magnitudes are similar, as is statistical significance. There are again negative impacts 
from temperature for electricity capacity and consumption. The coefficients for 
population density and water resources are mostly not significant in Table 4.4. There 
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are negative coefficients for the Africa/Middle East binary variable, but only in the 
electricity access regression in column 4 is there significance at the one percent level.  
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16Table 4.4 Instrumental variable results, government effectiveness and electricity use, 2012 
 (1)  
Log of electricity 
capacity per capita 
(kilowatts) 
(2)  
Log of household 
consumption of 
electricity per 
capita (megawatt-
hours) 
(3)  
Log of final 
consumption of 
electricity per 
capita (megawatt-
hours)  
(4)  
Access to 
electricity 
(percentage of 
population divided 
by 100) 
(5) Electricity 
transmission and 
distribution losses  
(percent of output 
divided by 100) 
(6) Electricity 
quality index 
Government 1.562*** 1.949*** 1.730*** 0.260*** -0.140** 0.686 
    Effectiveness IV (0.417) (0.491) (0.346) (0.072) (0.065) (0.567) 
Log GDP 0.337 0.426 0.474 0.071 0.069 0.826*** 
    per capita, 1960 (0.324) (0.352) (0.290) (0.073) (0.059) (0.319) 
Rural population (% -0.035*** -0.019 -0.023** -0.009*** 0.002 0.001 
of population), 1960 (0.011) (0.012) (0.010) (0.003) (0.001) (0.016) 
Population  -0.780 -0.781 -0.868 0.108 -0.024 -1.694** 
    density (0.771) (0.918) (0.913) (0.116) (0.067) (0.688) 
Temperature -0.045** -0.045*** -0.055*** -0.004 0.003 -0.009 
 (0.018) (0.016) (0.015) (0.004) (0.002) (0.022) 
Water resources -0.001 -0.001 -0.005 -0.000 -0.001 -0.012* 
    per capita (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.002) (0.001) (0.007) 
Africa/Middle East -0.341 -0.089 -0.232 -0.144*** -0.022 -0.533 
 (0.236) (0.257) (0.213) (0.049) (0.036) (0.351) 
Number of countries 92 87 92 92 66 73 
R2 0.609 0.509 0.648 0.641 0.148 0.530 
Second-stage F stat  27.98*** 17.97*** 32.65*** 33.21*** 1.32 10.70*** 
       
Instrument: Log life expectancy, 1950–1955 
F statistic (excluded) 15.257 12.564 15.257 15.257 6.435 7.729 
Partial R2  0.162 0.168 0.162 0.162 0.088 0.181 
Notes: ***, **, * show statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent level respectively. Robust standard errors are in brackets below the coefficients. Coefficients 
for constants are not shown. The Stock-Yogo test critical value at 5 percent significance level (15% maximal IV size) is 8.96. Results are similar if malaria incidence 
is an additional control. Some government effectiveness coefficient magnitudes are similar when using OLS with the same controls: electricity losses still has a 
coefficient of –0.1. Some government effectiveness coefficients are lower using OLS: the coefficient in the final consumption column changes from 1.7 to 1.0. 
84 
 
Table 4.5 shows the impact of initial government effectiveness levels on subsequent 
changes in electricity. Government effectiveness from 1996 has positive and significant 
coefficients for each of the electricity variables except electricity losses or the 
electricity quality index. There are positive coefficients, significant at the one percent 
level, for the government effectiveness variable from 1996 in explaining the annual 
percentage changes in both household electricity consumption per capita and final 
electricity consumption per capita over the period 1996–2012. For a one-unit increase 
in the government effectiveness index, the per capita final consumption of electricity 
increases by 1.9 percentage points per annum on average. Whilst it is difficult to 
establish causality rather than just correlation, the positive coefficients for government 
effectiveness in explaining subsequent changes in electricity rather than levels are 
suggestive of a causal relationship. 
The signs of the coefficients for the controls in Table 4.5 match expectation. For the 
log of GDP per capita in 1996 from Table 4.5, the coefficients are positive and 
significant, except for the non-significant coefficients for the change in electricity 
losses and access to electricity. The positive coefficient for the log of GDP per capita 
in explaining the change in electricity is significant at the one percent level for both 
consumption variables and for electricity capacity. There are also positive and 
significant coefficients for GDP per capita growth, confirming that electricity use 
increases as economies grow. The magnitude of the coefficients for log of GDP per 
capita and the growth of GDP per capita are similar to the findings of Burke and 
Csereklyei (2016).  
Growth in electricity is lower in countries that already use more electricity. For 
example, the log of electricity capacity per capita in 1996 has a negative coefficient, 
significant at the one percent level, in explaining the change in electricity capacity per 
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capita for the period 1996–2012. These convergence-style coefficients are reasonable, 
as there may be less incentive for electricity growth when the initial levels are already 
higher. There could be diminishing returns to greater electricity use after a certain point. 
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17Table 4.5 Results, government effectiveness and the change in electricity use, changes up to 2012 
 (1) Annual 
percentage 
change in 
electricity 
capacity per 
capita (1996–
2012)  
(2) Annual 
percentage 
change in 
household 
consumption of 
electricity per 
capita (1996–
2012) 
(3) Annual 
percentage 
change in final 
consumption of 
electricity per 
capita (1996–
2012)  
(4) Change in 
access to 
electricity (2000–
2012)  
(5) Change in 
electricity 
transmission and 
distribution 
losses (1996–
2012) 
(6) Change in 
electricity quality 
index (2006–
2012) 
Government 0.011** 0.016*** 0.019*** 0.021* -0.038 -0.020 
  effectiveness, 1996 (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.011) (0.026) (0.218) 
Log GDP 0.021*** 0.017*** 0.021*** 0.006 -0.023 0.489*** 
    per capita, 1996 (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.010) (0.023) (0.144) 
GDP p.c. growth  0.800*** 0.792*** 0.883*** 0.115 -1.708** 17.885*** 
   p.a. 1996–2012 (0.174) (0.150) (0.171) (0.278) (0.756) (4.615) 
Log electricity -0.019***      
  capacity pc, 1996 (0.004)      
Log household  -0.020***     
 elec. cons. pc, 1996  (0.004)     
Log final electricity   -0.022***    
 consumption pc, 96    (0.003)    
Access to electricity    -0.099***   
   , 2000    (0.024)   
Electricity losses (%      -0.866***  
  of output, 1996)     (0.108)  
Electricity quality      -0.438*** 
   Index, 2006      (0.142) 
Number of countries 105 98 106 109 76 68 
R2 0.347 0.411 0.504 0.203 0.552 0.354 
Notes: ***, **, * show statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent level respectively. Robust standard errors are in brackets below the coefficients. Coefficients 
for constants are not shown.
87 
 
A relatively large fraction of variation in electricity use is explained by the regressions 
in each table. The R-squared values are approximately 0.8 for the regressions for 
electricity capacity, consumption, and access in Table 4.3, while the R-squared value 
for the change in final electricity consumption per capita is above 0.5 in Table 4.5. 
4.5 Conclusion 
The main finding is that government effectiveness is of central importance for 
electricity sectors in developing countries. The result holds for the level of electricity, 
and also for the impact of past government effectiveness on subsequent changes in 
electricity for the period 1996–2012. This paper uses a large sample of developing 
countries, combines numerous data sources, assesses multiple dimensions of electricity 
use, and controls for a wide range of important factors for explaining electricity use. I 
use data for up to 135 developing countries up to 2012. 
This paper adds to the evidence that institutions are important for economic growth and 
development (Acemoglu et al. 2001; Acemoglu et al. 2005; Baland et al. 2010). In 
particular, it shows that government effectiveness is important for electricity sectors in 
developing countries. Improving government effectiveness could be a vital step 
towards meeting UN Sustainable Development Goal 7 of ensuring access to modern 
energy for all. This paper provides an example of the wide-ranging impact of 
institutions, complementing other examples such as the finding of Collignon et al. 
(2015) that poor governance contributes to the adverse public health outcome of 
antibiotic resistance.  
Government effectiveness appears to be the key aspect of governance for electricity use 
in developing countries on average. Effective governments could impact on electricity 
outcomes through a number of channels, with quality of regulation being one possible 
channel. Whilst other studies have found that political instability has been a major 
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negative factor in particular countries or small groups of countries (Bhattacharyya 
2007; Nepal and Jamasb 2012b), this paper finds that government effectiveness is 
crucial on average across a large sample of developing countries. The average effects 
estimated in this paper act as a complement to research on the key institutional barriers 
to greater development of electricity sectors in individual developing countries.  
The importance of government effectiveness for electricity sectors may relate to the 
need for fundamental skills such as planning, committing, and prioritizing, while 
adapting to fit the specific context in each country. For instance, the electrification 
experience of Sub-Saharan African countries shows that ‘there is no single solution that 
fits all cases and each country would have to identify its own solution’ (Bhattacharyya 
2013, p. 153). Governments need to be effective to identify and then be able to 
successfully implement electrification plans, rather than just promoting basic stability 
or transparency. Sound regulatory quality in a country is not sufficient for electricity 
sector development, as governments play a more central role in electrification than just 
setting the rules for the private sector. 
There are multiple dimensions in electricity use, but the factors causing development 
of each of the key factors are quite similar. For instance, electricity use can be assessed 
on criteria of access, quantity of consumption, capacity, transmission and distribution 
losses, or quality. Aspects of government effectiveness are important for each of these 
electricity dimensions. This suggests that policy to improve government effectiveness 
could have indirect benefits for many aspects of electricity. 
Additional factors are also important for electricity use including economic and 
geographic factors, and these impacts match expectation. For instance, this paper finds 
that higher GDP per capita is associated with higher use of electricity. Higher 
temperatures are associated with lower electricity use; temperature could be relevant 
89 
 
for electricity use due to direct reasons such as differing motivations for heating and 
cooling in countries with different temperatures, or other indirect reasons such as 
impacts on sectoral compositions of economies. I also find that a higher rural share of 
the population leads to lower electricity access.  
Government effectiveness is an indirect channel to greater electricity use in developing 
countries. Policies to enhance government effectiveness can provide a solid foundation 
and be complementary to sector-specific policies to increase electricity access and use 
in developing countries.  
Donors considering contributing to electrification in developing countries could expect 
more effective outcomes by focusing on countries with better governance. Kenya, for 
example, had a government effectiveness score above the average for Sub-Saharan 
Africa in 2012, and started to receive support from the African Development Bank in 
2015 for the Last Mile Connectivity Project. This project aims to support government 
initiatives to increase electricity access (African Development Bank 2016). Additional 
government input in Kenya could help to convert investment in electricity grid 
infrastructure into higher rates of electricity access (Lee et al. 2016). Ethiopia is another 
country that had a government effectiveness score above the average for Sub-Saharan 
Africa in 2012. In addition, Ethiopia has relatively high renewable energy potential, 
particularly hydropower (Howells et al. 2017). In contrast, countries with low 
government effectiveness could be more risky destinations for donor contributions to 
electrification. 
There is scope for further research on factors affecting electrification. For instance, the 
impacts of economic structure and policies aiming to increase the industrial or services 
shares of GDP could be investigated. In addition, the impact of electrification on long-
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term economic, social, and environmental indicators is a related area for further 
research.   
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CHAPTER 5 MACROECONOMIC IMPACTS OF THE 
2010 EARTHQUAKE IN HAITI 
 
Summary: 
In this paper I use the synthetic control method to estimate the macroeconomic losses 
from the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, one of the most severe natural disasters in the 
modern era. The macroeconomic effects of the earthquake were equal to an average 
loss of up to 12 percent of gross domestic product over the period 2010–2015. While 
surges in imports and foreign aid supported a temporary increase in aggregate 
consumption, aggregate investment and services-sector output experienced large 
contractions. The road transport sector was severely affected. Impacts on electricity use 
have been less pronounced. The data suggest that macroeconomic losses may be 
permanent. The earthquake is thus a case of an extreme natural disaster contributing to 
divergence in development outcomes. 
5.1 Introduction 
On 12 January 2010 Haiti was hit by a severe earthquake that struck near Port-au-
Prince, its capital city. The earthquake caused over 200,000 deaths, more than two 
percent of Haiti’s population (EM-DAT 2015). These impacts make the earthquake one 
of the worst natural disasters ever recorded for any nation. The earthquake registered 
7.0 on the Richter scale.  
In this paper I use the synthetic control method (SCM) to assess the ongoing 
macroeconomic impacts of the earthquake in Haiti. The SCM – developed by Abadie 
and Gardeazabal (2003), Abadie et al. (2010), and Abadie et al. (2015) – allows 
measurement of macroeconomic losses over time through comparison of the actual 
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outcome with a hypothetical counterfactual. The counterfactual is a weighted average 
of other similar economies that were not exposed to the earthquake. Existing work has 
used the synthetic control method to study a range of events, including German 
reunification (Abadie et al. 2015) and the second Intifada crisis (Horiuchi and Mayerson 
2015). The SCM has also been used to investigate conflict within Spain (Abadie and 
Gardeazabal 2003), tobacco tax impacts in California (Abadie et al. 2010), and the US 
shale oil and gas boom (Munasib and Rickman 2015). 
SCM analyses of earthquake impacts have found major local effects. For instance, 
duPont and Noy (2015) find adverse and long-term local impacts on gross domestic 
product (GDP) per capita from the 1995 Kobe earthquake. Barone and Mocetti (2014) 
show impacts for two earthquakes in different Italian regions, finding that a bad 
outcome is more likely in regions with lower institutional quality prior to the 
earthquake.  
Existing analysis of the economic impact of the earthquake in Haiti provides a range of 
results. Using a regression approach with worldwide data on natural disasters from 
1970–2008, an early estimate of monetary damages in Haiti was approximately US$8 
billion in 2009 dollars (Cavallo et al. 2010).26 While Cavallo et al. (2013) find that even 
extreme disasters in their global sample up to 2008 do not have a significant effect on 
economic growth when controlling for political changes, they note that the Haiti 
earthquake in 2010 was the most catastrophic disaster in the modern era. Using the 
distribution of disaster impacts, based on synthetic controls for countries from a 
comprehensive global dataset from 1970–2008, and assuming the outcome for Haiti 
was in the most extreme one percent of disasters, Cavallo et al. (2013) project that 
                                                          
26 These damages relate to fixed assets and capital (including inventories), raw material and extractable 
natural resources, and mortality and morbidity that are a direct consequence of the earthquake.  
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income per capita in Haiti in 2020 (purchasing power parity (PPP) 2008 international 
dollars) could have been $1,410 without the earthquake, compared to $1,060 with the 
earthquake.27 In contrast, the IMF (2015) uses a simple extrapolation of 2005–2006 
GDP growth to conclude that GDP returned to the pre-earthquake trend by 2014. The 
projection by Cavallo et al. (2013) suggests the earthquake had a potentially permanent 
macroeconomic impact, while the IMF (2015) calculation indicates a large impact, but 
one that is transitory. 
My contribution is to quantify the macroeconomic losses resulting from the earthquake 
in Haiti using a systematic approach to modelling the counterfactual. I calculate the 
counterfactual using data for Haiti and a group of similar countries from before the 
earthquake, and data for the group of similar countries from after the earthquake. The 
approach contrasts with a simple extrapolation, which would only use data for Haiti 
from before the earthquake. The paper uses more updated data than prior assessments 
of Haiti’s earthquake, and gives a detailed breakdown of impacts in different economic 
sectors. I also construct counterfactuals for a broader range of variables than other SCM 
papers to allow assessment of the underlying causes of GDP losses. 
The results suggest that consumption was temporarily supported by large foreign 
inflows following the earthquake, but that production has suffered sustained losses. 
Aggregate consumption, including non-profit institution spending for households, 
increased in the initial emergency response. This increase was possible due to surges in 
imports and foreign aid. The services sector suffered a large contraction as a result of 
the earthquake. Investment remains adversely affected, and negative transmission 
impacts include a reduction in road transport energy use, hindering GDP recovery. 
                                                          
27 Not controlling for political changes. 
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A detailed assessment of the macroeconomic effects of the 2010 earthquake in Haiti is 
important for a number of reasons. The extreme nature of the earthquake could imply 
that estimates of economic impacts using average losses from other studies are not 
directly applicable. Hallegatte et al. (2007) find that GDP losses increase sharply if the 
intensity and frequency of extreme events exceeds a threshold, suggesting that the high 
risk of future natural disasters in Haiti is a major issue. This paper also adds detail and 
context to the recent macroeconomic outcomes from the earthquake, emphasizing that 
disaster-resilient investment is likely to be important for reducing the impact of future 
natural disasters. 
5.2 Before the earthquake 
Haiti had a low level of socioeconomic development prior to the earthquake, with the 
Human Development Index value in the year 2000 ranking Haiti 134th out of 166 
countries (UNDP 2016). More than half of the population of Haiti was living in extreme 
poverty prior to the earthquake. Nearly half of the population had no access to 
healthcare and over 80 percent had no clean drinking water (Échevin 2011). Chronic 
malnutrition affected nearly a fifth of children up to six years of age in Port-au-Prince 
in 2009. There were higher levels of malnutrition in other regions (Échevin 2011). 
The Haitian economy was subject to a number of shocks prior to the earthquake. For 
instance, political instability leading up to 2004 coincided with the withdrawal of 
external economic support and weak economic performance (IMF 2015). In 2008, 
storms and floods led to over 500 deaths (EM-DAT 2015). These storms also had severe 
impacts on crop production in Haiti, with damages estimated at around 200 million US 
dollars (World Bank 2013). The impact on the agricultural sector affected a large 
proportion of the population, with around 40 percent of the labour force in agriculture 
(CIA 2016). Economic impacts were less pronounced as around half of economic 
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output in Haiti in 2009 was from the services sector and around 20 percent from 
agriculture (UN 2016a). While Haiti’s inflation rate was falling until 2008, global food 
price rises contributed to a spike in inflation in 2008 (IMF 2009). The rising food prices 
in 2008 also contributed to an increase in the current account deficit (IMF 2009).  
For a range of socioeconomic variables shown in Table 5.1, Haiti was similar to the 
average of low-income countries. For GDP per capita, life expectancy, and health 
expenditure, Haiti was slightly above the low-income average, while for institutional 
quality and trade openness, Haiti was below the low-income average.  
18Table 5.1 Socioeconomic characteristics in Haiti and other low and lower-
middle-income countries, 2009 
Notes: GDP per capita is in purchasing power parity constant 2011 international dollars. Life 
expectancy is in years. Institutional quality is an average of the six indicator values from the 
Worldwide Governance Indicators (2015). Trade openness is the sum of imports and exports as a 
percent of GDP. Health expenditure per capita is in purchasing power parity constant 2011 
international dollars. Income groups are based on World Bank classifications. The values are averages 
for 31 low-income (including Haiti) and 52 lower-middle-income countries. Sources: World Bank 
(2016a), Worldwide Governance Indicators (2015). 
 
The socioeconomic context in Haiti prior to the earthquake was important in 
determining the scale of the earthquake impacts. Noy (2009) finds that determinants of 
higher resilience to disasters include higher income per capita, higher literacy rates, 
higher institutional quality, greater trade openness, and higher government spending. 
Based on natural disaster events from 1970–2006, Hochrainer-Stigler (2015) finds that 
disaster impacts likely depend on the socioeconomic situation before the disaster. 
Variable Haiti Low-income Lower middle-income 
GDP per capita  1,613 1,411 4,546 
Life expectancy 61 57 66 
Institutional quality -1.09 -0.93 -0.56 
Trade openness 58 62 82 
Health expenditure per capita 104 78 244 
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5.3 Method and data 
The synthetic control method (SCM) provides a systematic approach to calculating a 
counterfactual outcome, using the weighted average of a group of similar countries 
called the donor pool (Abadie and Gardeazabal 2003; Abadie et al. 2010; Abadie et al. 
2015). The analysis includes (𝐽 + 1) countries indexed by 𝑗, where 𝑗 = 1 is Haiti and 
𝑗 = 2 to 𝑗 = 𝐽 + 1 are the donor pool countries that are unaffected by the earthquake. 
The synthetic control, 𝑾∗, is a (𝐽 × 1) vector of weights written as: 
(1)    𝑾∗ = (𝑤2, … , 𝑤𝐽+1)',  
with 0 ≤ 𝑤𝑗  ≤ 1 for 𝑗 = 2, … , 𝐽 + 1 , and 𝑤2 +  … . + 𝑤𝐽+1 = 1. 
5.3.1 Outcome variables 
I calculate synthetic controls for Haiti’s GDP, sectoral output, consumption, 
investment, and trade flows. I also investigate the earthquake’s impact on Haiti’s energy 
sector, including electricity use and road transport energy use. I consider government 
revenue and expenditure amounts, and also foreign flows from official development 
assistance (ODA) and remittances. 
5.3.2 Calculation of weights 
The synthetic control, 𝑾∗, is calculated to be the closest possible match for Haiti in the 
period before the earthquake. The similarity between Haiti and the calculated 
counterfactual is based on 𝑘 characteristics, including the outcome variable, in the 
period before the earthquake. These characteristics, or predictor variables, include 
consumption, investment, exports, imports, GDP per capita, population, and land area. 
97 
 
Three values of the outcome variable are used as predictor variables in each case to 
improve the pre-earthquake fit of the synthetic control.28 
The synthetic control can be produced by minimizing equation 2. 
(2)   ∑ 𝒗𝐦(𝑋1𝑚  −  𝑿𝟎𝒎𝑾
𝑘
𝑚=1
)2  
𝒗𝐦 is the weight showing the relative importance of each of the 𝑘 characteristics for 
matching the experience of Haiti before the earthquake. 𝒗𝐦 is produced by minimizing 
the mean of the squared difference between actual and counterfactual values of the 
outcome variable in the period before the earthquake. 𝑋1𝑚 is the value for the 𝑚th 
predictor variable for Haiti and 𝑿𝟎𝒎 is the (1 × J) vector for the 𝑚th predictor variable 
for donor pool countries. 
5.3.3 Time period 
In my main analysis I use data for the eleven-year period 2004–2014 (World Bank 
2016a; UN 2016a; IEA 2017), with separate analyses with World Bank and UN data. 
World Bank GDP data are also available in 2015 for each country. I also consider a 
longer period of GDP per capita data as a robustness test, with a start date of 1998. Data 
on government expenditure and revenue are from the International Monetary Fund 
(2016). I label the number of years in the pre-earthquake period as 𝑇0, and the number 
of years after the earthquake as 𝑇1. 
 
 
                                                          
28 The outcome variables in the years 2005, 2007, and 2009 are used as predictor variables. Four values 
are used for the robustness test in Figure 5.21. Inflation is also a predictor variable when there is 
enough data to form a relatively large donor pool with World Bank (2016a) data. 
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5.3.4 Donor pool 
The donor pool is made up of countries that are not affected by the earthquake, but are 
otherwise similar to Haiti. The choice of the donor pool is an important part of the 
synthetic control method. 
I construct the donor pool using a data-driven approach. From a sample of low-income 
and lower-middle income countries with data available, I restrict the donor pools based 
on various thresholds, most notably a GDP per capita threshold. For robustness, I 
construct multiple donor pools with different data and criteria. If the outcomes of the 
synthetic controls are similar with different data and donor pool criteria, this suggests 
the findings are robust. 
Using the World Development Indicators (WDI) data (World Bank 2016a), I focus on 
a balanced panel including GDP and components of GDP, with variable names in 
Appendix Table A5.1. I restrict the donor pool to countries with GDP per capita PPP 
(in constant 2011 international dollars) of less than $4,000 in 2009. For the WDI data, 
the donor pool of countries that are similar to Haiti is the following 22 countries: 
Bangladesh, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Kenya, Kyrgyz 
Republic, Liberia, Madagascar, Mali, Moldova, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, 
Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, and Uganda.  
When using the United Nations (UN) data, I focus on GDP and sectors of production. 
I restrict the potential donor pool to countries with GDP per capita (constant 2005 
prices) of less than US$1,000 in 2009. From this larger balanced panel with complete 
GDP and sectoral production data, I also remove countries with significantly different 
growth experiences to Haiti. Specifically, I remove countries with GDP per capita 
growth that differs from Haiti by more than 15 percentage points in total over either the 
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pre-earthquake period (2004–2009) or the post-earthquake period (2010–2014). I also 
exclude countries that have State Fragility Index (Marshall and Cole 2014) values that 
increase by four or more points in a single year.29  
For the UN data, the donor pool of countries that are similar to Haiti is the following 
20: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Comoros, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Kyrgyz Republic, Lesotho, 
Mauritania, Nepal, Niger, Pakistan, Senegal, Somalia, Tanzania, and Togo. 
If there were spill-over effects from the earthquake to donor pool countries, the 
difference between the synthetic control and the actual outcome could either be 
underestimated or exaggerated (Abadie et al. 2010). The Dominican Republic shares 
an island with Haiti, but is already excluded based on its higher per-capita GDP. The 
earthquake would not have had major impacts on donor pool countries via Haitian trade 
flows. Nearly 90 percent of Haitian exports were to the United States in 2009 (Simoes 
and Hidalgo 2011). Haitian imports were also mostly from countries that have been 
excluded from the analysis based on higher income. 
5.3.5 Difference between actual and counterfactual 
I calculate the macroeconomic impact of the earthquake as the difference between the 
outcome variable for Haiti and the outcome variable for the synthetic control. The 
outcome variable for Haiti is labelled 𝑌1, while 𝑌𝑗 is used to refer to the outcome 
variables for the countries in the donor pool. The effect of the earthquake and aftermath 
at time 𝑡 can be written as: 
(3)   𝑌1𝑡  −  ∑ 𝐰𝒋
∗
𝐽+1
𝑗=2
𝑌𝑗𝑡   
                                                          
29 Larger values of the State Fragility Index are for more fragile states. 
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I calculate the total impact by summing over time:            
 (4)  ∑ (
𝑇0+𝑇1
t= 𝑇0+1
 𝑌1𝑡  − ∑ 𝐰𝒋
∗
𝐽+1
𝑗=2
𝑌𝑗𝑡). 
The existence of other major shocks after the earthquake, such as weather and political 
events (Burke and Leigh 2010; Dell et al. 2012), would potentially confound my 
estimates. Haiti did experience shocks following the earthquake including Hurricane 
Sandy in 2012 that caused 54 deaths (USAID 2013). There was also a major cholera 
outbreak that started in late 2010. The cholera outbreak was caused by bacteria 
introduced into Haiti (Lantagne et al. 2013), with this introduction likely occurring 
during the earthquake aftermath and recovery period (Katz 2013). The link between the 
earthquake and the cholera outbreak suggests that both events can be considered 
together as one larger event. Shocks in donor pool countries could also impact the 
results. Globally common shocks do not pose a problem for the synthetic control 
method, as these would affect both the actual outcome and the counterfactual, and not 
affect the difference between these variables.   
5.3.6 Inferential tests 
One way to test the significance of the output gap is an inferential test based on the ratio 
of post-earthquake to pre-earthquake Mean Square Prediction Error (MSPE). The 
prediction error is the difference between actual and counterfactual for the outcome 
variable. The test based on MSPE has been used in previous SCM work (Abadie et al. 
2010). 
Taking the ratio of the post-earthquake MSPE to the pre-earthquake MSPE can show 
the extent of the impact after the earthquake, while controlling for the pre-earthquake 
fit of the synthetic control. A small MSPE in the pre-earthquake period would indicate 
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that the synthetic control closely matches the actual case. For the post-earthquake 
period, a large MSPE would indicate that the earthquake had a large impact.  
I calculate the ratio of MSPE for Haiti, and also for every other country in the donor 
pool, after constructing synthetic controls for each country in the donor pool. A 
distribution of synthetic controls can then be found. This allows a permutation test 
alternative to the standard inferential testing for statistical significance. The MSPE 
inferential test is based on the uncertainty that the synthetic control is adequate, rather 
than uncertainty that a sample is an adequate reflection of an aggregate population. 
5.3.7 Data issues 
The accuracy of data for low-income countries needs to be considered. Measurement 
errors and considerable unreported economic activity in informal sectors (Henderson et 
al. 2012) can affect GDP data accuracy. Haiti’s statistical capacity is ranked 138 out of 
153 countries for the period 2005–2013 (World Bank 2015), indicating that sizeable 
GDP measurement error is possible. Further, the massive disruption of the earthquake 
may have amplified measurement error issues. Haiti’s average statistical capacity score 
has improved in recent years, but the results still need to be interpreted with data quality 
caveats in mind. To lessen these concerns, I use multiple data sources and construct 
counterfactuals for multiple variables. Some variables may be subject to less 
measurement error than others. For instance, imports may be better measured than some 
types of domestic production or consumption, particularly in the earthquake aftermath 
when domestic production may have been more difficult to measure than imports 
coming through limited entry points. Some energy data are likely to be of higher quality 
than GDP data. Electricity generation from centralised sources, for example, is 
technically easier to measure than GDP. 
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5.4 Results 
5.4.1 Impacts on GDP 
My main finding is that the earthquake has led to large and sustained GDP losses for 
Haiti. I calculate the GDP lost in the first six years following the earthquake to be 
approximately $6 billion, in total, in constant 2010 US dollars. This is calculated by 
integrating the difference between the actual and counterfactual in Figure 5.1. The 
average of the annual percentage loss is 12 percent. In contrast, extrapolation of average 
GDP growth from 2004–2009 produces a four percent average GDP loss. Figure 5.1 
suggests the potential for a persistent impact on GDP, without subsequent convergence 
to the counterfactual. If this is true, the output losses from the earthquake will continue 
to accumulate over time. Persistent losses to annual GDP are consistent with the finding 
that aggregate output is a unit root process in some cases (Nelson and Plosser 1982; 
Ben-David et al. 2003; Darné 2009).30  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
30 The null hypothesis of Haiti’s GDP having a unit root is not rejected at the 10 percent level based on 
an augmented Dickey-Fuller test with trend term. 
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9Figure 5.1 GDP (constant 2010 US dollars, billions) for Haiti vs. Synthetic Haiti 
 
Notes: Sources: WDI, author calculations 
 
Figure 5.2, using UN data in constant 2005 US dollars, produces a similar outcome. 
There is a slightly smaller average loss of ten percent for the five years to 2014 in Figure 
5.2, rather than the 12 percent average loss for the six years to 2015 in Figure 5.1. In 
both cases, it appears that the effect on annual GDP is persistent rather than transitory.  
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10Figure 5.2 GDP (constant 2005 US dollars, billions) for Haiti vs. Synthetic 
Haiti 
 
Notes: Sources: UN, author calculations 
 
Based on the data used in Figure 5.2, Haiti had the second highest ratio of MSPE in the 
post-earthquake period to MSPE in the pre-earthquake period, as I show in Figure 5.3. 
The probability is 2/21 that Haiti would randomly have a ratio within the top two from 
the sample including Haiti and the 20 donor pool countries. This corresponds to 
statistical significance at the ten percent level. 
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11Figure 5.3 Ratio of MSPE in the post-earthquake period to MSPE in the pre-
earthquake period in log for GDP 
 
Notes: Sources: UN, author calculations 
 
The synthetic control using UN data in Figure 5.2 closely matches the actual outcome 
in the period before the earthquake. Similarity of other predictor variables is also 
important. Table 5.2 shows that Haiti is indeed similar to the Figure 5.2 synthetic 
control for most of the predictor variables. The synthetic control is closer to Haiti than 
the equally weighted average for the donor pool for most of the variables. The exception 
is investment as a percent of GDP.31 
 
 
 
                                                          
31 The optimisation process is in respect of all of the predictor variables, so it is possible that a small 
number of synthetic control predictor variables could be further from the actual outcome in Haiti than 
the equally-weighted donor pool. 
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19Table 5.2 GDP predictor variable averages prior to the 2010 earthquake 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: the predictor variables (except for GDP) are averaged over 2004–2009 as the pre-earthquake 
period. Consumption, exports, imports, and investment are a percent of GDP. Investment is gross 
capital formation. ‘Donor pool’ is an equally-weighted average of the 20 countries in the donor pool. 
Sources: WDI, UN 
 
I also show results for GDP per capita. Figure 5.4, using WDI data in PPP constant 
2011 international dollars, shows a loss of seven percent in the year of the earthquake, 
and an average loss of six percent in the six years following the earthquake. This is 
comparable to the loss in GDP in Figure 5.2, when taking into account the major loss 
in population. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Predictor Variable Haiti Synthetic Haiti Donor pool 
Consumption  100% 99% 93% 
Exports 15% 25% 26% 
Imports  43% 43% 41% 
Investment 28% 18% 22% 
Land area (sq. km) 27,560 242,826 537,101 
Population (million) 9.5 7.9 22.8 
GDP per capita USD 454 459 554 
GDP billion USD (2005) 4.2 4.1 12.7 
GDP billion USD (2007) 4.4 4.4 14.1 
GDP billion USD (2009)  4.6 4.6 14.9 
107 
 
12Figure 5.4 GDP per capita PPP (constant 2011 international dollars) for Haiti 
vs. Synthetic Haiti 
 
Notes: Sources: WDI, author calculations 
 
There are six countries with non-zero weights in the donor pool used in Figure 5.4. The 
synthetic control includes Burundi at 45 percent, Cameroon with a 28 percent weight, 
Senegal at 17 percent, Liberia at five percent, Nicaragua with three percent, and Nepal 
at two percent. Appendix Table A5.5–Table A5.9 contain the weights for each figure. 
5.4.2 Sectoral impacts 
Output losses for Haiti’s services sector have been large and ongoing. Retail and 
tourism were particularly hard hit, suffering 26 percent and 25 percent contractions 
respectively (Government of the Republic of Haiti 2010). Most commercial buildings 
in the centre of Port-au-Prince were damaged or destroyed, including hotels and 
restaurants. Service sector impacts can be seen through the dramatic initial fall in Figure 
5.5, and the ongoing gap below the counterfactual. Multiplying the sector weight in 
GDP of approximately 20 percent (UN 2016a) by the average difference between actual 
108 
 
and counterfactual of 10 percent in Figure 5.5 indicates that approximately one-fifth of 
the loss of GDP relates to the wholesale, retail, restaurants, and hotels sector.  
13Figure 5.5 Wholesale, retail, restaurants, hotels output (constant 2005 USD, 
billions) for Haiti and Synthetic Haiti 
 
 
Notes: Sources: UN, author calculations 
 
The large gap between actual services output and Haiti’s counterfactual is also 
statistically significant at the ten percent level, based on the MSPE test. Haiti has the 
second-highest MSPE ratio for the wholesale, retail, restaurants, and hotels components 
of the service sector, among donor pool countries, as shown in Figure A5.1.  
Direct earthquake impacts for the agricultural sector were also evident, as in Figure 5.6, 
but not to the same extent as for the services sector in the initial aftermath. This is due 
to the earthquake’s location close to Port-au-Prince, the hub of service sector activity. 
The agricultural sector is more geographically dispersed and less reliant on earthquake-
vulnerable buildings. In the years following the earthquake, agricultural production 
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growth stagnated in Haiti. Transmission of negative impacts to the agricultural sector 
occurred through damage to road transport. Further, the cholera outbreak in the 
earthquake aftermath led to a preference for imported food over domestically produced 
food (Katz 2013). The average difference between actual and counterfactual for 
agriculture is similar to Figure 5.5, and the agriculture sector is similar in size to the 
wholesale, retail, restaurants, and hotels sector, implying a similar impact on GDP, 
although the pre-earthquake fit between actual and synthetic control is not as good in 
Figure 5.6. Seasonal variation and ongoing natural disaster risk makes it more difficult 
to calculate a suitable synthetic control for agricultural production in Haiti. For 
example, shocks experienced in Haiti in the pre-earthquake period included four storms 
in 2008 (World Bank 2013).  
14Figure 5.6 Agriculture, hunting, forestry, fishing output (constant 2005 USD, 
billions) for Haiti and Synthetic Haiti 
 
Notes: Sources: UN, author calculations 
 
Haiti’s manufacturing output contracted sharply in the year of the earthquake, but then 
rebounded more quickly than other sectors, as evident in Figure 5.7. This suggests some 
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degree of success in rebuilding damaged businesses, although there is still a 
considerable loss in the manufacturing sector. There is an average difference between 
actual and counterfactual of 8 percent in Figure 5.7. As manufacturing is approximately 
10 percent of output in Haiti, this implies that the manufacturing loss would account 
for approximately one-tenth of the GDP loss.  
15Figure 5.7 Manufacturing output (constant 2005 USD, billions) for Haiti and 
Synthetic Haiti 
 
Notes: Sources: UN, author calculations 
 
5.4.3 Consumption 
Aggregate consumption increased after the earthquake, before subsequently declining 
towards the SCM counterfactual, as shown in Figure 5.8.32 The surge in the 
consumption variable is consistent with the extent of the emergency spending required 
                                                          
32 Figure A5.2 shows a synthetic control for consumption as a percent of GDP. This produces a more 
stable synthetic control than Figure 5.8 with consumption increasing above counterfactual and then 
returning towards the counterfactual, but the variable in Figure A5.2 includes impacts of both 
consumption increases and GDP losses.  
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to alleviate the severe earthquake impacts. The relief effort involved many aspects 
including supply of food and access to water and health care. The change in aggregate 
consumption was mostly due to private consumption changes, as government 
consumption is only a small proportion of total consumption in Haiti.33 The initial 
increase in household consumption was partly driven by aid inflows, as household 
consumption includes expenditure of non-profit institutions serving households. The 
urgency of consumption needs in the earthquake aftermath has potential to bring 
forward future consumption. 
16Figure 5.8 Final consumption expenditure (constant 2010 USD, billions) for 
Haiti vs. Synthetic Haiti 
 
Notes: Sources: WDI, author calculations 
 
5.4.4 Investment 
Investment decreased in Haiti in the aftermath of the earthquake, and there has not been 
a return to the counterfactual path in Figure 5.9. The initial drop relates to the diversion 
                                                          
33 Government consumption expenditure was less than ten percent of aggregate consumption for Haiti 
in each of the 11 years to 2014 (UN 2016a). 
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of resources to consumption in the emergency and recovery period. The ongoing gap 
of actual investment below the counterfactual increases the prospects that the economic 
impacts of the earthquake will be persistent rather than transitory.  
Investment can potentially play an important role in earthquake recoveries, with 
different predictions depending on which economic theory is used. In neoclassical 
models, the expected economic effects of an earthquake depend on relative changes in 
capital and labour. Initial reductions in capital per worker can be followed by an 
increase in capital accumulation and a temporary surge in economic growth (Okuyama 
2003), but reductions in effective workers can hinder growth (Loayza et. al 2012). With 
increasing returns to inputs (Romer 1986), loss of capital could lead to a permanently 
lower growth path, but installation of more productive capital investment during a 
rebuilding stimulus could lead to faster long-term growth. For Haiti, the reduction in 
investment could lead to extended macroeconomic losses, unless investment 
productivity and quantity increase. 
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17Figure 5.9 Gross capital formation (constant 2010 USD, billions) for Haiti vs. 
Synthetic Haiti 
 
Notes: Sources: WDI, author calculations 
 
5.4.5 Government 
Low levels of revenue are an ongoing constraint for Haiti’s government. Official 
development assistance has not been channelled through the Haitian government in 
most cases (UN n.d.). Figure 5.10 shows government revenue generally increasing, 
although there has been a decline following 2012. The differences between actual and 
counterfactual in the period prior to the earthquake make it difficult to draw conclusions 
on the impact of the earthquake on government revenue.  
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18Figure 5.10 General government revenue, in billions of constant 2010 US 
dollars, for Haiti vs. Synthetic Haiti 
 
Notes: revenue as a percent of GDP, multiplied by GDP. Sources: IMF, WDI, author calculations  
 
Fiscal constraints faced by the government hindered the potential for a domestic fiscal 
stimulus from public sources. Government expenditure has increased, and is above the 
counterfactual, evident in Figure 5.11, although the pre-earthquake fit is not ideal. 
Figure 5.11 also shows an expenditure decrease following 2013.  
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19Figure 5.11 General government total expenditure, in billions of constant 2010 
USD, for Haiti vs. Synthetic Haiti 
 
Notes: expenditure as a percent of GDP, multiplied by GDP. Sources: IMF, WDI, author calculations 
 
5.4.6 Trade impacts 
A large initial increase in imports of consumption goods and services supported Haiti’s 
temporary post-earthquake increase in consumption. Haiti’s initial increase in imports 
was necessary due to the loss of productive capacity following the earthquake and 
heightened demand for some products such as building supplies. Figure 5.12 shows that 
imports were above the counterfactual in the years immediately following the 
earthquake and then fell below the counterfactual, although the calculated 
counterfactual varies considerably in the case of imports. Larger proportionate changes 
in GDP components such as imports are more likely than in GDP, as fluctuations in the 
output of one component may be offset by fluctuations in another.  
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20Figure 5.12 Imports, in billions of constant 2010 USD, for Haiti vs. Synthetic 
Haiti 
 
Notes: Sources: WDI, author calculations 
 
Exports have increased to a minor extent since the earthquake, as evident in Figure 
5.13. The synthetic control for exports increases sharply in the year to 2012, raising 
questions over the suitability of the synthetic control in this case.34 The difficulty in 
finding a suitable synthetic control for exports partly relates to the size and 
concentration of the export sector in Haiti. The export sector in Haiti is small and 
focussed on light manufacturing, with over 80 percent of exports coming from textiles 
(Simoes and Hidalgo 2011). The continued upward trend in exports is partly a result of 
the recovery in the manufacturing sector.  
 
                                                          
34 Whilst the actual and synthetic control are very similar prior to the earthquake, there was an 
unusually large increase of exports of over 150 percent in Burkina Faso from 2009 to 2012 compared 
to an average of 44 percent for the donor pool. Burkina Faso makes up over 45 percent of the synthetic 
control for exports.  
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21Figure 5.13 Exports, in billions of constant 2010 USD, for Haiti vs. Synthetic 
Haiti 
 
Notes: Sources: WDI, author calculations 
 
In line with the major increase in imports, Haiti experienced an initial deterioration in 
its external balance on goods and services following the earthquake.35 Figure 5.14 
shows the initial shock to the external balance, followed by a return to the 
counterfactual. The absolute size of the external deficit had grown considerably by 
2014.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
35 The World Bank defines external balance on goods and services as exports of goods and services 
minus imports of goods and services. 
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22Figure 5.14 External balance, in billions of current USD, for Haiti vs. 
Synthetic Haiti 
 
Notes: Sources: WDI, author calculations 
 
5.4.7 Official development assistance and remittances 
Inflows of funds to developing countries can support recoveries after natural disasters, 
and are particularly needed if an absence of insurance markets hinders private 
consumption smoothing. The impact of foreign assistance following natural disasters 
depends on the amount, timing, and effectiveness of the flows. Foreign financing can 
have a positive impact through greater availability of resources, or there can be negative 
impacts if institutions lack the capacity to effectively use funds. 
There was a major surge in net official development assistance (ODA) to Haiti in 2010. 
While the median increase in ODA after natural disasters is generally modest (Becerra 
et al. 2014), for Haiti there was an increase of 173 percent in real terms from 2009 to 
2010. This large increase in ODA was in response to the extreme nature of the 
earthquake’s impacts in Haiti. 
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The timing and consistency of official development assistance have important 
implications for short-term recovery and long-term development. Figure 5.15 shows a 
large increase in net ODA and official aid in 2010, but a subsequent fall toward the 
counterfactual. Figure A5.3 in the Appendix shows that Haiti had the second-highest 
ratio of MSPE among donor pool countries, for net ODA and official aid received, 
despite the drop after the initial surge.  
23Figure 5.15 Net official development assistance and official aid received 
(constant 2013 USD) for Haiti vs. Synthetic Haiti in millions 
 
Notes: Sources: WDI, author calculations 
 
Even though there was a large initial increase in aid to Haiti, the impact of the aid also 
depends on its composition. The initial surge in aid was primarily for emergency 
response needs rather than long-term investment. The proportion of net ODA to Haiti 
for humanitarian assistance increased from an average of seven percent in the previous 
12 years, to 51 percent in 2010 (OECD 2015a). In contrast, the total amount of aid 
classified as technical cooperation was lower in the four years after the earthquake than 
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the four years before the earthquake (OECD 2015a). Also, intermediaries such as 
nongovernmental organisations and private contractors received large amounts of aid, 
making it difficult to determine the final use of these funds (Ramachandran and Walz 
2012) and to determine likely outcomes. 
There have also been aid inflows with a greater focus on long-term development. For 
instance, the US government supported efforts to make the electoral process more 
transparent through actions such as creation of Electoral Information Centers to 
increase publicly available electoral information (US Department of State 2015). For 
urban infrastructure, the US government provided shelter solutions for more than 
300,000 people who were displaced following the earthquake (US Department of State 
2015), although tens of thousands were still living in tents five years after the 
earthquake (Miami Herald 2015). Development of road infrastructure is another 
priority. Road quality has been a major problem in Haiti, due in part to earthquake 
damage and also seasonal flooding, including for agricultural producers such as those 
in the Fond Baptiste area (USAID 2012). Roads rehabilitated in 2010 by the United 
Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) have included construction of retaining 
walls for a road linking Port-au-Prince and Jacmel (UNOPS n.d.). More work remains 
to be done, as the ongoing threat to infrastructure from natural disasters was evident in 
the impact of Hurricane Matthew, with the destruction of the main road between Port-
au-Prince and the southern part of Haiti (BBC 2016). The Haiti Reconstruction Fund, 
a partnership between the Government of Haiti and the international community, has 
also targeted infrastructure development. For instance, the development of the Caracol 
Industrial Park in the north of Haiti aims to decentralise economic growth, adding over 
10,000 jobs in sectors such as garment manufacture (Haiti Reconstruction Fund 2016).  
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It is possible that spill-over impacts from the earthquake in Haiti could affect aid 
received by other countries and the calculation of the synthetic control. For instance, 
there is a possibility that other countries in the donor pool received less in aid due to 
the large increase in aid to Haiti. Despite this possibility, evidence of major falls in total 
aid for other countries was not pronounced in the data. On average, donor pool countries 
received more in net ODA and official aid in the four years after the earthquake than 
the four years before the earthquake. Further, net official development assistance and 
official aid on a global basis, excluding Haiti, increased in each of the four years from 
2010, except for 2012 (World Bank 2016a). 
Large aid inflows can also have economic side-effects, potentially appreciating the 
exchange rate, increasing wage inflation, and reducing export competitiveness (Rajan 
and Subramanian 2011). Exchange rate impacts for the Haitian gourde were muted, 
partly due to the build-up of foreign currency reserves (IMF 2015). The short-term aid 
surge could also have been inflationary, but the consumer price index remained below 
ten percent, shown in Figure 5.16. 
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24Figure 5.16 Inflation in consumer prices, annual percent, for Haiti vs. 
Synthetic Haiti 
 
Notes: Sources: WDI, author calculations 
 
Foreign flows like remittances also contributed more to consumption than investment 
after the earthquake (IDB 2014). Remittances have increased since the earthquake but 
the trend does not exhibit a noticeable change following the earthquake. The pre-
earthquake fit between actual and synthetic control is not as good as some of the other 
variables, as shown in Figure 5.17. Remittances can be constrained by a number of 
factors, including lack of financial development. For instance, Posso (2015) finds that 
an increase in the proportion of the population using microfinance is associated with an 
increase in remittance inflows. There was potential for remittances to fall following the 
global financial crisis, but Ruiz and Vargas-Silva (2012) note that remittance growth in 
2008 was positive for many Latin American countries including Haiti.  
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25Figure 5.17 Personal remittances received, current USD, billions 
 
Notes: Sources: WDI, author calculations 
 
5.4.8 Energy use 
Energy and electricity use were at low levels prior to the earthquake in Haiti, although 
there had been a trend of modest increase. Following the earthquake, primary energy 
consumption in Haiti continued its upward trend (Figure A5.4). Electricity generation 
also increased from 2010–2012, after a minor initial fall in the year of the earthquake, 
but stagnated after 2012, as shown in Figure 5.18. Long-term structural issues in 
electricity supply in Haiti (IMF 2015) could be more important determinants of the 
level and trend of electricity generation.  
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26Figure 5.18 Electricity production (GWh) for Haiti and Synthetic Haiti 
 
Notes: Sources: IEA, WDI, author calculations 
 
The impact of the earthquake on road transport is starkly evident in Figure 5.19, with 
energy used for road transport falling sharply in the year of the earthquake. Many roads 
were damaged by the earthquake, including around 70 kilometres of main roads 
(Government of the Republic of Haiti 2010). Damage to roads contributed to the 
transmission of economic impacts after the earthquake, providing an impediment to the 
economic recovery. 
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27Figure 5.19 Road transport energy use (thousand tonnes of oil equivalent) for 
Haiti and Synthetic Haiti 
 
Notes: Sources: IEA, WDI, author calculations 
 
5.4.9 Population in Port-au-Prince 
 
The earthquake caused pronounced social dislocation in Port-au-Prince. The major 
impact of the earthquake and the aftermath on the population size of Port-au-Prince is 
evident in Figure 5.20, with a large gap below the counterfactual up to 2014. In addition 
to the social impacts, the large-scale internal displacement has major implications for 
economic outcomes in Haiti. Permanent migration of skilled workers away from 
disaster-affected areas can accelerate poverty traps (Hallegatte and Dumas 2009).  
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28Figure 5.20 Millions of people living in largest city for Haiti vs. Synthetic Haiti 
 
Notes: Sources: WDI, author calculations 
5.5 Robustness tests for GDP per capita 
One robustness test is to consider a longer time horizon. I have repeated the SCM 
analysis with WDI data starting from 1998. I chose not to use the longer time period in 
the main analysis due to the difficulty in finding synthetic controls to closely match 
Haiti’s longer run macroeconomic experience. Haiti’s GDP per capita growth between 
1998 and 2009 was lower than most countries, and was characterised by two distinct 
periods. From 1998–2004 annual economic growth was negative, and from 2004–2009 
annual growth was positive. Haiti’s economic performance prior to 2004 was 
substantially affected by political instability (IMF 2015).  
The SCM outcome with the longer series produces a GDP per capita loss of eight 
percent in the year of the earthquake, and nine percent on average for the five years 
following the earthquake, as evident in Figure 5.21. This again indicates that the 
economic impacts of the earthquake were severe. The donor pool is expanded for Figure 
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5.21 to include countries with GDP per capita growth that was as low as Haiti’s GDP 
per capita growth, for the period from 1998–2009. This donor pool expansion occurs 
through the omission of inflation as a predictor variable.  
29Figure 5.21 GDP per capita PPP (constant 2011 international dollars) for Haiti 
vs. Synthetic Haiti 
 
Notes: Sources: WDI, author calculations 
 
A robustness test for the synthetic control using UN data is to restrict the donor pool to 
countries that are similar to Haiti across extra dimensions. I have used a small donor 
pool of five countries that are similar to Haiti in terms of land area, population size, 
state fragility, and economy. More specifically, countries are included that have land 
area less than 150,000 square kilometres (Haitian land area is 27,560 square 
kilometres), 2009 population less than 30 million (Haiti in 2009 had a population of 10 
million), and average State Fragility Index (Marshall and Cole 2014) within 2 points of 
Haiti over 2004–2009. The same criteria from the main analysis are also used: GDP per 
capita (2005 constant USD) of less than $1,000 in 2009, GDP per capita growth within 
15 percentage points of growth in Haiti for the period 2004–2009, GDP per capita 
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growth within 15 percentage points of growth in Haiti for the period 2010–2014, and 
excluding countries that had a one-year increase of 4 or more points in the State 
Fragility Index (Marshall and Cole 2014). Countries that do not meet all of these criteria 
or have missing data are excluded, leaving five countries: Benin, Comoros, Lesotho, 
Nepal, and Togo. The synthetic control using these five countries in the donor pool 
produces a seven percent average GDP per capita gap between actual and 
counterfactual, with a nine percent gap in the year of the earthquake. The seven percent 
average loss in GDP per capita for the small donor pool is in-between the six percent 
average loss for Figure 5.4 and the nine percent average loss in Figure 5.21. Figure 
A5.5 shows the synthetic control for the small donor pool. The five countries in the 
small donor pool that meet the additional criteria also make a disproportionately large 
contribution to the other synthetic controls. On average, these countries make up 26 
percent of the synthetic controls listed in Appendix Table A5.5, 53 percent for Table 
A5.6, 24 percent for Table A5.7, and 50 percent for Table A5.8. 
5.6 Comparison with Latin America and Caribbean 
It may also be of interest to compare economic growth in Haiti to the average for the 
Latin America and Caribbean region as most Latin American and Caribbean countries 
are excluded from the donor pools due to their income being above the thresholds. 
Figure 5.22 compares GDP per capita for Haiti and the Latin America and Caribbean 
average, with both series as an index with base year in 2009. After the shock of the 
earthquake, the GDP per capita index for Haiti does not catch up to the Latin America 
and Caribbean index in Figure 5.22: there is persistence in the gap rather than 
convergence. This is similar to the results using the SCM, such as Figure 5.4, where 
GDP per capita in Haiti does not catch up to the counterfactual following the 
earthquake. Following the earthquake in 2010, there are no major shocks that are 
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evident in the GDP per capita indices in Figure 5.22. There are no outliers having a 
major impact on the Latin America/Caribbean average economic growth for 2010–
2016. 
30 Figure 5.22 GDP per capita index (base year = 2009) for Haiti vs. Latin 
America & Caribbean 
 
Notes: Sources: WDI, author calculations 
5.7 Conclusion 
The loss of over 200,000 lives was a devastating outcome of the 2010 earthquake in 
Haiti, and the initial destruction also contributed to large output losses. I calculate the 
gap between actual and counterfactual GDP to be approximately 12 percent on average 
in the six years to 2015. In aggregate terms, I calculate the total loss to be approximately 
$6 billion (constant 2010 US dollars) over the six years to 2015.  
The $6 billion of production losses calculated in this paper is similar in magnitude to 
the $8 billion in monetary damages initially estimated by Cavallo et al. (2010), although 
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it is difficult to make precise comparisons for a number of reasons. One reason is that 
the $6 billion loss calculated in this paper does not include future production losses for 
all years in the future. While the present value of total production losses from a natural 
disaster in a no-reconstruction scenario is theoretically equivalent to initial asset losses, 
equivalence is based on strong assumptions, such as the discount rate equalling the 
return on capital, and shocks being marginal (Hallegatte 2014). The massive impact of 
the earthquake in Haiti reduces the relevance of the theoretical loss equivalence in this 
case. Further, the $6 billion loss in this paper is in 2010 US dollars while the $8 billion 
is in 2009 US dollars.36 While it is difficult to compare different loss calculations, the 
losses calculated in this paper are severe. 
While GDP losses have been major and ongoing, the earthquake had differing impacts 
on various parts of the Haitian economy. Aggregate consumption increased in the short 
term, due in part to a temporary surge in foreign inflows. Investment has not recovered, 
nor has the services sector, but the smaller manufacturing sector showed reversion 
towards the no-earthquake counterfactual. While electricity generation was lower in the 
year of the earthquake than the previous year, the difference was minor, and there have 
been some modest electricity production increases followed by some stagnation. Road 
transport energy use was considerably lower after the earthquake. 
While it is perhaps too early to determine if the macroeconomic impacts of the 
earthquake are indeed permanent, the fact that GDP remains well below the 
counterfactual several years after the event means that a permanent effect is possible. 
The gap of actual investment below counterfactual suggests that GDP losses may 
persist, unless investment quantity and productivity increase. There is evidence that 
                                                          
36 Using 2010 constant US dollars rather than 2009 constant US dollars gives GDP values that are 
approximately six percent higher; the loss estimations would be similar using either currency base year 
when rounding to the nearest billion. 
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other shocks, including World War II and the Great Depression, have had permanent 
impacts on economic output elsewhere (Barro 2009). The potentially permanent output 
impact from the earthquake is consistent with findings that aggregate output sometimes 
has a unit root (Nelson and Plosser 1982; Ben-David et al. 2003; Darné 2009). 
Persistent impacts of natural disasters, such as the earthquake in Haiti, can contribute 
to explanations of lower levels of economic development in more disaster-prone 
countries.  
The earthquake in Haiti is a case of massive economic damage that can result from 
unexpected natural disasters, especially in countries with relatively low disaster risk 
preparedness. Risk escalation from potential climate change and population growth is 
likely to increase the importance of investment for risk reduction in coming years. The 
synthetic control method could be applied to other natural disasters, such as the 2015 
Nepal earthquake, when sufficient data are available.   
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CHAPTER 6 IS ELECTRICITY AVAILABILITY A 
PRECONDITION FOR FASTER ECONOMIC GROWTH 
TRAJECTORIES? 
Summary: 
This paper investigates if greater electricity availability helps countries to jump to 
higher economic growth trajectories. I do not find that initial electricity availability is 
a precondition for subsequent economic or manufacturing-sector growth. A possible 
explanation is that countries could increase electricity availability as they grow. I find 
that there has been convergence in electricity levels in recent decades, showing that 
there has been greater electricity increases for countries with lower initial electricity 
availability. I use a cross-sectional regression approach with national-level data, 
primarily assessing economic growth in the decade to 2015. 
6.1 Introduction 
The human welfare consequences of economic growth are staggering (Lucas 1988), 
meaning that identification of factors able to increase economic growth is very 
important. Economic growth allows for greater consumption of necessities such as food 
and housing, and also contributes to economic development by allowing greater 
spending on education and healthcare. Many variables have been found to contribute to 
the rate of economic growth (Sala-i-Martin 1997) through either productivity or factor 
accumulation. Some of the factors more commonly found to contribute to economic 
growth include macroeconomic and political stability, health and education investment, 
effective institutions, trade openness, geographical conditions, and favourable 
conditions for private enterprise (Perkins et al. 2013).  
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Electricity is another variable that could play an important role in economic 
development in some countries in some time periods. Electricity is important as a direct 
input into production processes (Stern 2011), but there are also other indirect channels 
through which electricity could affect economic growth. For instance, electricity use 
can contribute to changes in social, health, and environmental outcomes, which can 
then flow through to economic growth. Electricity availability provides social benefits 
from improved lighting at night and by reducing time spent on collecting fuelwood 
(World Bank 2010). Electricity can help to reduce household air pollution and adverse 
health impacts from solid fuel use (Lim et al. 2012). Environmental impacts of 
electricity use depend on the energy type used as the primary fuel. Some studies have 
identified impacts of various energy types on economic output. For instance, renewable 
energy consumption has been found to have a positive impact on economic output in 
some countries (Bhattacharya et al. 2016).  
Electricity could impact on economic growth as a factor of production or through 
enhancing productivity, and the relative importance of these impacts could differ over 
time and place. Stern and Kander (2012) find that energy-augmenting technological 
change was important for economic growth in the 19th and early 20th century in Sweden, 
prior to labour-augmenting technological change becoming the dominant contributor. 
More generally, labour and capital accumulation made larger contributions to global 
economic growth in the 18th and early 19th century, before productivity growth made a 
greater contribution (Crafts and O’Rourke 2014). This indicates that the importance of 
productivity and factors of production have changed over time. 
Existing surveys of the relationship between electricity consumption and economic 
growth note that researchers find mixed results for studies of different countries, time 
periods, and use of different methods. These studies predominantly use annual data and 
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methods related to Granger causality. Payne (2010) conducts a survey of the literature 
on the role of electricity consumption in contributing to economic growth, focusing 
primarily on data for countries in the late twentieth century. Payne (2010) finds that 23 
percent of surveyed primary studies show a one-way relationship from electricity 
consumption to economic growth, 18 percent find a bi-directional causal relationship, 
while the rest find either a one-way relationship from economic growth to electricity 
consumption or no relationship. Ozturk (2010) reviews studies on the relationship 
between electricity consumption and economic growth using national-level data up to 
2006 and also finds that the direction of causality differs between studies. Different 
studies of the same country also produce conflicting results (Ozturk 2010). Other more 
recent studies include one by Omri (2014), who extends the literature survey, and again 
notes mixed results between different studies. Karanfil and Li (2015) use co-integration 
techniques with 160 countries and 13 subsamples, finding that the relationship between 
electricity and economic growth varies by region. 
In addition to surveys of previous literature, a more systematic assessment of the 
electricity-economic growth relationship is possible through meta-analysis, although 
results also differ with this approach. Chen et al. (2012) note that researchers more 
commonly find that electricity causes output in OPEC and Kyoto Annex I countries, 
but the reverse direction of causation for developing countries. Bruns et al. (2014) 
conducted a meta-analysis and found that when controlling for energy prices there is a 
robust effect from output to energy use, rather than from energy to output. A meta-
analysis by Kalimeris et al. (2014) finds that each of the four causal relationships: 
energy or electricity causing economic outcomes, economic output causing energy 
outcomes, no relationship, and a bi-directional relationship, occurs in the literature 
about as often, and did not find systematic correlation between any causal pattern and 
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the methodological approach.37 In another meta-analysis that focuses on the last two 
decades, Menegaki (2014) finds that methodology, number of countries, and inclusion 
of variables such as price level have an influence on results for the energy and GDP 
relationship. The statistical significance of these factors is generally at the 10 percent 
level for this meta-analysis covering 51 studies. 
The mixed results in previous studies of the relationship between electricity and 
economic growth may partly relate to methodological issues. Some previous studies 
focus on the bivariate relationship between electricity and economic growth, without 
controlling for other important variables, as identified by Payne (2010) and Bacon and 
Kojima (2016). Stern and Enflo (2013) note that Granger causality and co-integration 
techniques are sensitive to variable definition, time period, choice of controls, and 
introduction of structural breaks. In responding to the many studies with mixed results 
using Granger causality for examining the electricity and economic growth 
relationship, Ozturk (2010) suggests that new approaches are required.  
This paper focuses on the effects of electricity availability on subsequent economic 
growth performance over a decadal horizon, in contrast to many previous studies that 
investigate the impact of contemporaneous electricity consumption. I use a number of 
proxies for electricity availability including electricity capacity, access, quality, 
transmission and distribution losses, and consumption. Electricity capacity and access 
may be the best proxies for electricity availability to allow assessment of the role of 
electricity supply and investment on subsequent economic growth. It is very difficult to 
robustly assess the direction of relationship between contemporaneous electricity 
consumption and economic growth, even with advanced econometric techniques, as 
                                                          
37 Of the 686 specifications included in the meta-analysis by Kalimeris et al. (2014), 168 have 
electricity as the energy measurement method. 
136 
 
suggested by the mixed results of previous studies. The close relationship between 
electricity consumption per capita and GDP per capita is evident in Figure 6.1. Analysis 
of the effect of electricity availability on subsequent economic growth may reduce the 
threat of endogeneity related to contemporaneous electricity consumption and 
economic growth.  
31Figure 6.1 Log electricity consumption per capita and log GDP per capita, 
2005 
 
Notes: Log electricity consumption is in kilowatt hours per capita. Log GDP per capita is in 2011 constant 
international dollars PPP. Sources: US EIA (2016), World Bank (2016a). 
 
I use a cross-sectional regression approach to explain economic growth in this paper as 
opposed to a Granger causality approach. The cross-sectional approach is appropriate 
given the focus on the effect of electricity availability on economic growth in the 
subsequent decade. The cross-country growth regressions in this paper are for the 10 
years to 2015, as opposed to the many previous studies that use annual data. Electricity 
has not been a major focus in studies using cross-country growth regressions; electricity 
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is not included in the long list of variables used by Durlauf et al. (2005, Appendix B), 
for example. 
In addition to assessing a global sample of countries, I focus on impacts of electricity 
availability on economic growth while excluding high-income countries in a large 
sample of developing countries. Electricity sector development could be important for 
countries at earlier stages of economic development if they are to progress to later 
stages of economic development. The potential for different energy impacts on 
economic outcomes for individual countries at different stages of development has been 
investigated in some previous studies (Fatai et al. 2004, for example). 
This paper suggests that electricity availability does not appear to be a precondition for 
shifting to a faster economic growth trajectory on average, based on the decade to 2015. 
Rather, countries may be able to increase electricity availability when they deem it to 
be a priority. There could be a higher marginal product of electricity investment, and 
greater motivation to prioritise electricity sector investment, for countries at lower 
levels of electricity availability. The convergence in electricity levels in recent decades, 
with countries at lower levels of electricity availability having faster subsequent growth 
in electricity availability, suggests that countries do not face immutable electricity 
constraints.   
Electricity availability does appear to be an important factor when other potential 
causes of economic growth are ignored, but this significance disappears when 
controlling for other factors. This relationship is evident for both initial electricity levels 
and prior decade changes in electricity. 
Governments have historically played an important role in the provision of electricity, 
due to natural monopoly characteristics of electricity transmission infrastructure, 
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limitations on private sector incentives in some cases, and the long time frames 
involved in building large new electricity infrastructure. The high initial cost of 
investment in electricity infrastructure contributes to the low electricity supply in 
countries at earlier stages of development. These characteristics make electricity an 
important factor of production to study from a public policy perspective. 
6.2 Theory 
The potential for electricity to cause economic growth could occur through two broad 
channels. Electricity could increase productivity if it allows people to spend more time 
in gainful employment, relative to low productivity tasks like collection of fuelwood. 
Electricity can also contribute to economic growth as an input into production. Energy, 
including electricity, is an essential factor of production with limited substitutability 
with other inputs (Stern et al. 2017a). The theory of electricity as an input to production 
suggests that electricity used by industry, especially manufacturing, may be important. 
Electricity investment has both immediate and delayed impacts. Development of 
electricity infrastructure is a component of overall investment, having an immediate 
impact on economic growth through the investment component of GDP. This 
investment provides for consumption benefits over long durations of five decades or 
more in some cases. The delayed impacts of electricity on economic growth also occur 
through many other channels. Energy, including electricity, contributes to non-energy 
capital accumulation, which would then flow through to benefit economic growth 
(Lechthaler 2017). There is no exact lag length to precisely capture all of the delayed 
impacts of electricity on economic growth. I use a period of 10 years. 
Considering electricity as an input into economic production suggests that electricity 
can be inserted into a production function. This is similar to making energy an input in 
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production functions as in previous studies (Bretschger 2015, for example). Starting 
from a production function with electricity inputs (E) and non-electricity inputs (N): 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝐹(𝐸𝑡−𝑇 , 𝑁𝑡−𝑇)     (1) 
This equation shows output at time 𝑡 as a function of lagged inputs (lag of 𝑇 years) for 
a number of reasons. The lagged electricity variables can help to identify indirect 
impacts of electricity on economic growth, including through productivity 
enhancements. The lags should also reduce potential reverse causation from economic 
growth to electricity.  
The non-electricity inputs would include endogenous factors such as labour and capital 
in a standard production function context, but this paper uses a broader definition of 
inputs to include some exogenous factors that are associated with economic growth. 
For example, temperature is an exogenous geographical factor that is part of the context 
within which economic growth differences occur. Other deep drivers of economic 
growth include political and institutional capital such as stability and effectiveness of 
governments, human capital such as education and health of populations, and economic 
capital related to trade openness and macroeconomic stability. Some of these deep 
drivers could have a delayed impact on economic growth, as reflected in the lagged 
variables in this paper.   
With output as a Cobb-Douglas function of productivity (𝐴), broadly-defined electricity 
inputs, and non-electricity inputs (or a constant elasticity of substitution production 
function assuming an elasticity of substitution of one): 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝐴𝐸𝑡−𝑇
𝛼𝑁𝑡−𝑇
𝛽     (2) 
Taking the log of both sides gives: 
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𝐿𝑛𝑌𝑡 = 𝑙𝑛𝐴 + 𝛼𝑙𝑛𝐸𝑡−𝑇 + 𝛽𝑙𝑛𝑁𝑡−𝑇   (3) 
Subtracting lagged income and dividing by T, the number of years, gives a model 
describing economic growth (lagged income on the right-hand side is included in the N 
term): 
[𝐿𝑛𝑌𝑡− 𝐿𝑛𝑌𝑡−𝑇]
𝑇
 =
𝑙𝑛𝐴
𝑇
+ 𝜑𝑙𝑛𝐸𝑡−𝑇 + 𝛾𝑙𝑛𝑁𝑡−𝑇  (4) 
6.3 Method and data 
To assess the impact of electricity availability on subsequent economic growth per 
capita, I use a cross-sectional regression approach. I first focus on the initial level of 
electricity at the start of the period of growth. In contrast to some of the Granger 
causality studies that take a bivariate approach, I also control for other non-electricity 
factors that could impact on economic growth in the model below. All variables on the 
right-hand side of equation 5 are initial values. In other words, they are lagged by 10 
years.  
( 𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑐
2015 − 𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑐
2005 ) / 10 =  𝜑𝑙𝑛𝐸𝑐
2005  +  𝛾𝒙′𝑐
2005 +  𝜀𝑐  (5) 
The dependent variable is the average annual rate of economic growth calculated as the 
differenced logs divided by number of years. I use GDP per capita growth for the 10-
year period up to 2015. The 𝑌𝑐 variable is the level of GDP per capita for each of the 𝑐 
countries. I also use growth in manufacturing sector value added per capita and 
electricity availability as dependent variables to assess potentially more specific 
impacts of initial electricity availability. Electricity is a crucial input for the 
manufacturing sector, and electricity could potentially have larger impacts on the 
manufacturing sector compared to other sectors of the economy. Assessing causes of 
growth in electricity availability could reveal if there is convergence in electricity 
availability, similar to convergence in income levels. 
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I use multiple electricity variables to proxy for electricity availability, as described in 
Table 6.1, with a separate regression for each electricity variable. The 𝒙 vector includes 
the non-electricity controls, as described below. The error term is 𝜀𝑐, with 𝐸(𝜀𝑐) = 0. 
20Table 6.1 Electricity variables 
Variable Source Description 
Log of electricity consumption 
per capita 
EIA, 
WDI 
Log of the quotient of total electricity consumption 
in billion kilowatt hours from EIA, and total 
population from WDI. 
Log of electricity capacity per 
capita 
EIA, 
WDI 
Log of the quotient of total electricity installed 
capacity in million kilowatts from EIA, and total 
population from WDI. 
Log consumption of electricity 
by industry sector per capita 
IEA, 
WDI 
Log of the quotient of electricity consumption by 
industry sector, in kilograms of oil equivalent from 
IEA, and total population from WDI. 
Electricity transmission and 
distribution losses 
WDI Electric power transmission and distribution losses, 
percentage of electricity output divided by 100. 
They include losses in transmission between sources 
of supply and points of distribution, and in 
distribution to consumers, including pilferage. 
Access to electricity WDI Access to electricity (percentage of population 
divided by 100). 
Electricity quality index WEF Quality of electricity supply (lack of interruptions 
and lack of voltage fluctuations), 1=extremely 
unreliable, 7=extremely reliable. 
Notes. Sources: EIA: U.S. Energy Information Administration, IEA: International Energy Agency, 
WDI: World Bank World Development Indicators, WEF: World Economic Forum. Measurement 
issues for electricity access are discussed in Section 4.3. 
 
The controls are included in the 𝒙 vector. I include six broad characteristics that many 
previous studies have found to be associated with economic growth (Perkins et al. 
2013). These include macroeconomic and political stability, health and education, 
effective governance and institutions, trade openness, and geographic conditions. 
Perkins et al. (2013) also refer to favourable environments for private enterprise. 
Electricity availability of high quality is an example of this. Electricity is also important 
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for public services. I also control for the initial level of GDP per capita in the x vector. 
Barro (1991) finds a negative relationship between the initial level of GDP per capita 
and subsequent GDP per capita growth, consistent with Solow-Swan (Solow 1956; 
Swan 1956) neoclassical growth models. This suggests that there will be convergence 
in incomes over time. I also control for total energy consumption per capita, excluding 
electricity consumption per capita. In addition, I also consider regional binary variables, 
as Rockey and Temple (2016) suggest that regional binary variables should be included 
in econometric models of economic growth. Consideration of unobservable factors 
such as the level of technology in each country is important (Eberhardt and Teal 2011), 
but regional binary variables can account for some variation in technology when there 
are similarities within regions. 
There are a number of data sources for the variables. Electricity consumption and 
capacity data are from the United States Energy Information Administration (US EIA 
2016). Electricity quality is from the World Economic Forum (2016). From the World 
Bank (2016a), I use electricity transmission and distribution losses, access to electricity, 
energy consumption per capita, GDP per capita in purchasing power parity (PPP) 
constant 2011 international dollars, inflation in consumer prices, trade openness as the 
sum of exports and imports divided by GDP, population, income and region groups, 
and life expectancy. Political stability, control of corruption, and government 
effectiveness are from the Worldwide Governance Indicators (2015). The education 
index is from the United Nations Development Programme (2016). Hanushek and 
Woessmann (2012) note that cognitive skills are an appropriate measure of educational 
achievement, but using cognitive skills data would reduce the sample size. Temperature 
data are from the climate dataset CRU CY v.3.22 from the Climate Research Unit 
(Harris et al. 2014). 
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Different impacts of electricity on economic growth could be due to variation in 
electricity scarcity across country groups; Stern and Kander (2012) find that economic 
growth is constrained when energy is scarce. Differences in electricity consumption 
between income groups is major and evident in Figure 6.2, showing that high-income 
countries use well over 20 times more electricity than low-income countries on average. 
These differences in electricity use could flow through to impact on future GDP. Figure 
6.3 shows the major variation in electricity use across regions rather than income 
groups, with electricity consumption in South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa being 
particularly low on average. The next section includes results for a global sample and a 
developing country sample excluding high-income countries. This helps to focus on the 
impacts for countries at earlier stages of economic development where electricity is in 
lower supply. I use World Bank (2016a) income groups from 2005, as the start of the 
10-year period of economic growth.  
32Figure 6.2 Electricity consumption per capita, by income group, 2005 
 
Notes: Electricity consumption is megawatt hours per capita, 2005. Sources: US EIA (2016), World 
Bank (2016a). 
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33Figure 6.3 Electricity consumption per capita, by region, 2005 
 
Notes: Regional groups are South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and Caribbean, East Asia 
and Pacific, Middle East and North Africa, Europe and Central Asia, and North America. Sources: US 
EIA (2016), World Bank (2016a). 
Equation (6) has the change in electricity variables rather than levels, to assess whether 
lagged growth in electricity variables, rather than levels, contributes to economic 
growth. The model in equation (6) with long-run growth rates should not be adversely 
affected by trending data (Chirinko 2011; Stern et al. 2017b). The electricity 
consumption and capacity variables are annualised changes for the prior decade (1995–
2005), and the electricity losses variable is the difference between 1995 and 2005 
electricity loss values. 
( 𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑐
2015 − 𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑐
2005 ) / 10 =  𝜑𝛥1995−2005𝐸𝑐  +  𝛾𝒙′𝑐
2005 +  𝜀𝑐  (6) 
An example of a previous study that finds a significant relationship between changes in 
electricity and economic growth is the work by Kodongo and Ojah (2016), who find 
that improved access to infrastructure, including electricity infrastructure, is important 
for economic growth. The study by Kodongo and Ojah (2016) uses a panel of Sub-
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Saharan African countries with infrastructure changes in the previous year as an 
independent variable. 
My paper focuses on economic growth in the 10 year period up to 2015 for a number 
of reasons. There is greater data availability for recent years. Also, recent time periods 
are more relevant than more distant time periods when the context was substantially 
different. The decade up to 2015 has seen many major changes that represent a break 
from earlier periods. The global financial crisis of 2007–2009 was a major economic 
break and the subsequent period has involved low growth and high public debt in many 
high-income countries, but has seen less impact on economic growth in low and middle-
income countries.38 There are major changes evident in trends of total electricity 
consumption per capita in countries of all income groups. Figure 6.4 shows the trend 
changes in the most populous countries in the low and lower-middle income groups 
over the decade to 2014. There are major increases in electricity consumption per capita 
for Ethiopia and India, although the absolute level in Ethiopia is low.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
38 I also consider the decade to 2006 that does not include the global financial crisis. 
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34Figure 6.4 Electricity consumption per capita, Ethiopia and India 
 
Notes: Electricity consumption per capita (megawatt hours), for Ethiopia and India. Sources: US EIA 
(2016), World Bank (2016a). 
Figure 6.5 gives an initial indication of the impact of electricity capacity on economic 
growth. There does not appear to be a major relationship between initial electricity 
capacity and economic growth for the ten years to 2015. The line of best fit has a slight 
downward slope, although the relationship appears weak. It is possible that a 
relationship may be obscured by other variables, or there may in fact be no relationship 
between electricity and economic growth on average. As electricity capacity per capita 
is strongly correlated with GDP per capita, the weak negative relationship may reflect 
convergence of GDP per capita, with higher GDP per capita (and electricity capacity 
per capita) being associated with lower subsequent economic growth.  
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35Figure 6.5 Log electricity consumption per capita and subsequent GDP per 
capita growth 
 
Notes: Log electricity capacity per capita (watts per capita) in 2005 and average annual GDP per capita 
growth (difference of logged income) for the decade to 2015. Sources: US EIA (2016), World Bank 
(2016). 
Potential endogeneity may arise through sources such as reverse causation, omitted 
variable bias, or measurement error. Reverse causation is possible as studies have found 
that economic output causes electricity output in some cases (Payne 2010). This is 
related to electricity demand being a function of income. Omitted variable bias could 
result as there are many variables that are correlated with electricity that can also 
contribute to economic growth and it may be difficult to control for all of them. 
Ways to address potential endogeneity in this paper include the use of lags in the 
explanatory variables, changes in the dependent variable rather than levels, and multiple 
proxies for electricity availability beyond just electricity consumption. Using initial 
values for independent variables that pre-date the subsequent change in the dependent 
variables lessens the likelihood of reverse causation. It is also less likely that growth 
would lead to reverse causation compared to levels. For instance, growth in income is 
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less likely to cause greater educational attainment or life expectancy compared to the 
potential for the level of income to influence social indicators. 
A drawback of focusing on the effect of electricity availability on subsequent economic 
growth is that it is just capturing part of the relationship; contemporaneous effects are 
not included. In this sense, the coefficients for electricity could be understating the 
impact on economic growth. This applies to the initial levels of electricity in equation 
5 and also the lagged changes in electricity in equation 6. 
The time period of analysis in this paper is also relevant in relation to endogeneity. I 
use a 10 year period for the dependent variable growth. This is beneficial in comparison 
to studies using annual levels or changes which are more likely to entangle cause and 
effect. 
The extensive list of controls in this paper helps to address potential endogeneity from 
omitted variable bias. The cross-sectional regression approach allows for more 
variables as controls compared to single-country Granger causality analysis which 
encounters limitations on degrees of freedom.39 There is still potential for omitted 
variable bias where omitted variables are correlated with the electricity measures.  
Use of instrumental variables is an option to address endogeneity, but there are 
challenges related to weak instruments and validity. A potential instrument for 
electricity consumption could be electricity infrastructure, although this instrument may 
not be ideal. Electricity infrastructure precedes electricity consumption, but may be 
built in anticipation of future demand and economic growth (Stern et al. 2017a). As an 
example of an instrument for electricity, Andersen and Dalgaard (2013) use lightning 
density as an instrument for power outages. My paper does not include an instrumental 
                                                          
39 Granger causality using panel data is another alternative. 
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variable approach due to the difficulty in finding an ideal instrument for each of the 
electricity variables. The results in the paper are indicative, with the caveat that the 
endogeneity problem might not have been fully overcome. 
6.4 Results 
In Table 6.2, a significant impact of electricity availability on economic growth for the 
ten years to 2015 appears to be evident. Only the initial level of GDP per capita is 
controlled for, with other important factors controlled for in Table 6.3. There is a 
significant coefficient for electricity consumption, with significance at the one percent 
level. The industry sector electricity variable also has a positive coefficient, but is not 
statistically significant. The log of electricity capacity per capita and electricity access 
are also positive and significant at the one percent level. Transmission and distribution 
losses show a negative coefficient, consistent with higher electricity losses representing 
greater inefficiency, but without statistical significance at the ten percent level. The 
control of initial GDP per capita has negative and significant coefficients in each case 
in Table 6.2, indicating convergence of economic output as countries with higher initial 
income have lower subsequent growth in income per capita. The magnitudes of the 
coefficients for log GDP per capita in Table 6.2 are roughly similar to the finding by 
Barro (2015) of a 1.7 percent annual convergence rate. 
The significant electricity coefficients from Table 6.2 are sensitive to inclusion of other 
controls. For instance, the coefficient for electricity consumption that is significant at 
the one percent level in Table 6.2 is no longer significant when temperature is added as 
an additional control. This indicates that omitted variable bias is a potential issue, as 
the statistical significance of electricity consumption disappears with just two controls. 
There is a reasonable number of degrees of freedom when only two controls are 
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included, suggesting that disappearing significance is not caused entirely by having too 
few degrees of freedom. 
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21Table 6.2 Results, electricity and GDP per capita growth to 2015 
Notes: ***, **, * show statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent level respectively. Robust standard errors are in brackets below the coefficients. Coefficients 
for constants are not shown. All explanatory variables are at a 10-year lag, except that access to electricity is at a 15-year lag and electricity quality is at a 9-year lag 
due to data availability. Average annual rate of GDP per capita growth is calculated as the differenced logs divided by number of years. Results are similar if the 
countries with the fastest (Turkmenistan) and slowest (Yemen) economic growth for 2005–2015 are excluded.
 Dependent variable: Average annual GDP per capita growth (difference of logs), 2005–2015 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Log electricity consumption per capita 0.005***      
    (0.002)      
Log consumption of electricity by industry p.c.  0.003     
     (0.002)     
Log electricity capacity per capita   0.006***    
    (0.002)    
Electricity transmission and distribution losses    -0.040   
    (0.028)   
Access to electricity      0.024***  
     (0.008)  
Electricity quality index      -0.002 
      (0.002) 
Log GDP per capita  -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.006** 
    (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Number of countries 173 129 173 131 177 117 
R2 0.126 0.255 0.155 0.270 0.143 0.228 
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When controlling for an extensive list of other potentially important variables in Table 
6.3, none of the electricity variable coefficients are significant.40 This does not mean 
that there is definitely no relationship between electricity and economic growth, but 
there is no statistically significant impact of initial electricity level on subsequent 
economic growth identified in Table 6.3.41  
There are reasonable coefficients for the other factors in Table 6.3. The initial log of 
GDP per capita has similar negative coefficients to Table 6.2. The positive impact of 
more open economies is evident in the positive and significant coefficients at the one 
percent level for initial trade openness. There are also significant coefficients at the one 
percent level showing lower initial inflation being positive for economic growth, 
although this may not be evident in all time periods. Easterly et al. (1993) notes that 
coefficients for independent variables in growth regressions can change sign for 
different time periods. Three of the regressions also have statistically significant 
negative coefficients at the ten percent level for temperature, indicating that higher 
temperatures are adverse for economic growth. This is comparable to other studies: 
Burke et al. (2015) note that productivity peaks at 13 degrees Celsius and declines at 
higher temperatures. The negative and significant impacts of temperature on economic 
growth could be due to the higher disease burden at higher temperatures, such as from 
malaria (Sachs and Malaney 2002). One surprising result is that the control of 
corruption variable has negative and significant coefficients. In other words, countries 
that were assessed in 2005 as doing a better job of controlling corruption had lower 
economic growth from 2005–2015, after controlling for other variables. 
 
                                                          
40 The electricity coefficients are also insignificant in explaining economic growth in the decade to 
2006, and using the between estimator in a panel regression to explain the log of GDP per capita levels. 
41 Results are similar when controlling for regional binary variables. 
153 
 
22Table 6.3 Results, electricity and GDP per capita growth to 2015, with controls 
Notes: ***, **, * show statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent level respectively. Robust standard errors are in brackets below the coefficients. Coefficients 
for constants are not shown. All explanatory variables (including controls) are at a 10-year lag, except that access to electricity is at a 15-year lag and electricity 
quality is at a 9-year lag due to data availability. Results are similar if the control of corruption variable is excluded. 
 Dependent variable: Average annual GDP per capita growth, 2005–2015  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Log electricity consumption per capita 0.002      
    (0.003)      
Log consumption of electricity by industry p.c.  0.002     
     (0.002)     
Log electricity capacity per capita   0.001    
    (0.002)    
Electricity transmission and distribution losses    -0.024   
    (0.031)   
Access to electricity      0.001  
     (0.009)  
Electricity quality index      -0.002 
      (0.002) 
Log GDP per capita  -0.011*** -0.008 -0.011*** -0.008 -0.011*** -0.011* 
    (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) 
Log energy consumption p.c., excluding electricity 0.001 -0.006 0.002 -0.006 0.002 -0.001 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
Political stability / no violence -0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.002 -0.001 -0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Control of corruption -0.012** -0.011* -0.011** -0.010* -0.011** -0.005 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) 
Inflation, consumer prices -0.010*** -0.011*** -0.009*** -0.011*** -0.009*** -0.012*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Log life expectancy 0.025 0.014 0.025 0.013 0.025 0.018 
 (0.016) (0.019) (0.016) (0.019) (0.018) (0.021) 
Education index 0.012 0.037 0.014 0.044 0.015 0.035 
 (0.024) (0.026) (0.024) (0.027) (0.024) (0.024) 
Government effectiveness 0.006 0.002 0.006 0.001 0.006 0.001 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) 
Trade openness 0.008*** 0.007** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Temperature -0.004* -0.002 -0.004* -0.002 -0.005* -0.002 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Number of countries 142 118 142 120 138 106 
R2 0.332 0.363 0.330 0.399 0.326 0.448 
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Table 6.4 investigates whether initial electricity availability has been beneficial for 
growth in manufacturing sector value added per capita in developing countries. Five of 
the six electricity variables have negative and significant coefficients. This is surprising 
at first, because manufacturing relies more heavily on electricity than other sectors, and 
electricity availability would plausibly be more important in developing countries when 
it is in shorter supply. The negative association may be due to the omission of 
contemporaneous electricity changes, as described below. 
Table 6.5, with changes in electricity as dependent variables, shows that electricity 
levels have converged over the decade to 2014. There are negative coefficients for 
initial electricity levels, significant at the one percent level in each case except for 
electricity losses, in explaining the change in electricity over the subsequent decade. 
For instance, a one percentage point increase in initial electricity access is associated 
with a 0.2 percentage point decrease in the change in electricity access in the subsequent 
decade.  
The negative relationship between initial electricity level and subsequent electricity 
change in Table 6.5 could be contributing to the negative association between initial 
electricity level and manufacturing growth in Table 6.4. Manufacturing uses large 
amounts of electricity, but electricity changes are not controlled for in Table 6.4 to 
avoid reverse causation from manufacturing growth to contemporaneous electricity 
changes. This could bias the coefficients for initial electricity in Table 6.4 since the 
omitted electricity changes are correlated with both initial electricity and manufacturing 
growth. When contemporaneous changes in electricity are included in the first 
regression in Table 6.4 (column 1), the negative and significant coefficient for initial 
electricity consumption is no longer negative or significant.    
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23Table 6.4 Results, electricity and manufacturing sector value added per capita growth to 2015, excluding high-income countries 
Notes: ***, **, * show statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent level respectively. Robust standard errors are in brackets below the coefficients. Coefficients 
for constants are not shown. All explanatory variables (including controls) are at a 10-year lag, except electricity access is at a 15-year lag and electricity quality is at 
a 9-year lag due to data availability. Average annual rate of manufacturing sector per capita growth is calculated as the differenced logs divided by number of years. 
 Dependent variable: Average annual manufacturing sector value added per capita growth, 2005–2015  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Log electricity consumption per capita -0.020***      
    (0.007)      
Log consumption of electricity by industry p.c.  -0.011**     
     (0.005)     
Log electricity capacity per capita   -0.010*    
    (0.006)    
Electricity transmission and distribution losses    0.026   
    (0.082)   
Access to electricity      -0.082***  
     (0.027)  
Electricity quality index      -0.009** 
      (0.004) 
Log GDP per capita  0.009 0.005 0.004 -0.006 0.010 0.008 
    (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.008) (0.012) 
Log energy consumption p.c., excluding electricity 0.008 -0.002 0.005 -0.002 0.003 -0.008 
 (0.008) (0.011) (0.007) (0.011) (0.006) (0.010) 
Political stability / no violence -0.006 0.002 -0.007 0.006 -0.008 -0.010* 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.005) 
Control of corruption -0.004 -0.018* -0.012 -0.026* -0.015 -0.003 
 (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.016) (0.009) (0.011) 
Inflation, consumer prices -0.013** -0.011** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.012** -0.018*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Log life expectancy -0.011 -0.005 -0.003 0.005 0.082 -0.037 
 (0.034) (0.043) (0.035) (0.054) (0.054) (0.045) 
Education index 0.004 0.012 -0.009 -0.009 0.004 0.026 
 (0.041) (0.038) (0.044) (0.044) (0.041) (0.038) 
Government effectiveness 0.008 0.019 0.011 0.024* 0.009 0.019 
 (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.015) 
Trade openness 0.012 -0.004 0.011 -0.010 0.009 0.023* 
 (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.014) (0.012) 
Temperature -0.014*** -0.009* -0.012** -0.005 -0.011** -0.003 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) 
Number of countries 83 72 83 71 83 66 
R2 0.241 0.198 0.183 0.167 0.229 0.256 
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24Table 6.5 Results, initial electricity level and subsequent decadal change in electricity to 2014, excluding high-income countries 
Notes: ***, **, * show statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent level respectively. Robust standard errors are in brackets below the coefficients. Coefficients 
for constants are not shown. All explanatory variables are at a 10-year lag, except that electricity quality is at a 9-year lag due to data availability. The dependent 
variables are changes in electricity: consumption and capacity are average annual changes for the decade to 2014, the losses variable is the 10-year change to 2014, 
access is the 10-year change to 2010, and quality is the change from 2006–2014.
Dependent variable: Change in electricity: Consumption Industry cons. Capacity Transmission Access Quality 
 per capita (1) per capita (2) per capita (3) & dis. loss (4) (5) (6) 
Log electricity consumption per capita -0.017***      
    (0.005)      
Log consumption of electricity by industry p.c.  -0.023***     
     (0.007)     
Log electricity capacity per capita   -0.022***    
    (0.006)    
Electricity transmission and distribution losses    -0.354*   
    (0.202)   
Access to electricity      -0.155***  
     (0.029)  
Electricity quality index      -0.513*** 
      (0.121) 
Log GDP per capita  0.014* 0.020** 0.028*** -0.014 0.024** 0.479*** 
    (0.007) (0.009) (0.008) (0.012) (0.009) (0.151) 
Number of countries 140 97 140 98 145 82 
R2 0.170 0.227 0.207 0.070 0.199 0.222 
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Table 6.6 returns to the central story of explaining changes in economic growth, but 
includes prior-decade changes in electricity rather than initial electricity levels as 
independent variables. There are some positive and significant coefficients for the 
change in electricity consumption per capita and the change in electricity consumption 
per capita by the industrial sector in explaining subsequent economic growth in the first 
two columns.  
There are some issues of interpretation and potential endogeneity for the regressions 
with changes in electricity variables instead of levels. It is possible that the change in 
electricity variables in the prior decade could help economies to develop through many 
channels including production of capital goods, contribution to industrialisation, and 
greater labour force participation. These channels may justify positive and significant 
coefficients for the change in electricity consumption in contributing to higher GDP per 
capita levels or growth. On the other hand, there may be endogeneity problems. Similar 
to electricity levels, electricity consumption growth may be higher in the prior decade 
if there are predictions of strong economic growth in the next decade. This would imply 
potential reverse causation. There could also be an issue with omitted variables, despite 
the long list of controls. For instance, the variables for growth of electricity 
consumption in the prior decade may be acting as a proxy for economic growth in the 
prior decade.  
Table 6.6 includes GDP per capita growth from the prior decade (1995–2005) as a 
control when attempting to explain GDP per capita growth from 2005–2015 in the final 
four columns. Neither of the electricity growth variables retain the significance from 
the first two columns. The change in GDP per capita from the prior decade (1995–2005) 
has positive and significant coefficients in three of four columns. This implies that 
countries that had faster economic growth in the decade from 1995–2005 also had 
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higher economic growth in the decade from 2005–2015. Whilst economic growth has 
been described as lacking persistence and having low predictive power for future 
economic growth (Easterly et al. 1993; Rodrik 1999; Pritchett 2000), it is possible for 
economic growth trends to continue for one or more decades. There are positive 
correlations for economic growth in consecutive decades, but this correlation 
diminishes for non-consecutive decades (Easterly et al. 1993; Pritchett and Summers 
2014).
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 25Table 6.6 Results, change in electricity (1995–2005) and GDP per capita growth (2005–2015), excluding high-income countries 
Notes: ***, **, * show statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent level respectively. Robust standard errors are in brackets below the coefficients. Coefficients 
for constants are not shown. Electricity variables are the change from 1995–2005: consumption and capacity are average annual changes, while losses is the 10-year 
difference. All control variables are at a 10-year lag, except the change in GDP per capita is from 1995–2005.   
 Dependent variable: Average annual GDP per capita growth, 2005–2015  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Change, electricity consumption per capita 0.080**    0.011    
   (1995–2005) (0.041)    (0.053)    
Change, electricity cons. by industry p.c.  0.050**    0.012   
   (1995–2005)  (0.021)    (0.021)   
Change, electricity capacity per capita   -0.004    -0.031  
   (1995–2005)   (0.052)    (0.055)  
Change, electricity transmission & dist. losses    -0.008    0.014 
   (1995–2005)    (0.017)    (0.015) 
Change, GDP per capita (1995–2005)     0.137 0.454*** 0.152* 0.423*** 
     (0.105) (0.093) (0.089) (0.094) 
Log GDP per capita  -0.008* 0.001 -0.008* -0.004 -0.012** 0.004 -0.011** -0.003 
    (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) 
Log energy consumption p.c., excluding electricity 0.001 -0.012** 0.001 -0.009 0.002 -0.015*** 0.001 -0.011** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
Political stability / no violence -0.003 0.001 -0.002 0.004 -0.004 -0.000 -0.004 0.002 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Control of corruption -0.010* -0.014** -0.012** -0.017** -0.007 -0.009 -0.007 -0.013* 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
Inflation, consumer prices -0.007*** -0.007** -0.007*** -0.008*** -0.005* 0.002 -0.004 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Log life expectancy 0.019 0.004 0.026* 0.009 0.027 -0.002 0.032* 0.000 
 (0.016) (0.020) (0.016) (0.021) (0.018) (0.015) (0.017) (0.017) 
Education index 0.016 0.031 0.006 0.043 0.020 0.024 0.015 0.048 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.030) (0.036) (0.027) (0.023) (0.029) (0.033) 
Government effectiveness 0.008 0.009 0.010* 0.011 0.008 0.006 0.009 0.009 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) 
Trade openness 0.006 0.003 0.006 0.001 0.004 0.002 0.004 -0.002 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
Temperature -0.007** -0.006* -0.006** -0.003 -0.004 -0.001 -0.004 0.001 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
Number of countries 106 81 106 83 104 80 104 82 
R2 0.231 0.299 0.209 0.267 0.271 0.536 0.273 0.452 
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6.5 Conclusion 
In this paper I assess whether initial electricity availability has been important in 
helping countries to jump to faster economic growth trajectories. This is an important 
question because economic growth is crucial for improvements in living standards. 
Electricity could plausibly be an important contributor to economic growth for a 
number reasons, including the limited substitutability with other production inputs. 
Also, electricity consumption per capita is higher in countries with higher GDP per 
capita. 
I do not find evidence that initial electricity availability has been a precondition for 
economic growth on average after controlling for other important factors in the decade 
to 2015. This includes assessment of multiple electricity attributes such as electricity 
capacity, consumption, losses, quality and access to electricity. The results suggest that 
electricity sector development would not necessarily lead to higher subsequent 
economic growth, despite the close relationship between electricity levels and GDP per 
capita levels. Rather than being a precondition for economic growth, countries could 
be able to increase electricity availability as they grow, by making electrification a 
priority. I do find evidence that electricity availability has converged across countries 
over the decade to 2015. 
While some previous studies have found significant relationships for various countries 
in various time periods, and others have not, it is reasonable that there is no identifiable 
relationship in this paper. I have assessed a different question, the impact of electricity 
availability on subsequent economic growth, and investigated average effects for global 
and developing country samples. Whilst electricity consumption quantity can be 
important in particular countries and particular time periods, it is unlikely to be a 
binding constraint for economic growth in all cases. Different results could also be 
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possible for different time periods. The lack of significant results in this paper could 
also relate to small sample size and limitation on degrees of freedom for the cross-
sectional approach. 
This paper differs from the majority of previous studies on the relationship between 
electricity and economic growth in relation to method and data. Previous studies have 
largely used annual data and methods related to Granger causality, while this paper 
focuses on a 10-year period and growth regressions. Use of 10-year periods and initial 
explanatory variables helps to reduce the risk of endogeneity from reverse causation, 
but does not take into account contemporaneous effects. 
This paper shows that the relationship between initial electricity availability and 
subsequent economic growth is sensitive to inclusion of controls, suggesting that 
omitted variable bias could be a potential issue for some previous studies looking at 
electricity and economic growth. There are many other non-electricity growth 
determinants, including institutional, geographic, trade, and other economic variables 
that may be more important in different situations. It seems that no single factor is likely 
to be a panacea for improving economic growth (Easterly 2001), including expansion 
of electricity availability. 
The results in this paper provide important background information for policymakers 
considering expansion of electricity availability. For instance, expectations of 
economic growth improvements from electrification programs may not be justified. 
Even if electrification programs do not have major benefits for subsequent economic 
growth, there could possibly be broader social, health, or environmental benefits. These 
benefits could justify expansion of electricity availability in their own right. The social, 
health, or environmental benefits may also indirectly contribute to economic growth in 
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the long run. Future research could consider the impact of electricity availability on 
environmental outcomes.  
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CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSION 
 
Summary: This thesis includes five papers related to energy economics and economic 
development. The first paper finds that financial capital is an important contributor to 
consumption of capital-intensive energy types. The following chapter finds that 
financial capital has been particularly important for wind energy, and that policies and 
preferences have been crucial for solar energy. Chapter 4 finds that government 
effectiveness is the most important governance attribute for the development of 
electricity sectors in developing countries. Chapter 5 shows that the 2010 earthquake in 
Haiti has had persistent impacts on the overall economy and particular sectors such as 
the services sector. The final paper investigates whether initial electricity availability is 
a precondition for countries jumping to faster economic growth trajectories. It does not 
find a significant effect after controlling for many possible contributors to economic 
growth. 
7. 1 Key findings 
The key finding from the first paper is that financial capital supports energy transitions 
to more capital-intensive energy types and systems. For developing countries, this is a 
transition from biomass towards coal energy. For developed countries, the primary 
transition is from fossil fuels to greater use of modern renewable energy. Specific types 
of financial capital have been more important than others. For instance, bank credit and 
domestic private debt securities have been important for wind energy.  
In Chapter 3, I find that there are key differences in which underlying factors are most 
important for solar and wind energy. Greater aggregate policy support in numerical 
terms is important for solar energy, owing to the higher cost of this energy type in the 
past. Solar energy use is also greater in countries where higher proportions of citizens 
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see climate change as a personal threat. Countries that had introduced carbon pricing in 
2009 had greater consumption of both wind and solar energy per capita in 2014. Private 
financial capital, including bank credit and domestic debt, is important for wind energy. 
Chapter 4 finds that government effectiveness is the most important general governance 
attribute for electricity sector development in developing countries. Whilst other 
attributes such as political stability may be important in particular cases, government 
effectiveness is more important for developing countries on average. I find that 
government effectiveness has been important for both the level and subsequent changes 
in electricity use for developing countries in the sixteen years to 2012. Government 
effectiveness is important for numerous aspects of electricity sectors, including 
capacity, consumption, access, transmission and distribution losses, and quality. 
Chapter 5 shows that some shocks can be so massive that they can inhibit ongoing 
development for energy systems and economies more generally. The 2010 earthquake 
in Haiti was a massive humanitarian disaster, and I show that that the macroeconomic 
impacts have been large and sustained, suggesting a potentially permanent impact. 
These large impacts have been particularly extreme in key sectors that were directly 
impacted, especially services sectors, given the earthquake location close to the capital 
city. There was also a major fall in energy use below the counterfactual in the case of 
road transport energy use. If the effects are indeed permanent, Haiti’s economy may 
never fully recover from the earthquake (relative to a scenario without the earthquake). 
In Chapter 6, I find that a potential causal relationship from initial electricity availability 
to subsequent economic growth is not robust. While there is a significant relationship 
between lagged electricity and subsequent economic growth when only initial income 
is a control, this significance disappears when other important growth determinants are 
included. There has been convergence in electricity levels in recent decades, as 
165 
 
countries with low initial electricity levels have experienced higher subsequent 
electricity growth. This suggests that electricity may not be an unchangeable constraint, 
but that countries have been able to increase electricity availability when they prioritise 
it and when it is needed to support production.  
7.2 Policy implications 
A key policy implication of the first paper is that differences in financial systems can 
indirectly impact on energy transitions. Financial policy that changes the size and 
structure of financial systems can have an impact on subsequent changes in energy 
systems. For instance, the structure of financial systems will depend on different tax 
policies for different asset classes, and this can indirectly have an impact on energy 
outcomes. This is in addition to more direct policies such as carbon pricing, feed-in 
tariffs, and renewable energy certificates. For developing countries, a key policy 
implication is that extra attention and assistance may be required to encourage transition 
directly from biomass to renewables. Otherwise, the natural progression may be 
towards fossil fuels as economies and financial systems develop. 
The indirect importance of financial policy for energy outcomes is also implied by 
Chapter 3, along with the potential of shaping preferences through educational 
campaigns, and the importance of carbon pricing as a part of comprehensive energy 
policy. Energy policy is complex and it may be difficult to describe the details to broad 
audiences, but there is potential for greater awareness of general principles. For 
instance, a number of issues could receive greater attention and be framed in general 
terms. Cost of energy types and storage over time could be framed in a long-term 
perspective rather than focussing on past costs. The difference between fossil fuels, 
with ongoing fuel costs, and renewable energy, with large upfront costs but no fuel 
costs, could be emphasised. The broader context of energy could also be considered 
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more: there are political and environment risks of various energy types. Diversification 
of energy mixes could be a greater focus as a risk management approach, given the 
nature of energy decisions that can involve irreversible changes in the context of 
uncertainty. With greater public support for holistic and well-reasoned energy policy, 
there can be improved incentives for politicians to follow more suitable and stable 
energy policy paths. For instance, carbon pricing could be introduced, or re-introduced, 
in more countries.  
Chapter 4 gives an example of a possible indirect policy path for electricity sector 
development in low- and middle-income countries. Prior to the implementation of more 
direct policy focused on electricity sector reforms such as corporatisation, regulatory 
reform, and privatisation of various electricity aspects, policy to improve government 
effectiveness could be useful. This would be likely to set a solid foundation and increase 
the chances of success for direct reforms. For overseas donors considering support of 
electrification programs, there is an incentive to focus initially on developing countries 
with relatively higher government effectiveness. Electrification programs in these 
countries are more likely to be successful. Kenya is an example of a country with 
potential for improved electrification outcomes: the government effectiveness score for 
Kenya was above the average for Sub-Saharan Africa in 2012 but Kenya has the 8th 
most people without electricity access (World Bank 2017). Tanzania is another country 
where electrification is a priority (Mathematica Policy Research 2017) and there is 
room for electrification improvements. Tanzania has the 6th most people without 
electricity access (World Bank 2017). 
In response to the massive earthquake impact that I discussed in Chapter 5, 
policymakers could further consider the benefits of investment for disaster risk 
resilience to reduce initial impacts of natural disasters, and also to recover from 
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previous natural disasters. Natural disaster impacts may become more common and 
pronounced due to global trends of increasing carbon dioxide concentrations and 
population growth, further necessitating mitigation for disaster events. In the case of 
developing countries where available resources are limited, developed country donors 
and investors have a potential role to play. 
Chapter 6 suggests that policies to increase electricity availability may not necessarily 
contribute to subsequent economic growth in all cases. Despite the absence of a 
significant average effect, it is still possible that electricity sector development could 
increase subsequent economic growth in particular cases. This suggests that 
policymakers may need to determine if electricity shortages are a key constraint for 
economic growth in a particular setting, rather than relying on an automatic economic 
growth benefit. Policymakers may still wish to pursue electrification for purposes other 
than increases in subsequent economic growth. For instance, electrification advances 
could be beneficial from social, health, or environmental perspectives. Electrification 
could also have a beneficial contemporaneous economic effect, as opposed to a lagged 
effect.  
7.3 Future research 
In addition to consideration of banks and financial capital markets in energy transitions, 
more research could be useful on the role of financial institutions such as pension funds, 
insurance companies, and mutual funds. These types of financial institutions have been 
identified as possible sources of larger amounts of energy capital in the future, although 
there have been investment barriers in the past. Also, the role of investment decisions 
by individuals in contributing to energy investment could be investigated. 
The synthetic control method (SCM) is a relatively new empirical approach to 
calculating counterfactuals in a systematic manner, and there is potential for applying 
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it to a number of other shocks. For instance, the SCM could also be applied to policy 
shocks that influence energy mix changes. 
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26Table A2.1 Results, change in electricity share, and capital intensity using IEA capital costs, for the ten years to 2013 
Notes: ***, **, * show statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels respectively. Robust standard errors are in brackets below the coefficients. All countries 
are included if data are available. The sample covers 114 countries, but 113 for coal and solar regressions. The independent variables are for the year 2003 unless 
otherwise noted. Coal reserves are for 2011. Temperature and precipitation are 10-year averages to 2013. Change in total electricity use per capita is a percentage 
change for the five years to 2003. Capital intensity is a measure calculated by the author as electricity-type capital intensity multiplied by electricity share, summed 
for each electricity type. 
 
 Dependent variables: Ten-year change in electricity share, and ten-year change in capital intensity  
 Biofuels 
and waste 
Hydro Coal Oil Natural 
Gas 
Nuclear Wind Solar Geo-
thermal 
Capital 
Intensity 
Private credit, 0.005 -0.004 0.008 0.013 -0.086** 0.013 0.046** 0.004 0.003 0.746*** 
    divided by GDP (0.007) (0.019) (0.020) (0.028) (0.035) (0.037) (0.019) (0.003) (0.003) (0.243) 
Log GDP per capita 0.006*** 0.011 -0.008 -0.024 0.019 -0.007 0.005 0.003** -0.005** 0.053 
 (0.002) (0.017) (0.006) (0.017) (0.014) (0.009) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.068) 
Coal reserves, -0.007 0.028 -0.007 0.021 -0.035 0.006 -0.002 0.005* -0.010* 0.222* 
    KTOE per capita (0.007) (0.023) (0.031) (0.027) (0.031) (0.017) (0.007) (0.003) (0.005) (0.117) 
Oil reserves, -0.001 0.004 0.020*** -0.015 -0.008 0.003 -0.001 -0.003*** -0.004* -0.086 
    KTOE per capita  (0.003) (0.009) (0.006) (0.011) (0.014) (0.005) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.053) 
Gas reserves, 0.000 -0.000 0.003*** 0.006*** -0.009*** 0.000 0.000 -0.000** -0.000 0.011 
    KTOE per capita   (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.010) 
Forest area, sq. km, -0.068 -0.890** -0.665*** 0.886 0.798 0.173 -0.015 0.015 -0.188 -0.697 
    per capita (0.076) (0.451) (0.229) (0.555) (0.561) (0.173) (0.077) (0.022) (0.126) (1.588) 
Land area sq. km, -0.024 -0.061 0.199** -0.195 0.019 0.043 -0.058** -0.040*** 0.079* -1.568** 
    per capita (0.022) (0.148) (0.078) (0.273) (0.281) (0.046) (0.026) (0.014) (0.045) (0.765) 
Temperature, C, -0.001*** -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.004** 0.001 -0.001* 0.000 0.000 -0.007 
    ten-year average (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.009) 
Precipitation, metres 0.006 0.010 0.040*** -0.021 -0.033* -0.004 -0.002 -0.003*** 0.002 -0.083 
    ten-year average (0.004) (0.014) (0.010) (0.021) (0.020) (0.004) (0.005) (0.001) (0.003) (0.072) 
Initial electricity use  -0.014* 0.008 -0.039 0.031 0.023 -0.000 -0.022** -0.000 0.023** -0.106 
    per capita (0.008) (0.042) (0.025) (0.036) (0.041) (0.015) (0.010) (0.003) (0.011) (0.172) 
Change in total  0.001 0.020 0.009** -0.011 -0.022** 0.004 -0.005** 0.004*** 0.000 0.101*** 
    electricity use pc (0.003) (0.021) (0.004) (0.025) (0.009) (0.004) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.038) 
R2 0.197 0.084 0.237 0.078 0.151 0.030 0.282 0.280 0.269 0.311 
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27Table A2.2 Results, share of total primary energy supply in 2013 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: ***, **, * show statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels respectively. Robust standard errors are in brackets below the coefficients. All countries 
are included if data are available. The sample covers 114 countries for coal and 115 for other types. The independent variables are for the year 2003 unless otherwise 
noted. Coal reserves are for 2011. Temperature and precipitation are 10-year averages to 2013. Initial energy use is total primary energy supply per capita in 2003. 
Change in total energy use per capita is a percentage change for the five years to 2003. 
                                       Dependent variables: Share of total primary energy supply 
 Biofuels 
and waste 
Hydro Coal Oil Natural 
Gas 
Nuclear Wind Solar Geo-
thermal 
Private credit, 0.080* -0.022 0.037 0.066 -0.178*** -0.028 0.011** 0.007*** 0.018 
    divided by GDP (0.046) (0.023) (0.057) (0.059) (0.062) (0.017) (0.004) (0.003) (0.019) 
Log GDP per capita -0.200*** -0.013 0.015 0.131*** 0.075*** 0.007 0.002** 0.001** -0.021 
 (0.026) (0.014) (0.017) (0.020) (0.025) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) (0.016) 
Coal reserves, -0.062** -0.048* 0.226*** -0.081** 0.032 0.000 0.000 0.001* -0.059 
    KTOE per capita (0.031) (0.026) (0.050) (0.032) (0.039) (0.016) (0.001) (0.001) (0.040) 
Oil reserves, -0.030 0.012 0.004 0.049** -0.009 -0.021** -0.000 -0.001* -0.006 
    KTOE per capita  (0.022) (0.015) (0.017) (0.020) (0.028) (0.008) (0.001) (0.001) (0.011) 
Gas reserves, -0.024** 0.005 0.011 0.006 0.014 -0.010** 0.001 0.000 -0.006 
    KTOE per capita   (0.011) (0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.014) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) 
Forest area, sq. km, 3.103*** 0.069 -0.567 -1.291* 0.049 0.367 0.005 0.013 -1.374* 
    per capita (0.713) (0.535) (0.364) (0.660) (0.768) (0.232) (0.015) (0.012) (0.816) 
Land area sq. km, -0.507*** 0.247* -0.246 0.488** -0.439* -0.257** -0.015*** -0.020*** 0.616* 
    per capita (0.155) (0.132) (0.168) (0.202) (0.239) (0.100) (0.006) (0.007) (0.368) 
Temperature, C 0.008** -0.005* -0.006*** 0.007** 0.001 -0.002** -0.000 0.000* -0.002 
    ten-year average (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Precipitation, metres -0.004 0.028** 0.005 -0.018 -0.035 -0.011** -0.001 -0.003*** 0.040*** 
    ten-year average (0.025) (0.012) (0.016) (0.031) (0.034) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) (0.014) 
Initial energy use  0.041*** -0.003 -0.016* -0.054*** 0.016 0.011** -0.001* -0.001* 0.011 
    per capita (0.013) (0.007) (0.008) (0.011) (0.017) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.011) 
Change in total  -0.187 -0.160 0.041 -0.053 0.258 -0.050 -0.005 -0.001 0.019 
    energy use pc (0.131) (0.177) (0.136) (0.154) (0.205) (0.040) (0.004) (0.004) (0.052) 
R2 0.612 0.135 0.289 0.418 0.359 0.262 0.339 0.318 0.339 
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28Table A2.3 Results, fixed-effects panel estimates, combined private credit and debt variable, 1998–2012 
Notes: ***, **, * show statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels respectively. Robust standard errors clustered by country are in brackets below the 
coefficients. Coefficients for dummy variables for each year, and coefficients for constants, are not shown. All countries are included if data are available. There are 
546 observations for solar and 551 observations for the other energy types. This includes 47 countries. 
  
 Dependent variables: Share of total primary energy supply  
 Biofuels, 
waste 
Hydro Coal Oil Natural 
Gas 
Nuclear Wind Solar Geo-
thermal 
Private credit and debt,  0.004 -0.001 -0.012** -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 0.003** 0.000 0.009 
     divided by GDP (0.003) (0.001) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.007) 
Public debt,  -0.017 0.007* 0.027 -0.053 0.035* -0.024 0.003 0.000 0.024 
     divided by GDP (0.010) (0.004) (0.021) (0.032) (0.020) (0.022) (0.004) (0.001) (0.022) 
Stock market capitalisation, -0.003 -0.001 0.001 -0.010 0.020** 0.001 -0.000 0.000 -0.005 
    divided by GDP (0.003) (0.002) (0.006) (0.011) (0.009) (0.003) (0.001) (0.000) (0.005) 
Log GDP per capita -0.115*** 0.001 0.084*** 0.020 -0.010 0.018* -0.007 -0.002 0.012 
 (0.015) (0.009) (0.023) (0.044) (0.050) (0.010) (0.005) (0.003) (0.012) 
Temperature,  0.003** 0.001 -0.002 0.002 -0.007*** 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 
     Degrees Celsius (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Precipitation, metres -0.002 0.010*** 0.010 -0.011 -0.003 -0.003 0.001 -0.000 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
R2 (within)  0.413 0.098 0.225 0.458 0.356 0.096 0.467 0.201 0.178 
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29Table A3.1 Description of variables that are in regressions or correlation table 
(A3.2), grouped by type of variable 
Variable Source Description 
Wind energy per capita IEA Wind, total primary energy supply, 
tonnes of oil equivalent per capita. 
Solar PV energy per capita IEA Solar photovoltaics, total primary energy 
supply, tonnes of oil equivalent per 
capita. 
Solar thermal energy per capita IEA Solar thermal, total primary energy 
supply, tonnes of oil equivalent per 
capita. 
Solar energy per capita IEA Solar (PV plus thermal), total primary 
energy supply, tonnes of oil equivalent 
per capita. 
Wind share of energy IEA Wind share of total primary energy 
supply (range 0 to 1). 
Solar PV share of energy IEA Solar PV share of total primary energy 
supply (range 0 to 1). 
Solar thermal energy share IEA Solar thermal share of total primary 
energy supply (range 0 to 1). 
Solar share of energy IEA Solar (PV plus thermal) share of total 
primary energy supply (range 0 to 1). 
Wind electricity per capita IEA Wind electricity output, megawatt hours 
per capita. 
Solar PV electricity per capita IEA Solar photovoltaic electricity output, 
megawatt hours per capita. 
Solar thermal electricity per capita IEA Solar thermal electricity output, 
megawatt hours per capita. 
Solar electricity per capita IEA Solar electricity output, megawatt hours 
per capita. 
Preference for wind energy EC Percentage of respondents who think that 
their national government should focus 
on development of wind power (QA65), 
divided by 100. Survey of 24,924 
respondents from EU countries (roughly 
1,000 per country) from 2005. 
Preference for solar energy EC Percentage of respondents who think that 
their national government should focus 
on development of solar power (QA65), 
divided by 100. Survey of 24,924 
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respondents from EU countries (roughly 
1,000 per country) from 2005. 
Perceived threat of climate change Gallup Percentage of respondents who think 
global warming is a serious personal 
threat, divided by 100. Survey of 
206,193 respondents from 128 countries 
in 2007 and 2008. 
Globalisation: political participation KOF Political globalisation index, values from 
0 to 100, divided by 100, based on: 
number of embassies, membership in 
international organisations, participation 
in U.N. Security Council Missions, 
international treaties. 
Renewable energy certificates REN21 Tradable renewable energy certificates at 
national or sub-national level, binary 
variable.  
Feed-in-tariffs REN21 Feed-in tariff (including premium 
payment) at national or sub-national 
level, binary variable.  
Carbon price WB/Ec National or subnational carbon pricing 
instruments implemented, as of 2009, 
binary variable. 34 countries had carbon 
prices in 2009. 
Wind RDD per capita IEA Total wind energy research, 
development, demonstration in million 
USD, 2014 prices and PPP, per capita 
(population from WDI). 
Solar RDD per capita IEA Total solar energy research, 
development, demonstration in million 
USD, 2014 prices and PPP, per capita 
(population from WDI). 
Wind policy support per megawatt hour Eco Total policy support for wind electricity 
(onshore plus offshore) including 
support for research and development, 
investment, production, energy demand, 
and energy savings, in thousand Euro 
(2012) per megawatt hour. 
Solar policy support per megawatt hour Eco Total policy support for solar electricity 
including support for research and 
development, investment, production, 
energy demand, and energy savings, in 
thousand Euro (2012) per megawatt 
hour. 
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Government effectiveness WGI An index representing quality of public 
services and quality of policy 
formulation and implementation. The 
index values are normally distributed 
with mean zero and standard deviation 
of one. 
Weighted average cost of capital Diac. Weighted average cost of capital for 
onshore wind projects in countries across 
the EU, based on interviews with experts 
(equity providers, project developers, 
bankers) in 2014. 
Private credit (% of GDP) GFDD Private credit by deposit money banks, 
% of GDP, divided by 100. 
Domestic private debt (% of GDP) GFDD Outstanding domestic private debt 
securities, % of GDP, divided by 100. 
Public debt (% of GDP) GFDD Outstanding public debt securities 
(domestic and international), % of GDP, 
divided by 100. 
International priv. debt (% of GDP) GFDD Outstanding international private debt 
securities, % of GDP, divided by 100. 
Equity capitalisation (% of GDP) GFDD Stock market capitalisation, % of GDP, 
divided by 100. 
Foreign direct invest. (% of GDP) WDI Foreign direct investment, net inflows, 
% of GDP. 
Pension funds (% of GDP) GFDD Pension fund assets, % of GDP, divided 
by 100. 
Insurance assets (% of GDP) GFDD Insurance company assets, % of GDP, 
divided by 100. 
Mutual funds (% of GDP) GFDD Mutual fund assets, % of GDP, divided 
by 100. 
Log GDP per capita WDI Log gross domestic product per capita, 
purchasing power parity, constant 2011 
international dollars. 
Trade openness WDI Exports of goods and services plus 
imports, % of GDP. 
Log patents per capita WDI Patent applications from residents and 
non-residents, per capita, log.  
Log global horizontal irradiance B&G Log mean global horizontal irradiance, 
population weighted, 0-axis fixed tilted. 
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Coal reserves per capita EIA Coal, recoverable reserves, 2014, million 
short tons per capita. 
Oil reserves per capita EIA Oil, recoverable reserves, 2014, billion 
barrels per capita. 
Gas reserves per capita EIA Natural gas, recoverable reserves, 2014, 
trillion cubic feet per capita. 
Log wind energy potential LU Log wind energy potential, restricted to 
installations with capacity factors greater 
than 20%. 
Log carbon dioxide emissions p.c. IEA Carbon dioxide emissions, electricity 
and heat production, thousand tonnes, 
per capita, log. 
Log energy consumption per capita WDI Energy use, kilograms of oil equivalent 
per capita, log. 
Notes: Sources: B&G: Breyer and Gerlach (2010), Diac: DiaCore (2016), EC: European Commission 
(2006), Eco: Ecofys (2014), EIA: U.S. Energy Information Administration, GFDD: Global Financial 
Development Database, IEA: International Energy Agency, KOF: KOF Index of Globalisation (Dreher 
2006), LU: Lu et al. (2009), REN21: Renewable energy policy network for the 21st century (From 
Table 2 of Global Status Report 2011: Renewable energy support policies), WB/Ec: Figure 2 from joint 
report by World Bank and Ecofys (Kossoy et al. 2015), WDI: World Bank World Development 
Indicators, WGI: Worldwide Governance Indicators. 
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30Table A3.2 Correlations of each variable with wind, solar PV, and solar 
thermal energy per capita 
Variable Number of 
countries/ 
observations 
Correlation 
with wind 
energy per 
capita 
Correlation 
with solar 
PV energy 
per capita 
Correlation 
with solar 
thermal 
energy p.c. 
Wind energy per capita 140 1.00 0.36 0.15 
Solar PV energy per capita 139 0.36 1.00 0.27 
Solar thermal energy per capita 140 0.15 0.27 1.00 
Preference for wind energy 28 0.46 -0.30 -0.21 
Preference for solar energy 28 -0.16 0.41 0.52 
Perceived threat of climate change 109 0.25 0.41 0.17 
Globalisation: political participation 136 0.41 0.38 0.16 
Renewable energy certificates 93 0.35 0.27 -0.06 
Feed-in-tariffs 93 0.17 0.25 0.17 
Carbon price 140 0.59 0.56 0.15 
Wind RDD 26 0.43 -0.22 -0.21 
Solar RDD 26 -0.05 -0.01 -0.01 
Wind policy support per MWh 28 -0.07 0.11 -0.23 
Solar policy support per MWh 28 0.00 0.49 0.38 
Government effectiveness 137 0.51 0.44 0.25 
Weighted average cost of capital 28 -0.25 -0.25 0.18 
Private credit (% of GDP) 125 0.60 0.37 0.32 
Domestic private debt (% of GDP) 49 0.68 0.17 0.03 
Public debt (% of GDP) 49 0.05 0.31 0.05 
International priv. debt (% of GDP) 76 0.33 0.18 0.02 
Equity capitalisation (% of GDP) 97 -0.03 0.00 0.03 
Foreign direct invest. (% of GDP) 135 -0.01 0.07 0.01 
Pension funds (% of GDP) 67 0.18 -0.03 0.08 
Insurance assets (% of GDP) 116 0.58 0.40 0.12 
Mutual funds (% of GDP) 68 0.21 -0.04 -0.04 
Log GDP per capita 137 0.37 0.39 0.19 
Trade openness 136 -0.03 0.06 -0.02 
Log patents per capita 85 0.28 0.27 0.14 
Log global horizontal irradiance 130 -0.46 -0.31 0.10 
Log carbon dioxide emissions p.c. 135 0.24 0.29 0.17 
Log wind energy potential 137 0.21 0.05 -0.04 
Coal reserves per capita 133 0.07 0.16 0.02 
Oil reserves per capita 130 -0.07 -0.09 -0.05 
Gas reserves per capita 129 -0.05 -0.05 -0.03 
Log energy consumption per capita 140 0.31 0.32 0.13 
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31Table A3.3 Global country sample and key data 
99 countries in the global sample with data for energy consumption, climate change 
preference, and private credit are listed in the following table, along with the carbon 
pricing status in 2009. Energy variables are for 2014, private credit is for 2009.  
Country Wind 
energy 
per 
capita 
Solar PV 
energy per 
capita 
Solar 
thermal 
energy per 
capita 
Perceived 
threat of 
climate 
change 
Carbon 
price 
Private 
credit (% 
of 
GDP/100) 
Algeria 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.46 0 0.15 
Angola 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.38 0 0.18 
Argentina 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.71 0 0.10 
Armenia 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.65 0 0.22 
Australia 0.038 0.018 0.013 0.75 0 1.23 
Austria 0.039 0.008 0.021 0.54 1 0.98 
Azerbaijan 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.43 0 0.18 
Bangladesh 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.32 0 0.33 
Belarus 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.3 0 0.31 
Belgium 0.035 0.022 0.002 0.68 1 0.61 
Benin 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.15 0 0.21 
Bolivia 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.51 0 0.33 
Botswana 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.3 0 0.28 
Brazil 0.005 0.000 0.003 0.76 0 0.47 
Cambodia 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.51 0 0.24 
Cameroon 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.32 0 0.10 
Chile 0.007 0.002 0.001 0.69 0 0.70 
China 0.010 0.002 0.015 0.21 0 1.10 
Colombia 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.65 0 0.31 
Congo, Rep. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.31 0 0.05 
Costa Rica 0.013 0.000 0.000 0.72 0 0.48 
Czech Republic 0.004 0.017 0.002 0.39 1 0.48 
Denmark 0.199 0.009 0.005 0.4 1 2.13 
Dominican Republic 0.005 0.002 0.000 0.46 0 0.19 
Ecuador 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.69 0 0.22 
Egypt 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.21 0 0.37 
El Salvador 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.51 0 0.98 
Estonia 0.040 0.000 0.000 0.32 1 1.03 
Finland 0.017 0.000 0.000 0.39 1 0.86 
France 0.022 0.008 0.001 0.75 1 0.95 
Georgia 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.47 0 0.32 
Germany 0.061 0.038 0.008 0.6 1 0.99 
Ghana 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.19 0 0.15 
Greece 0.029 0.030 0.018 0.82 1 0.89 
Guatemala 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.51 0 0.25 
Haiti 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.35 0 0.13 
Honduras 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.57 0 0.50 
Hong Kong, SAR 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.54 0 1.49 
Hungary 0.006 0.000 0.001 0.75 1 0.66 
Iceland 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.33 1 1.85 
India 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.29 0 0.45 
Indonesia 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.33 0 0.24 
Iran 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.43 0 0.53 
Iraq 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.28 0 0.04 
Ireland 0.096 0.000 0.003 0.6 1 1.75 
Israel 0.000 0.009 0.134 0.62 0 0.88 
Italy 0.021 0.032 0.003 0.76 1 0.87 
Japan 0.003 0.017 0.003 0.8 0 1.08 
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Jordan 0.000 0.000 0.021 0.51 0 0.74 
Kazakhstan 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.35 0 0.51 
Kenya 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.49 0 0.28 
Korea, Rep. 0.002 0.004 0.001 0.8 0 0.97 
Kyrgyz Republic 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.39 0 0.13 
Lebanon 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.54 0 0.63 
Luxembourg 0.012 0.015 0.005 0.75 1 1.11 
Malaysia 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.5 0 1.08 
Malta 0.000 0.014 0.010 0.64 1 1.20 
Mexico 0.004 0.000 0.002 0.63 0 0.18 
Moldova 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.73 0 0.36 
Mongolia 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.3 0 0.41 
Morocco 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.29 0 0.73 
Mozambique 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.48 0 0.18 
Namibia 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.35 0 0.47 
Nepal 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.32 0 0.46 
Netherlands 0.030 0.004 0.002 0.57 1 1.19 
Nicaragua 0.012 0.000 0.000 0.49 0 0.26 
Niger 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.21 0 0.11 
Nigeria 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.18 0 0.36 
Pakistan 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.24 0 0.23 
Panama 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.61 0 0.73 
Paraguay 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.54 0 0.26 
Peru 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.58 0 0.25 
Philippines 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.42 0 0.29 
Poland 0.017 0.000 0.000 0.54 1 0.48 
Portugal 0.100 0.005 0.007 0.85 1 1.57 
Qatar 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.43 0 0.49 
Romania 0.027 0.007 0.000 0.66 1 0.39 
Russian Federation 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.39 0 0.45 
Saudi Arabia 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.4 0 0.46 
Senegal 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.33 0 0.24 
Singapore 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.59 0 0.97 
South Africa 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.21 0 0.78 
Spain 0.096 0.015 0.052 0.69 1 1.73 
Sri Lanka 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.65 0 0.25 
Sudan 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.42 0 0.10 
Sweden 0.100 0.000 0.001 0.56 1 1.25 
Syria 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.41 0 0.17 
Tajikistan 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.19 0 0.12 
Tanzania 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.48 0 0.15 
Thailand 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.61 0 0.96 
Togo 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.23 0 0.17 
Trinidad and Tobago 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.71 0 0.36 
Tunisia 0.004 0.000 0.004 0.46 0 0.56 
Turkey 0.009 0.000 0.010 0.66 0 0.34 
Ukraine 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.52 0 0.74 
United Kingdom 0.043 0.005 0.001 0.69 1 2.02 
United States 0.050 0.006 0.009 0.63 1 0.58 
Uruguay 0.018 0.000 0.000 0.68 0 0.24 
Vietnam 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.53 0 0.88 
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32Table A3.4 Results for solar thermal energy, European Union countries, 2014 
 
Notes:  ***, **, * show statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent level respectively. Policy support, GDP per capita, private credit, patents, and energy 
consumption are lagged by 5 years. Preference for solar energy is based on a survey from 2005. Weighted average cost of capital is based on interviews of market 
participants in 2014. Global horizontal irradiance is from a study by Breyer and Gerlach (2010). Robust standard errors are in brackets below the coefficients. 
Coefficients for constants are not shown. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Solar thermal energy per 
capita 
Solar thermal share of energy  Solar thermal energy per 
capita change 
Preference for solar energy (lag) 0.045 0.016* -0.013 
    (0.028) (0.010) (0.019) 
Solar policy support per megawatt hour (lag) 0.010 0.011** 0.020 
 (0.014) (0.006) (0.017) 
Private credit divided by GDP (lag)  0.007*** 0.007 
   (0.002) (0.007) 
Weighted average cost of capital  0.000 0.000 
     (0.000) (0.001) 
Log global horizontal irradiance  0.002 0.014 
  (0.009) (0.013) 
Log GDP per capita (lag)  0.001 -0.008 
  (0.004) (0.010) 
Log patents per capita (lag)  -0.005*** 0.000 
  (0.002) (0.003) 
Log energy consumption per capita (lag)  0.002 0.005 
  (0.005) (0.007) 
Observations 28 25 25 
R2 0.301 0.841 0.392 
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33Table A3.5 Results for solar photovoltaic energy, global sample of countries, 2014 
 Solar PV 
energy p.c. 
Solar PV 
energy share  
SPV energy 
p.c. change 
Solar PV 
electricity pc 
SPV elect. 
share 
SPV elect. 
p.c. change 
Perceived threat of climate change (lag) 0.010*** 0.003** 0.007* 0.086* 0.016* 0.077 
    (0.003) (0.001) (0.004) (0.050) (0.009) (0.048) 
Carbon price (lag) 0.007*** 0.004*** 0.008** 0.093** 0.022*** 0.082* 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.043) (0.008) (0.043) 
Private credit divided by GDP (lag)  0.001 -0.001 -0.002 0.002 -0.013 
   (0.001) (0.002) (0.030) (0.005) (0.028) 
Globalisation: political participation (lag)  0.001 0.004 0.055 0.009 0.043 
  (0.001) (0.003) (0.048) (0.009) (0.049) 
Government effectiveness (lag)  -0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.004 0.005 
     (0.001) (0.002) (0.023) (0.004) (0.022) 
Log global horizontal irradiance  0.004** 0.005 0.093 0.023* 0.074 
  (0.002) (0.005) (0.073) (0.013) (0.071) 
Log GDP per capita (lag)  0.000 0.000 0.010 0.004 0.009 
  (0.000) (0.001) (0.015) (0.003) (0.014) 
Log energy consumption per capita (lag)  -0.000 0.001 0.008 -0.000 0.007 
  (0.000) (0.001) (0.014) (0.002) (0.013) 
Feed-in tariff (lag)    0.020 0.003 0.017 
    (0.015) (0.003) (0.014) 
Observations 107 93 93 74 74 74 
R2 0.349 0.432 0.371 0.391 0.407 0.369 
Notes:  ***, **, * show statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent level respectively. GDP per capita, private credit, globalisation: political participation, 
government effectiveness, and energy consumption are lagged by 5 years. Perceived threat of climate change is based on a survey from 2007–2008. Carbon price is 
a binary variable with value of 1 for countries that had a carbon price in 2009, and feed-in tariff is a binary variable with value of 1 for countries that had adopted 
feed-in tariffs prior to 2011. Global horizontal irradiance is from a study by Breyer and Gerlach (2010). Robust standard errors are in brackets below the coefficients. 
Coefficients for constants are not shown.
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34Table A4.1 Variable descriptions 
Variable Source Description 
Electricity capacity (log) UN Log of electricity capacity in kilowatts. 
Electricity – household 
consumption (log) 
UN Log of household consumption of electricity in 
megawatt-hours per year. 
Electricity – final consumption 
(log) 
UN Log of final consumption of electricity in 
megawatt-hours per year. 
Access to electricity WDI Access to electricity (percentage of population 
divided by 100). 
Electricity transmission and 
distribution losses 
WDI Electricity transmission and distribution losses 
(% of output). 
Electricity quality index WEF Quality of electricity supply (lack of 
interruptions and lack of voltage fluctuations), 
1=extremely unreliable, 7=extremely reliable. 
Government effectiveness WGI An index representing quality of public services 
and quality of policy formulation and 
implementation. This and other governance 
index values are normally distributed with mean 
zero and standard deviation of one.  
Voice and accountability WGI An index representing the degree of citizen 
participation in government selection and 
freedom of expression. 
Political stability WGI An index relating to the lack of violence in 
addition to stability more generally. 
Regulatory quality WGI An index giving an assessment of policies and 
regulations related to private sector 
development. 
Rule of law WGI An index based on the quality of property rights 
and the judicial system. 
Control of corruption WGI An index representing the extent to which public 
power being used for private gain is avoided. 
Gross domestic product per 
capita (log) 
WDI Log of GDP per capita per year, purchasing 
power parity terms, constant 2011 international 
dollars. 
Population WDI Number of people. 
Rural population WDI Percentage of population living in rural areas. 
Population density WDI People per square kilometre of land area, 
divided by one thousand. 
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Temperature CRU Average temperature, degrees Celsius.  
Water resources WDI Renewable internal freshwater resources per 
capita (cubic metres) divided by one thousand. 
Electricity prices WB Average of electricity price from 2015 and 2016 
data in US cents per kilowatt-hour for a business 
with a standardised warehouse. Earlier years of 
data are not available.  
Democracy / autocracy PIV Democracy score minus autocracy score. 
Africa/Middle East WDI Binary variable equal to 1 for countries in 
Africa and the Middle East. 
Life expectancy (1950–1955) UN Life expectancy at birth, both sexes combined 
1950–1955, medium variant. 
Policy reform indicator ESM Reform indicator for the power sector for 
reforms undertaken up to 1998. Countries have 
a score of between 0 and 6, with one point 
added for each reform undertaken in the power 
sector from the following list: utility 
commercialisation/corporatisation, energy law 
passed, regulatory body commenced work, 
private sector investment in new power plants, 
restructure/separation of state-owned power 
utility, privatisation of electricity generation or 
distribution. 
GDP per capita, 1960 (log) CLIO Log of GDP per capita per year in 1990 
international Geary-Khamis dollars, data for 
1960 
Notes. Sources: UN: United Nations, WDI: World Development Indicators, WEF: World Economic 
Forum: Competitiveness Rankings, WGI: Worldwide Governance Indicators, WB: World Bank Doing 
Business – Getting Electricity, CRU: Climate Research Unit (UK). PIV: Polity IV project, ESM: 
ESMAP (1999), CLIO: Clio Infra – secretarial function for database performed by International 
Institute of Social History and using a subsidy from the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific 
Research.  
213 
 
35Table A5.1 Variables from the World Bank (2016a) World Development 
Indicators (WDI) 
Variable 
GDP (constant 2010 US $) 
GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2011 international $) 
Final consumption expenditure, etc. (% of GDP) 
Final consumption expenditure, etc. (constant 2010 US $) 
Gross capital formation (% of GDP) 
Gross capital formation (constant 2010 US $) 
Imports of goods and services (% of GDP) 
Imports of goods and services (constant 2010 US $) 
Exports of goods and services (% of GDP) 
Exports of goods and services (constant 2010 US $) 
External balance on goods and services (current US $) 
Land area, square kilometres 
Personal remittances received (current US $) 
Population in largest city 
Population 
Net official development assistance and official aid received (constant 2013 US$) 
Inflation, consumer prices (annual %) 
 
 
36Table A5.2 Variables from UN (2016a) 
Variable 
GDP (constant 2005 US$) 
Final consumption expenditure (constant 2005 US$) 
Gross capital formation (constant 2005 US$) 
Imports of goods and services (constant 2005 US$) 
Exports of goods and services (constant 2005 US$) 
Agriculture, hunting, forestry, fishing output (constant 2005 US$) 
Manufacturing output (constant 2005 US$) 
Wholesale, retail trade, restaurants and hotels output (constant 2005 US$) 
 
37Table A5.3 Variables from IEA (2017) 
Variable 
Dataset: World Energy balances: Total: Road: thousand tonnes of oil equivalent (ktoe) 
Dataset: World energy statistics: Electricity (GWh) Production 
Dataset: World Energy balances: Total: Total primary energy supply (ktoe) 
 
38Table A5.4 Variables from IMF (2016) 
Variable 
General government revenue, percent of GDP 
General government total expenditure, percent of GDP 
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39Table A5.5 Weights of countries in the donor pool for figures using WDI data 
Country  
Fig 5.1 
GDP 
Fig 5.4 
GDP pc 
Fig 5.8 
Cons. 
Fig A5.2 
Cons % 
Fig 5.9 
GCF 
Fig 5.10 
Gov. Rev. 
Fig 5.11 
Gov. Exp. 
Bangladesh 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Benin 0 0 0  0 0 0 0.184 
Burkina Faso 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Burundi 0 0.451 0.218 0.192 0.494 0.619 0.402 
Cambodia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.050 
Cameroon 0.199 0.277 0 0 0.285 0 0 
Kenya 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Kyrgyz Rep. 0 0 0 0 0 0.155 0 
Liberia 0.016 0.049 0 0.053 0.046 0 0 
Madagascar 0 0 0.099 0 0 0 0 
Mali 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Moldova 0.055 0 0.161 0 0 0 0.142 
Mozambique 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Nepal 0 0.019 0 0.755 0 0.137 0.059 
Nicaragua 0 0.037 0 0 0.175 0.087 0 
Rwanda 0 0 0 0 0 0.002 0.163 
Senegal 0 0.168 0 0 0 0 0 
Sierra Leone 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sudan 0 0 0.078 0 0 0 0 
Tanzania 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Togo 0.730 0 0.444 0 0 0 0 
Uganda 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Table A5.5 (continued) Weights of countries in the donor pool for figures using 
WDI data 
Country  
Fig 5.12 
Imp. 
Fig 5.13 
Exp. 
Fig 5.14 
Ex. bal. 
Fig 5.15 
ODA 
Fig 5.16 
Infl. 
Fig 5.17 
Remit 
Fig 5.20 
Pop. 
Bangladesh 0 0 0.149 0 0 0.072 0.057 
Benin 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Burkina Faso 0 0.453 0 0 0 0 0 
Burundi 0.272 0.202 0.480 0 0.187 0 0.444 
Cambodia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Cameroon 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Kenya 0 0 0 0.326 0 0.420 0 
Kyrgyz Rep. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Liberia 0.031 0.031 0 0.038 0 0 0 
Madagascar 0 0 0 0 0.309 0 0 
Mali 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Moldova 0 0 0.027 0 0.484 0.093 0.073 
Mozambique 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Nepal 0.334 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Nicaragua 0.043 0 0.345 0 0 0.415 0 
Rwanda 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Senegal 0.104 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sierra Leone 0 0 0 0 0.019 0 0 
Sudan 0.076 0 0 0.095 0 0 0 
Tanzania 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.426 
Togo 0.140 0.300 0 0.541 0 0 0 
Uganda 0 0.013 0 0 0 0 0 
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40Table A5.6 Weights of countries in the donor pool for figures using UN data 
Country  
Fig 5.2 
GDP 
Fig 5.5 
WRRH 
Fig 5.6 Ag. Fig 5.7 Man. 
Benin 0 0.142 0 0 
Burkina Faso 0 0.007 0 0 
Cameroon 0.146 0 0 0 
Chad 0 0 0 0 
Comoros 0.094 0.028 0 0.270 
Côte d'Ivoire 0 0 0 0 
Democratic Republic of the Congo 0 0 0 0 
Guinea 0.006 0 0 0 
Guinea-Bissau 0 0.348 0 0 
Kenya 0 0 0 0 
Kyrgyz Republic 0 0.283 0 0 
Lesotho 0 0 0.312 0 
Mauritania 0 0 0 0.143 
Nepal 0 0.180 0.005 0.561 
Niger 0 0 0 0 
Pakistan 0 0.013 0 0 
Senegal 0 0 0 0 
Somalia 0.229 0 0.683 0 
Tanzania 0 0 0 0.026 
Togo 0.524 0 0 0 
 
41Table A5.7 Weights of countries in the donor pool for figures using IEA and 
WDI data42 
Country  Fig A5.4 Energy Fig 5.18 Electricity Fig 5.19 Road 
Bangladesh 0 0 0 
Benin 0.525 0 0 
Cambodia 0 0 0 
Cameroon 0 0 0 
Côte d'Ivoire 0 0 0 
Ghana 0 0.023 0 
Kenya 0 0 0 
Kyrgyz Republic 0 0 0 
Moldova 0.166 0.028 0 
Mozambique 0 0 0 
Nepal 0.105 0 0 
Nicaragua 0 0 0.490 
Niger 0.116 0.949 0.240 
Senegal 0 0 0.268 
Sudan 0 0 0 
Tanzania 0 0 0.002 
Togo 0.088 0 0 
                                                          
42 The donor pool includes countries that meet the income threshold, and with a balanced panel for 
GDP per capita, consumption, investment, imports, exports, inflation, land area, population, and the 
three energy variables. 
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42Table A5.8 Weights of countries in the donor pool for Figure 5.21 using the 
longer series of WDI data 
Country  Fig 5.21 GDP pc 
Bangladesh 0.077 
Benin 0.284 
Burkina Faso 0 
Burundi 0 
Cambodia 0 
Cameroon 0 
Central African Republic 0 
Chad 0 
Côte d'Ivoire 0.088 
Democratic Republic of the Congo 0 
Ghana 0.020 
Guinea 0 
Kenya 0 
Madagascar 0 
Mali 0 
Malawi 0.156 
Moldova 0 
Mozambique 0 
Nicaragua 0 
Niger 0 
Rwanda 0 
Senegal 0 
Sierra Leone 0 
Sudan 0 
Tanzania 0 
Togo 0.219 
Uganda 0 
Uzbekistan 0 
Zimbabwe 0.156 
 
43Table A5.9 Weights of countries in the donor pool for Figure A5.5 using the 
smaller donor pool of five countries 
Country  Fig A5.5 GDP per capita 
Benin 0.240 
Comoros 0.128 
Lesotho 0 
Nepal 0.277 
Togo 0.355 
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36Figure A5.1 Ratio of MSPE in the post-earthquake period to MSPE in the pre-
earthquake period in logs for wholesale, retail, restaurants, hotels 
 
 
37Figure A5.2 Consumption share of GDP for Haiti and Synthetic Haiti 
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38Figure A5.3 Ratio of MSPE in the post-earthquake period to MSPE in the pre-
earthquake period in logs for Net ODA and official aid received 
 
39Figure A5.4 Total primary energy supply (thousand tonnes of oil equivalent) 
for Haiti and Synthetic Haiti 
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40Figure A5.5 GDP per capita (constant 2005 US dollars) for Haiti vs. Synthetic 
Haiti, donor pool of five countries 
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44Table A6.1 Variable descriptions 
Variable Source Description 
GDP per capita growth WDI, 
Calc. 
Differenced logs of GDP per capita 
divided by the length of time. 
Log GDP per capita WDI Log of GDP per capita is in purchasing 
power parity constant 2011 international 
dollars. 
Manufacturing sector value added 
per capita growth 
WDI, 
Calc. 
Differenced logs of manufacturing sector 
value added per capita divided by the 
length of time. 
Inflation, consumer prices WDI Inflation, consumer prices, annual (% / 
100). 
Political stability WGI An index relating to the lack of violence 
in addition to stability more generally. 
Control of corruption WGI An index representing the extent to which 
public power being used for private gain 
is avoided. 
Log life expectancy WDI Log of life expectancy at birth, total, in 
years. 
Education UNDP Education index from Human 
Development Index data, values range 
from 0 to 1. 
Government effectiveness WGI An index representing quality of public 
services and quality of policy formulation 
and implementation. The index values are 
normally distributed with mean zero and 
standard deviation of one. 
Trade openness WDI Exports plus imports, goods and services, 
percentage of GDP, divided by 100. 
Temperature CRU Temperature, degrees Celsius, divided by 
10. 
Log of electricity consumption per 
capita 
EIA, 
WDI 
Log of the quotient of total electricity 
consumption in billion kilowatt hours 
from EIA, and total population from 
WDI. 
Log of electricity capacity per 
capita 
EIA, 
WDI 
Log of the quotient of total electricity 
installed capacity in million kilowatts 
from EIA, and total population from 
WDI. 
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Log consumption of electricity by 
industry sector per capita 
IEA, 
WDI 
Log of the quotient of electricity 
consumption by industry sector, in 
kilograms of oil equivalent from IEA, and 
total population from WDI. 
Electricity transmission and 
distribution losses 
WDI Electric power transmission and 
distribution losses, percentage of 
electricity output divided by 100. They 
include losses in transmission between 
sources of supply and points of 
distribution, and in distribution to 
consumers, including pilferage. 
Access to electricity WDI Access to electricity (percentage of 
population divided by 100). 
Electricity quality index WEF Quality of electricity supply (lack of 
interruptions and lack of voltage 
fluctuations), 1=extremely unreliable, 
7=extremely reliable. 
Energy consumption (excluding 
electricity) per capita (log) 
WDI Energy (excluding electricity) use 
(kilograms of oil equivalent per capita), 
log. 
Notes. Sources: CRU: Climate Research Unit (UK), EIA: U.S. Energy Information Administration, 
IEA: International Energy Agency, UNDP: United Nations Development Programme, WDI: World 
Bank World Development Indicators, WGI: Worldwide Governance Indicators, WEF: World 
Economic Forum. 
 
